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Introduction 
Til swoll'n with cunning, of a self-conceit, 
His waxen wings did mount above his reach 
And melting, heavens conspired his overthrow! 
-Marlowe, Dr. Faustus (1588) 
There is nothing in heaven or on earth, no mystery in 
religion, no secret in nature which can defy the power 
and efforts of reason. 
-Leibniz, Philosophical Texts (1849) 
From time to time I visit the home where I grew up on 
Hyndford Street in Belfast. 
It's called healing through the past. I don't yearn for 
it, but you have to sort of go back to find out where 
you are. 
-Van Morrison, Interview (1997) 
We can find in ancient and Biblical literature certain values that are of the 
lineage shared by much of Western culture today. Because of their persistence, 
they comprise part of what Hilary Putnam calls the 'moral image' we· have of 
ourselves. Knowing that these values have endured enables us to claim more 
justification in employing them in discussions of moral dilemmas today. Mere 
persistence, however, does not ensure that a value should continue to be 
honored. Some long-honored values have persistently led to human suffering. 
Still, the continuity of values over time suggests that they may offer insight 
into norms of human nature that should be taken seriously. We get information 
from the culture's stories about when violations of these values lead either to 
human suffering or human thriving. If we are sufficiently attentive to the various 
currents of the West's canonic literature-new and old-it may be possible to · 
begin sorting out which values we should set aside and which we should keep as 
part of our 'moral image.' 
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This process of sorting out what is worth keeping and what we want to 
shed is part of what I think is the solution to the difficulty that recurs in projects 
like mine: When it is claimed that useful values can be found in a culture's stories, 
how can we determine which of the values and which of the stories may be 
helpfully employed in furthering human well-being rather than perpetuating 
human suffering? For every ancient story about slavery causing suffering or 
about the unjust exercise of power and authority resulting in the subjugation of 
women or others, there are many other stories that tend to support societal 
practices that perpetuate slavery or subjugation. 
I suggest in chapter 11.e that we may begin to allay this difficulty by how 
we read and employ ancient stories. Part of this process involves methods used 
by oral societies in their telling of stories; part involves the application of 
contemporary moral sensibility. In what I will suggest, I assume moral 
progress-which I am convinced can be defended, although I will not develop the 
defense here. I assume that over time we have expanded the breadth of our 
moral encompassment-that is, we include within our sphere of encompassment 
more than we did in the past. I argue that our stories chart that expansion, and 
can show us ways to further enlarge the encompassment. 
Implicit in my ·claim is a rejection of post-modern reductive views of ethics 
that call not for better thinking about ethics, but for wholesale abandonment of 
all binary moral oppositions. It is largely the case that the Western canon of 
literature, and of moral philosophy, is weighted in favor of those who have held 
power. And consciousness of this has been irreversibly imprinted on our 
understandings by Marxists, feminists, and race-theorists. But we will not be 
shedding binary oppositions like .. good' and "bad' anytime soon. Instead, my 
2 
claims rely on a belief in our ability over time to change those parts of the 
conventional moral code that are repressive or coercive or otherwise denying of 
human well-being. I argue that while moral codes have served to support beliefs 
that the hegemonic group is good and the other is bad, this is not all that moral 
codes do; they also, at their best, provide guidance that is life-enhancing and that 
encourages equitable relationships. My justification for this claim is not without 
some circularity, but as Richard Rorty argues, there probably are no 
justifications entirely free of that defect. 
The recurrence of certain themes in stories indicates that these themes are 
not trivial. The theme on which I concentrate is that there are boundaries limiting 
appropriate human action, human striving, and human domain. These claimed 
boundaries incorporate values that over time have developed a firm hold on us. 
Stories tend to suggest that violation of these boundaries-and thus, 
values-usually leads to human difficulty rather than human thriving. We ignore 
the stories at our peril because they have the potential to give us helpful 
information about our experience as human beings in the world. While 
anomolous stories might suggest contradictory evidence, it is the weight of 
common understandings as depicted in stories, over time, that provides insight. 
The stories that persist, that are reshaped by new generations and told again, are 
those tales to which we are drawn by a desire to understand ourselves and the 
best way to be with others. 
But, again, one of the difficulties is to differentiate what is helpful about a 
moral tradition from what is merely traditional. Another is that mere persistence 
does not imply that we ought honor the tradition. Clamors for honoring tradition 
may be simply a reactionary resistance to change. In an effort to begin resolving 
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these and other difficulties, I suggest in chapter 11.e that we employ a method 
that, assuming moral progress, encourages us to look at ancient literature in two 
useful ways. The first element of this method is to see how these values began 
forming and to learn something about their evolution. The second is to think 
about what ancient stories can teach us, but to do this in light of all we have 
learned since their conception. Thus, rather than examine Antigone solely in the 
way a fifth century Greek would have understood the story-which we 
cannot-we should look for the communal understandings it depicts, and 
consider them from a modern viewpoint that incorporates a value system that 
has evolved for twenty four-hundred years. 
By doing this, we can use understandings gained from examining ancient 
literature to find commonalities that not only endure, but that also seem to 
encourage human well-being. Where these commonalities persist, we can claim 
some justification for using them when we seek resolution of modern dilemmas. 
If, as I have already suggested, we consider these values through the prism of 
more than two thousand years of experience, we can bring to them not just what 
Sophocles, Aeschylus, and Milton understood, but also what we have been 
taught by Kant, Mill, Gandhi, de Beauvoir, King, Rawls, and others. 
In addition, using stories to gain moral information provides a kind of 
understanding not available by way of usual philosophical discourse. Something 
about our response to stories allows us to see in a way that reading a Kantian 
text, for example, does not. The form of stories, with their rich descriptions and 
their insights into human experience, gives us access to more than merely 
another of the currents of a moral claim; it provides a wholly different kind of 
moral message. The parable of the good Samaritan explicates the principle .uLove 
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your neighbor" in a way that cannot be captured in the form of an ethical 
principle, however detailed and nuanced. Tragic drama in particular, because it 
is focused on human life as we experience it in the world, is less abstract and thus 
is concerned with real losses and reversals, and with the emotional responses to 
these as they play out in the complexities of our familial, communal, and erotic 
attachments. 
Further, among the claims of those opposed to the development and use 
of some new medical technologies is that tools such as cloning and genetic 
therapies are arrogant infringements on god's work, or in some way violate 
appropriate limits. This dissertation argues that boundaries referred to as .... god's 
work" or .... appropriate limits" on human action are an essential element of 
ancient and Biblical literature, and that this theme continues into the modern 
period. As such, ancient and Biblical literature contains the development of the 
. boundary claims employed in current debates. Because Western culture 
developed from the Greek and Judaic cultures, it is helpful to see where some of 
these persistent beliefs originated. 
This dissertation does not attempt to justify or employ the values 
described to speak in any significant way to either side of the debate about 
emerging technologies. Instead, it should be seen as a contribution to the 
background of the debate. When stories point to values related to appropriate 
limits and warnings about entering divine realms they are acting as cautionary 
guides. Neither does this dissertation seek to show how specific stories can be 
related to the discussion of modern dilemmas. I will argue instead that our 
stories-mythological, Biblical, and secular-can be employed to develop more 
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understanding about what we value in human life, and thus about the good of 
human life. 
Leon Kass demonstrated his understanding of the power of cautionary 
elements in stories when he chose to use Nathaniel Hawthorne's short story ''The 
Birthmark" to begin the recent meetings of the President's Council on Bioethics, 
which Kass chairs.1 Kass used the story because he understands, like 
Kierkegaard, that there are limits to what philosophical discourse can describe. 
Kierkegaard argued that there are subjective matters that are important, but 
which cannot be stated directly, only indicated.2 
Later in the meetings, Council member Gilbert Meilaender also cited 
stories as a source of understanding in deliberations about whether there should 
be limits to human reach. He used Ernest Hemingway's The Old Man and the Sea, 
for example, to illustrate a point warning against thinking about "'human beings 
as no more than collections of parts." A Galway Kinnell poem, After Making Love 
We Hear Footsteps, portrayed Meilaender's discussion of the bond between 
generations and the danger that new technologies could lead to an image of the 
child "'as the parents' project or product." Ending his talk to the council, 
Meilaender referred to Dante's Inferno, where Ulysses is described as one of the 
''false counselors" who used their intellectual gifts in ways that ultimately led 
others astray. Meilaender cited John Sinclair's description of the Ulysses passage 
in saying the story is a compelling account of the "eternal and insatiable human 
1. See http://www.bioethics.gov/meetings/200201/intro.html. The story is about a scientist 
who loves his wife but kills her in the attempt to remove her single imperfection, a 
birthmark on her left cheek. He became so obsessive he tried to bring to bear all his 
learning and resources to remove the flaw, whatever the cost. 
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hunger and quest after knowledge of the world." Yet while there are dangers in 
the quest, he said, we cannot but admire those who make the journey. Thus, "our 
finitude and freedom are not easily reconciled" and so it is in this conflict of 
competing goods that bioethics seeks to .udiscern right order."3 
To sum up, the argument I employ is that there are commonly held beliefs 
about divinely or otherwise established boundaries. These beliefs are used in the 
current discussion about developing medical technologies. The values implied by 
those beliefs are evident in ancient and Biblical literature. Knowing where those 
values originated and that they persist is helpful in developing understanding of 
why the same values are employed today, and whether they have weight. 
Further, this is a first step in critically evaluating these claims. I do not hope to 
provide complete criteria for sorting out valid from spurious claims, but what I 
am trying to do is linked to that task. I suggest a method by which we may begin 
to be able to determine which stories and which values may contribute to human 
well-being and which do not. I argue further that stories can provide 
understanding about human life that is not available in traditional philosophical 
discourse. The evidence used to support the dissertation's overall arguments is 
the stories themselves, as well as the justification in chapter II. All of this is within 
the framework of recognizing that Fredric Jameson warned about when he said 
that ethics can be an ideological vehicle serving primarily to legitimize structures 
2. Kierkegaard 1992. 
3. See http://www.bioethics.gov/meetings/200201/intro.html. 
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of power and domination, such that moral codes become mere masks of the 
will-to-power of the dominant class, race, or gender.4 
4. Jameson 1981, 114. 
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Chapter I: Outline of Issues 
Summary 
This chapter is an outline of many of the issues and beliefs that will be 
considered in more depth in subsequent chapters. The discussion includes the 
variety of boundaries perceived by Western culture as human beings have tried 
to fathom the farthest reaches of what circumscribes their lives. Finding these 
boundaries, such as that of appropriate justice and proper use of knowledge-is 
made more complex because the limits shift over time. The later sections of this 
chapter discuss the way stories may help us understand the development and 
nature of boundaries, as well as point to enduring values that may with some 
justification be employed in discussion of modern dilemmas. 5 
a. The human/divine boundaiy 
Among the elements of what Hilary Putnam calls Nmoral image"6 is the 
conception of ourselves as part of a larger and mysterious whole, a whole within 
which we have certain·obligations of behavior. It is said that we exist in one 
realm, but that there is another realm, some other part of the larger whole that is 
the realm of divinity. Many religious traditions say it is from this second realm 
that creation itself emanated. In the Jewish tradition, for example, an eruption of 
creative force from God's realm brings the universe into existence. God must 
remain concealed from humanity if the universe is to continue in existence, for if 
5. The justification is in chapter II, below. 
6. Putnam 1987, 41:ff. Also see Putnam 1990. Putnam says (1987, 89, note 8) he adopted the 
term 11moral image" from Dieter Henrich' s lectures at Harvard on Kant's Transcendental 
Deduction. During a 1990 series of lectures at Stanford, Henrich further considered the 
idea of a moral image (published as Henrich 1992). 
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God and His realm were to become apparent, His "complete fullness" would 
leave "no room for the existence of anything else. "7 These traditions also argue 
that it is from this realm that moral authority is grounded 
The idea that god's realm is forbidden to us and that existence itself is at 
stake makes the search for more knowledge about it even more fearsome, and 
more tantalizing. Adam and Eve are the archetypes for this temptation and our 
curiosity has not waned since their banishment from the garden. We think that if 
we could get a better glimpse of divinity's forbidden landscape, if we could get 
more bits of knowledge from Prometheus, we could develop understanding of 
the whole; we might gain knowledge not just of fire but of all the secrets of the 
universe, perhaps even of immortality itself. But that understanding is sheltered 
from our grasp, and we suspect, or perhaps fear in some primordial part of us, 
that there indeed are places we should not go. The resulting tension, between 
fearful uncertainty and unrestrained arrogance, holds humanity in a fretful state 
of perpetual distress, forever teetering on the edge of shedding caution and 
testing the patience of whatever gods control the universe. 
In the ancient world, long before and long after the first appearances in 
Greek thought of science and natural philosophy, 8 a large measure of disease 
7. Steinsaltz 1980, 21. 
8. For example, in On the Sacred Disease, the author makes the claim, which would be 
attributed to the Hippocratics generally, that all diseases have natural causes, 1-6.352.1:ff, 
2-6.364.9:ff, 18-6.394.9:ff., in Jones 1923. A discussion of this appears in Lloyd 1987, 
Revolutions, 13:ff., and in Lloyd., ed. 1978. Hippocratic Writings. The development of 
natural philosophy, especially among the presocratics, may have begun a process of 
demystifying traditional assumptions, but for much of it, as Lloyd argues in Revolutions 
at 49, the new wisdom was often "'no more than the myth of the elite that produced it." 
Lloyd discusses this in relationship to the provenance of Hippocratic texts in "'The 
Hippocratic Question," 1975, in Classical Quarterly 25.2: 171-92. 
10 
was believed to be within the jurisdiction of religion and ritual, and the causes 
for many diseases were said to be located in the divine realm. 9 Access to 
understanding was accomplished by divination, charms, dreams, 10 and the 
narratives of mythology.11 But healers did not find in these sources the kind of 
direct answers to questions that increasingly would be sought as scientific 
medicine developed; 12 these answers were of the kind having to do with prayer, 
sacrifice, magic, and divining the intention and desires of the gods.13 What was 
9. Lloyd 1987, 4: 11 • • •  death, disease, madness, dreams, divination, and fate .. . .  were the 
province of myth, religion, and ritual . . .  " Clearly, however, not all disease was thought to 
be of divine origin. For example, whereas the plague was sent by Apollo in the mad 
1.43ff, other ailments, colds perhaps and certainly wounds incurred during battle, were 
of other origin, although whether the wound would kill or not may have been ascribed at 
least in part to gods. On this, see Lloyd, Revolutions, 12, n. 33. The connection between 
disease and divinity is in, for example, Hesiod, Works and Days, 106ff, and at 242: 11 • • •  the 
son of Cronus brings a great disaster from heaven: hunger and plague together." 
10. Herophilus includes II god-sent' dreams in his classification of three types (also Aetius 
5.2.3), in Von Staden 1989. Galen discusses diagnosis from dreams in a commentary on 
Epidemics, book 1-5.10.1.108.1ff. An entire Hippocratic treatise, On Regime, sometimes 
called On Dreams, discusses dreams. Aristotle endorses as *reasonable" the use of 
consulting dreams as a source of diagnostic information in On Divination in Sleep 
463a4ff. 
11. Although, as always, there are exceptions, and it is difficult to educe whether the 
exception is the rule, or not, because our sources are limited. Democritus in fr. 234 says 
*Men ask for health, in their prayers, from the gods, but they do not know that they have 
in themselves the power to attain this: doing the opposite out of lack of control they 
themselves become the betrayers of their health to their desires." Cf. Also frr. 119 and 
175 (Lloyd 1987, 18, n.56). Also in the Odyssey at 1.48ff., Zeus insists that while men 
blame gods for their troubles, evils in general come not from heaven but from mortals' 
own wickedness. 
12. Lloyd 1979. Especially chapter one. Mention of the shift away from the supernatural 
causation of disease and expectation that the supernatural will help with disease is also 
found in Thucydides 2.4 7 and 2.53. The Hippocratic claim that even madness has natural 
causes is echoed in nonmedical literature in, e.g., Xenophon Memorabilia 3.12.6, and in 
Herodotus, who at 3.33 suggests that Cambyses became insane either because he 
offended Apis or suffered from the sacred disease (epilepsy), which is claimed in 
Herodotus and the Hippocratic corpus as primarily a bodily condition. Similar 
suggestions in Herodotus put Cleomenes' mental affliction in the realm of natural cause, 
6.75ff. and 84. Also Lloyd 1979, 29ff., and 1987, 23ff. 
13. Whether and to what extent this and other claims about the Greeks represent 
common attitudes rather than merely the imaginative work of poetic creation is, as Lloyd 
says in Revolutions, 1rlghly problematic" (7, n.15). But, while much of our understanding 
is limited to what is gathered from a few poetic sources, the themes appear often enough, 
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learned from the answers provided comfort and perhaps healing because 
socially sustained patterns of behavior supported the methods. 14 The diviners 15 
were a kind of Promethean intermediary, intending by their methods to gather 
advice and secrets from the gods and return with them to the human realm. 
The dialogue about human/divine boundaries begins in ancient 
mythological/religious stories and continues in secular literature. Certain stories 
and works of art tell us more about this than others. For example, the art, 
literature, and theology of Judaism and Christianity transformed the Greek veil 
between divinity and humanity into a thick curtain; God's realm along with its 
workings and purposes became strictly off limits. Giovanni de Palo's fifteenth 
century painting 1he Creation of the World and the Expulsion from Paradise" 
shows God as a clearly transcendent divinity, residing above, in a separate realm, 
with a boundary between it and the world of humanity. God may be able to 
observe the world, perhaps manipulate its physics, and interfere with human 
action, but we are barred from knowing the divine realm. What humans should 
know is restricted to the domain they properly inhabit. In Western sacred 
literature, Adam and Eve-like Prometheus before them-were punished for 
transgressing the borders of that domain, and while they may have entered one 
thin layer of divine geography by eating from the tree of knowledge, the rest of 
God's realm is forbidden. As we shall see, the Greek conception of this boundary 
and are sufficiently echoed in later periods, that it seems likely they are relevant to 
understanding the background for the issues I discuss. 
14. Lloyd 1987 discusses this at length in reference to death and disease, 5ff. 
15 Vernant and Vidal-Naquet, 1972/1981, 9ff. An exception, especially in the presocratic 
period, was Xenophanes, who is reported to have rejected all forms of divination (Cicero 
On Divination 1.3.5, Aetius 5.1 .2, in Lloyd 1987, 38, n. 121). By the time On Regimen in 
12 
is far more fluid; a few heroic individuals, for example, seem to achieve divine 
status, perhaps even a kind of immortality, 16 but there is throughout Greek 
· literature the clear warning that human reach often extends too far and thus risks 
disaster. 
The boundary. and the issues involved are portrayed in many ways, but 
constant in them is the perceived danger that our curiosity, desires, stupidities, 
passions, and arrogance may one day lead us over the proverbial edge. Thus, 
when I refer to the divine realm, or to God's realm, it is important to understand 
that this may or may not be viewed literally, and often when I use the image, it is 
a metaphor for whatever lies outside humanity's appropriate reach. In this sense, 
the boundary may take the form of a demarcation between action that is justly 
appropriate for human beings and action that is not. The issue of boundaries 
thus comprises Creon's decision to refuse burial to Polyneices, Achilleus' s 
mutilation of Hector's body, Prometheus's giving fire to humanity, eating fruit 
from the forbidden tree, as well as others. 
b. Treading on forbidden ground 
In this section, as well as in chapters III, N, and V, I chart the development 
of the idea in the West that there is a veil that should not be breached between 
humanity's realm and God's realm, or, analogously, between appropriate human 
Acute Disease was written by the Hippocratic author, warnings were offered about the 
danger of medicine being confused with divination (Jones 3, 4.100.3f.}. 
16. For example, the Odyssey 4.561ft' (Menelaus}, 11.300ff (Castor and Polydeuces}, 
11.601ft' (Heracles}, and perhaps Oedipus in OC, 1553ft'. 
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actions and action proscribed for human beings.17 I do this mostly in secular, 
mythological, and sacred stories, but also in the literature of philosophy. It is a 
line that, when crossed, leads us unwisely to "playing God"18 or acting in such a 
way that we tread on forbidden ground, acting outside the scope of what is 
properly human and is thus "unnatural" to human life. C. S. Lewis used this idea 
in expressing his concern about the "unnaturalness" of controlling human 
reproduction.19 In philosophy, the relevance of deciding what is "natural" has 
largely been set aside. "Natural compared to what?" is the objection that dulls the 
force of the claim. But while most philosophical argumentation belittles 
"naturalness" as a criterion, often equating it merely with whatever has not been 
done in the past, there persists a cultural perception that is intuitively powerful. 
The National Bioethics Advisory Commission 1997 report on cloning, for 
example, speaks to the issue as it relates to theological concerns: 
Although Genesis notes that creation is "good" and humanity "very good," 
humans have displayed, according to some traditions, an irremediable 
propensity to use their divinely authorized dominion for unauthorized 
domination, to violate their covenant of partnership with God, and to 
create after their own image rather than the divine image. The person 
created in the image of God is thus also marked by a tendency to 
transgress limits . . .  The narratives in Genesis . . .  appear in religious 
discussions of . . .  tendencies to transgress appropriate limits.20 
17. Nicholas Rescher refers to this in relationship to there perhaps being som·e 
information that we are not equipped to deal well with. See below, chapter IV.c, 249. 
18. A discussion of this is in John Harris 1975 . .UThe Survival Lottery," in Philosophy 50: 
84. Also James Walter 1999, "Theological issues in Genetics," in Theological Studies vol. 
60.1: 124. 
19. Lewis 194 7 /1948, 69. 
20. Cloning Human Beings. Report and recommendations of the National Bioethics 
Advisory Commission, 1997, chapter 3, 47. 
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Seeing the development of this perception may give us clues about why 
we feel squeamish in breaching the veil and thus may provide guidance for when 
it is appropriate to do so. This dissertation does not speak to how this issue is 
addressed in other cultures. However interesting it would be to see where 
parallels and divergences occur, that is another project. 
I suggest in chapter IV that this boundary, as well as other limits, can be 
viewed in relationship to several issues, including cloning humans21 and genetic 
manipulation. I do not suggest that embedded in our stories is a moral map that 
delimits precisely how to use new technologies and when we reach too high. 
Still, it can be helpful to the discussion to see that certain relevant values and 
disvalues occur over and over in our stories. For example, if we can get at what 
we value about ourselves as humans, it could help us understand at what point in 
altering ourselves we begin to endanger those values. 
An important question related to the use of new information and 
technologies is whether taboos represent anything more than prejudice that 
should be outgrown. Why do we think it is bad to play god? Is playing god 
merely our fearful way of describing anything new in science? John Harris 
argues that "in the absence of an argument or ability to point to some specific 
harm that is involved in crossing species boundaries, we should regard the 
objections per se to such practices . . .  as mere and gratuitous prejudice."22 
Anthropologist Mary Douglas says, however, that humans have a natural 
21. While cloning is sometimes an ambiguous term, I mean by it somatic cell nuclear 
transfer, not embryo twinning or molecular cloning. While the cloning of organs and 
tissue might be subject to some of the same cultural beliefs as those applied to cloning 
human beings, I generally refer only to human cloning. 
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aversion to crossing categories, and that when we do transgress we see it as 
deeply wrong. 23 When we talk about xenotransplantation, for example, we cross 
categories and thus may perceive violation of a boundary. A crossing of 
categories, and certainly of boundaries, occurs when we move from accepted 
scientific methods that are comfortably in our realm to new methods that seem to 
be transgressing territory previously thought to reside in god's realm. It has been 
said that we could be crossing forbidden boundaries if we shift from begetting or 
.... creating" babies to designing and manufacturing babies.24 A boundary is 
. certainly at stake when we affect the evolutionary process by altering the human 
genome in ways that we pass along those changes from generation to generation 
rather than make changes that affect one person only. 
When Christiaan Barnard performed the first heart transplant in 1967, 
some feared the procedure crossed the line into god's realm, that something 
important about human identity and sanctity was violated by the transfer of body 
. parts-a forbidden crossing of boundaries, perhaps of categories . Christians 
who believe in whole-body resurrection fear that the integrity of the body is a 
necessary prerequisite for their participation in god's kingdom, partly because of 
22. Harris 1992, 84. 
23. Douglas 1978, 7ff. 
24. Leon Kass, for example, argues against cloning because it would "represent a giant 
step toward turning begetting into making, procreation into manufacture" in Pence 1998, 
29. Gilbert Meilander makes a similar argument in saying it is intrinsically wrong to 
reduce sexual reproduction to "replication" and that cloned children might not be 
regarded as gifts, in Pence 1998, 41-42. He makes the additional claim that the 
naturalness of human reproduction will lose deep ..,moral significance." Paul Ramsey and 
Joseph Fletcher discussed this issue in a series of exchanges about the possibility that we 
could be altering the paradigm of childbearing to one of manufacturing children. 
Fletcher asserted that gaining more control over childbearing affords more advantages 
than disadvantages. Ramsey disagreed. Fletcher in Hastings Center Report 2/5 
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the Biblical assertion that the dead shall be raised incorruptible. 25 The belief may 
have roots in ancient Egyptian beliefs about the dead needing a mostly intact 
body to travel after death. 26 Some groups of orthodox Jews argue that as God 
forbids tattooing and body piercing, so too does organ transplantation violate 
divine proscription. 27 Epictetus in the second century c.e. said he admires the 
man who accepts death rather than dramatically alter his body to forestall death. 
In Discourses, he tells the story of an athlete who must decide whether to have 
his genitals removed or risk death. 11He would not submit," Epictetus said, 11but 
hardened his heart and died. And as someone asked, 1How did he do this? As an 
athlete, or as a philosopher?'" Epictetus replies: 11 As a man."28 
(November 1972), 1-4 and Hastings Center Report 4/5 (December 1974), 4-7. Also see 
below, note 26. 
25. I Corinthians 15:52ff. Translations vary, some of which suggest that the dead shall be 
raised imperishable, meaning they become of spiritual substance. But the point is that 
whether it is incorruptible or imperishable, some claim this means the body must be kept 
whole or mostly whole to qualify for resurrection. 
26. Despelder and Strickland1996, 551ff. Also see John Hick 1976/1985, Death and Eternal 
Life; David Edwards, 1999, After Death?, London: Cassell, 108. 
27. This is not the usual position of most Jewish traditions, including conservative, 
reform, and reconstructionist Judaism. Prohibition on organ transplantation is limited 
mostly to some elements of the orthodox tradition. Eliot Dorff, a Conservative rabbi and 
medical ethicist, in his Matters of Life and Death, a Jewish Approach to Modern Medical 
Ethics. 1998. Philadelphia and Jerusalem: The Jewish Publication Society, says: 11 • • •  
saving a person's life and acting faithfully and kindly to others are values so sacred in 
Judaism that if a person's organ can be used to preserve someone else's life, it is actually 
an honor to the deceased person to use the organ in that way.IP Dorff notes, however, that 
11Despite this predominant opinion, some rabbis have limited organ transplantation to 
varying degrees, ,r 225-26. Also Baruch Brody, �e use of Halakhic material in 
discussions of medical ethics,w in Journal of Medicine and Philosophy. 1983, 8: 317-328. 
Also Brody's 11Response to Franck's 1Jewish Religious Law' and White's 1Common Law,' 
in The Clinical Encounter, 1983, Earl Shelp, ed., Boston: Reidel. Also, Fred Rosner and J. 
David Bleich, 1999, Jewish Bioethics, Hoboken, NJ: KTAV Publishing. Benjamin 
Freedman, 1999, Duty and Healing, Foundations ofa Jewish Bioethic, New York: 
Routledge. Fred Rosner, ed., 1990, Medicine and Jewish Law, Northvale, NJ: Jason 
Aronson. Lipschutz, 1999, 11To clone or not to clone-a Jewish perspective,w in Journal of 
Medical Ethics 25: 105-107. 
28. Epictetus, Discourses 1.2.26. 
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While fears and uncertainties persist, time, cultural changes, and 
scientific developments have mostly allayed concern about issues related to 
organ transplantation-as they have for other new medical technologies. For 
example, a shift may already be occurring in perceptions of boundary issues 
related to human cloning. The first reactions of revulsion have diminished as 
popular and scholarly commentators begin to suggest that some- limited uses for 
cloning can be justified, or that many of our concerns about cloning ought be set 
aside. Kathinka Evers argues, for example, that concerns about clones not having 
"'unique identity" are ""untenable."29 Michael Tooley similarly seeks to disabuse us 
of concerns related to producing human organisms without the capacity to 
become persons, saying there are no ethically problematic aspects of creating a 
"mindless organ bank. "30 Gregory Pence agrees, claiming that there is ethical 
justification for cloning embryos that will not become persons. It is, he says, an 
""obvious philosophical point that embryos are not persons with rights to life. 
Lauren Slater offers the observation of plastic surgeon Fred Rosen: ""Who says 
it's bad to play God? We already alter the course of God's will in hundreds of 
ways. Using antibiotics to combat infection. Who says the natural course of 
things is even right? Maybe God isn't good." He says that because we have 
always altered ourselves, "for beauty or for power, and so long as we are not 
29. Evers 1999. "The identity of clones," in Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 
24.1: 67-76. A similar argument is made by Gould, who argues in a discussion of cloning 
that personal identity is a Mnonexistent problem," in Pence 106. If Evers and Gould are 
right here, it supports Jan Heller's argument that Mreligiously based objections to human 
cloning" are weakened unless they can demonstrate that cloning Mwill undermine the 
identity formation of cloned children or the relational and social qualities of family life," 
in Human Cloning, 1998, James Humber and Robert Almeder, eds. Totowa, NJ: Humana 
Press, 153-155. 
30. Tooley, in Humber and Almeder 1998, 65, 68. 
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causing harm, what makes us think we should stop?" 31 Joseph Fletcher agrees, at 
least in part, asserting that cloning is preferable to the genetic roulette of sexual 
reproduction. 32 
Leon Kass considers cloning repulsive33 but nevertheless believes our 
revulsion will diminish, partly because our pluralistic society lacks certain shared 
values. He says it is anow vastly more difficult to express a common and 
respectful understanding of sexuality, procreation, nascent life, family, and the 
meaning of motherhood, fatherhood and the links between the generations."34 
Legal theorist John Robertson argued that cloning is covered by the culture's 
general and legal understanding of rights related to reproduction. 35 He says �� . . .  
our ethical, legal, and social commitment to reproductive and family liberty 
should place the burden on opponents to show that family-centered uses of 
cloning are not truly procreative."36 And, while Philip Kitcher is generally 
opposed to cloning, he accepts that there will be some uses that are ethical. 37 
Leon Eisenberg has since early in the discussion of cloning argued strongly that 
cloning will contribute to human well-being. His voice is among those that have 
been shifting public perception. He rejects ucategorically the proposal that we 
turn back at the edge of greater understanding of the biology of life, an 
31. Slater 2001, 57ff. 
32. Fletcher 1988, 6ff. 
33. See Kass 2001 and Kass 1971. 
34. Kass 1998, 15. 
35. Robertson 1998, 89. 
36. Robertson 1998, 96. Also John Robertson 1994, Children of choice: freedom and the 
new reproductive technologies. Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press 
37. Kitcher 1998, 68. 
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understanding which can increase our dominion over ourselves. 38 My 
discussion of these and other boundaries is throughout circumscribed by the 
questions raised about whether boundaries, perhaps like all else within the 
domain of moral codes, are merely ideological constructs to further empower the 
hegemonic group. This will be considered in more detail in chapter 11.e. 
c. Shifting boundaries 
A part of the Western psyche firmly believes that some knowledge should 
remain inaccessible because it is in god's domain, and some of the concern is that 
just because it has been inaccessible does not imply that it will always be 
inaccessible. The problem has been that we are often unsure exactly what resides 
in that realm and what in this. Is cloning properly within our reach, or is it 
outside the bounds of justice, outside the limits of right action for human beings? 
Details of the boundary's deployment shift regularly. For example, ancient beliefs 
supposed the gods to control the details of natural events in this world, and yet, 
except for a few exceptional mortals, humanity was precluded from 
understanding or interfering in either the gods' domain or their conduct in this 
world. Thales in the early sixth century suggested the boundary should be 
moved, arguing that although the gods have certain perquisites in the world, 
they are not involved in the day-to-day mechanics of the place; they do not cause 
lightning to strike, for example, or the sun to be eclipsed. 39 He asserted that the 
38. Eisenberg, Leon. 1976. "'The Outcome as Cause: Predestination and Human Cloning," 
in The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 1.4: 318-331. 
39. See Kirk 1960. Also Aristotle, Metaphysics A.3, 983b20, where Thales is discussed as 
the founder of the school that believed water to be the first principle. There is some 
question about the validity for the tradition that he foretold the solar eclipse that 
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natural world is subject to its own laws and that describing and understanding 
those laws are not forbidden to us.40 He and other presocratic natural 
philosophers thus began pushing backward the line of demarcation, redrawing it 
so that more and more information was said to be in the realm of possible human 
understanding. Aristotle41 nudged us farther in the same direction, as did the 
medical scholar Galen and his colleagues.42 The effort was stalled a few centuries 
later by forces in Christendom fearful that some knowledge was better left alone, 
but Aquinas and others spoke loudly in support of the need to let the scientific 
mind investigate what God had accomplished, at least partly because, following 
Aristotle, "all human beings by nature desire to know."43 
occurred during the battle of the Halys on May 28, 585, but it nevertheless appears in 
Xenophanes, fr. 19, cf. Herodotus 1.74. 
40. Anglin and Lambek 1995. Also Lloyd 1970. 
41. Jaeger 1957, part 1. See Allan Gotthelf 1985, Aristotle on Nature and Living Things. 
Bristol: Bristol Classical Press. Also see Allan Gotthelf and James Lennox 1987, 
Philosophical Issues in Aristotle's Biology, Cambridge. Also G .E.R. Lloyd 1973, Greek 
Science After Aristotle, New York: Norton. Also Lloyd 1973, Early Greek Science: Thales to 
Aristotle, N.Y.: Norton. 
42. Galen 1985. Also see Edelstein 1967; Owsei Temkin and C. Lilian Temkin, eds., 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press; G .E.R. Lloyd 1987, The Revolutions of Wisdom: Studies 
in the Claims and Practice of Ancient Greek Science, Berkeley: University of California 
Press; P.H. De Lacy 1972, "'Galen's Platonism,"' American Journal of Philology 93: 27-39; 
Vivian Nutton 1984, "'Galen in the Eyes of His Contemporaries,"' in Bulletin of the History 
of Medicine, 58: 315-24; Owsei Temkin 1973, Galenism: The Rise and Decline of a Medical 
Philosophy, Ithaca, New York. For more on this see Arnold Thackray 1972, John Dalton: 
critical assessments of his life and science, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
43. Aquinas refers several times and in various contexts to this opening statement of 
Aristotle's Metaphysics (980a21) and emphasizes, using three arguments, why the desire 
to know is a part of the essence of humanity: (1) Each thing naturally desires its 
perfection, (2) that by which a human being is human is intellect, and (3) knowledge is the 
actualization of the natural human potentialities. Aquinas concludes on the basis of these 
arguments that all scientific, systematic knowledge is good. Aquinas discusses this in his 
Commentary on the Metaphysics (1.1-4). A complete discussion of Aquinas on scientific 
inquiry is in Jan Aertsen's "'Aquinas's philosophy in its historical setting,"' in Kretzmann 
and Stump 1993, 12-37, esp. 27-28. Also, compare to Maimonidean doctrine (1.51--60) 
"'That such matters are beyond our ken, since they have to do with the free activity of a 
divinity whose attributes we cannot know,"' by which Maimonides argues that we can 
only know what is revealed through nature as the result of divine action, and all else 
about divinity is outside our ken. A discussion of this is in David Burrell, "'Aquinas and 
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The fifteenth and sixteenth century Renaissance enticed us farther along 
the path, and then, beginning in the late seventeenth century Enlightenment we 
enthusiastically set sail straight into the maw of what had been forbidden 
landscapes. Understanding the natural world, it was said, including the natural 
parts of human beings, is within our purview, and if God does indeed have a 
realm of his own, our meddling in this world does not transgress the boundary. 
Descartes encouraged us in the effort44 and then in 1687 Isaac Newton 
legitimized those who had been questioning whether there is a curtain 
separating our realm from the realm of Aristotle's divine ether.45 Newton argued 
that the same laws apply here and there, and so the stars are made of the same 
substance as the earth. Thus, just as we can gain knowledge of this world, we can 
begin knowing about Aristotle's divine cosmos . Our reach can indeed go beyond 
the world, Newton suggested. By 1849, Leibniz was confident enough to declare: 
""There is nothing in heaven or on earth, no mystery in religion, no secret in 
nature which can defy the power and efforts of reason."46 
Islamic and Jewish thinkers," in Kretzmann and Stump 1993. The Cambridge Companion 
to Aquinas, 1993, Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump, eds. Cambridge, England: 
Cambridge University Press, 75. Also see ldit Dobbs-Weinstein, 1995, Maimonides and St. 
Thomas on the Limits of Reason, Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press. 
44. Descartes. Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason and Seeking for 
Truth in the Sciences. Elizabeth Haldane and G.R.T. Ross, tr., 1911, in The Philosophical 
Works of Descartres. In the sixth part of the Discourse, Descartes explains what is needed 
to advance scientific understanding. He concluded the Discourse by saying that, for 
himself, he will spend the rest of his life employed in nothing but the pursuit of ..,natural 
reason," and takes a swipe at ancient ways of pursuing truth by remarking that he hopes 
..,those who avail themselves only of their natural reason in its purity may be better judges 
of my opinions than those who believe only in the writings of the ancients." 
45. In Westfall 1971, 397. Also Ronald Giere "Toe Skeptical Perspective: Science Without 
the Laws of Nature" in McErlean 2000, 182. For Aristotle, On the Universe 392a5. 
46. Leibniz 1998, 4.93ff. 
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Still, we are not sure. A part of our struggle is that we are in that in­
between state where we wonder whether we want Leibniz to be right or not. 
Each time our scientists take us into new places, we wonder anew whether we 
are finally trodding on ground so fully within God's purview that his retribution 
will curse us into oblivion. Icarus learned this, as did those in the Tower of 
Babel.47 We are torn between honoring the proscription against forbidden 
knowledge and a contrary prescription that has equal hold on us-Thales' and 
Galen's assurance that the universe is a natural entity and that with enough 
inquiry, observation, and work all of it can and should be understood by the 
human mind. 48 But the Enlightenment is now 200 years in the past and we find 
ourselves hurtling toward deeply troubling places. 
The angel Raphael says in Paradise Lost that there are divinely proscribed 
kinds of knowledge, things forbidden to humanity. We should admire the 
handiwork, Milton says, enjoy its glory, even that which appears evil,49 and stay 
on this side of the curtain; there is an authority that must be respected and an 
order of things.50 As Satan sought to reject that order, the more he accomplished 
47. See below, Genesis, section m.j. 
48. On Galen, see Vivian Nutton, ed. 1981. Galen: Problems and Prospects. London; Vivian 
Nutton, 1983, "'The Seeds of Disease: An Explanation of Contagion and Infection from the 
Greeks to the Renaissance," Medical History 27: 1-34; Vivian Nutton 1984, "'Galen in the 
Eyes of His Contemporaries," Bulletin of the History of Medicine 58: 315-24; S.M. 
Oberhelman 1983, "'Galen, On Diagnosis from Dreams." Journal of the History of 
Medicine and Allied Sciences 38: 36-47. On Thales, see Anglin and Lambek 1995, The 
Heritage of Thales, New York: Springer; Lloyd 1970, Early Greek Science: Thales to 
Aristotle, New York: Norton. 
49. Peter Fiore 1981 discusses similarities between Milton's and Augustine's thought on 
evil as being a part of the goodness of God's creation, and that love and praise of God 
persists even in hell, esp. pages 21:ff. 
50. Paradise Lost 4.115-17. Raphael consents to tell Adam "'what thou canst attain, which 
best may serve to glorify the maker and infer thee also happier." The issue had been 
whether and to what extent Adam could seek knowledge. Also, Paradise Lost 5. 724-28, 
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his own damnation. 51 Aquinas tells us that there are two kinds of knowledge: 
scientific and divine.52 We can probe the depths of scientific knowledge because 
understanding the creation glorifies God, Aquinas said, but we are to leave 
divine knowledge to the divine. Hallachic commentators have long adopted a 
similar position for Judaism.53 Dorff, for example, argues that rabbis of each 
generation must be allowed to interpret morality as they understand God's will 
and that radical innovations in medicine make it more imperative that the rabbis 
have flexibility in providing guidance about bioethics .54 That which is to be left to 
the divine includes establishment of the fundamental principles such as that all 
human life is sacred and its preservation has priority over other laws. Within the 
framework of that divine principle, we decide how and when it should be 
applied. 55 This deciding how and why, however, must be within the framework of 
for a similar proscription directed toward angels who seek knowledge not properly in 
their domain: "'Such a foe is rising, who intends to erect his throne equal to ours . . . hath 
in his thought to try in battle, what our power is, or our right."' Milton, John. 1968. 
Paradise Lost. Alastair Fowler, ed. New York: Longman Inc. 
51. A complete discussion of the need to admire and understand God's handiwork while 
guarding against trying to be like God is in Peter Fiore, 1981, Milton and Augustine, 
University Park, PA: Toe Pennsylvania State University Press, 20ff. 
52. Kretzman and Stump 1993. Also see Robert Pasnau, 2002, Thomas Aquinas on human 
nature: a philosophical study of Summa theologiae ta, 75-89. Cambridge/New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
53. Halakhah is that aspect of Judaism concerned with Jewish law. It is distinct from 
Aggadah, which embraces the non-legal ideas contained, for example, in Mishnah, which 
is the oral teachings, or Talmud, which is the collection of rabbinic teachings. For 
example, statements in the Talmud about moral behavior belong to Aggadah, whereas a 
rule, say, that the victim of an assault has to be compensated in a particular way belongs 
to Halakhah. In this way, Halakhah is more precise. Halakhic rulings may be based on 
understandings derived from Aggadah. See Louis Jacobs 1995, The Jewish Religion: A 
Companion, Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press. 
54. Dorff 1998, 399ff. He goes on to explain that Deuteronomy 17: 8-13 provides that in 
each generation questions about the law (and hence about what God wants) should be 
addressed to the judge of that generation (403). 
55. Dorff 1998, 409. 
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intellectual humility, of not trying to know all, which is not humanity's place; it is 
God's.56 
It is the lack of intellectual humility that many find dramatically illustrated 
in Mary Shelley's 1818 story of Dr. Frankenstein's effort to create human life. Dr. 
Frankenstein begins his work with contempt for those scientists who accepted 
Aquinas's strictures on eternal life and thereby gave up the quest for immortality 
and power. He complained that they exchanged ,,,, chimeras of boundless 
grandeur for realities of little worth. "57 The doctor longed to find ,,,,the secrets of 
heaven and earth,"58 to ,,,,unfold to the world the deepest mysteries of creation,"59 
to know not just scientific knowledge of this world, but to reach into God's mind 
for the secrets of creation. Later, seeing what chimeras of grandeur look like in 
the light of day, he cautions, echoing ancient warnings from Aeschylus and 
Euripides:60 ,,,,Learn from me . . .  how dangerous is the acquirement of knowledge, 
and how much happier that man is who believes his native town to be the world, 
than he who aspires to become greater than his nature will allow ."61 
Hence the issue here is not whether the boundary shifts, which it does, but 
rather, what are the sources of our beliefs about the existence of the boundary, 
and where and how do they show up over time? And then, finally, should we 
56. Dorff 1998, 419, n.9. Also Dorff 1992, 129-48. 
57. Shelley, Mary, 1818, Frankenstein, 32. 
58. Shelley 1818, 23. 
59. Shelley 1818, 33 
60. Especially Aeschylus's Prometheus Bound (232-45) and Euripides' The Bacchae 
(1150-52, 1325-26). 
61. Shelley 1818, 38. 
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continue to honor them because of beliefs that tradition should be honored, for 
good or ill, solely because it persists? 
I have spoken in this section mostly about the boundaries of information 
and of understanding the universe. But the boundaries of appropriate human 
actions raise similar questions, and those boundaries have also shifted over time. 
As we shall see, Arthur Adkins and others find evidence in ancient stories of the 
progress of these changes in the moral landscape. At times, the crossing of 
boundaries in this way refers to seeking god-like power or freedom. Elsewhere it 
refers to violating divine proscriptions on action. In all of these 
instances-whether related to limits on understanding or limits on actions-the 
central thread, the commonality, is that human beings have long been trying to 
fathom the farthest reaches of what circumscribes their lives . The way this is 
instantiated in ancient literature show us the seeds that would develop into the 
way we view these and similar questions. 
d. M oral understanding in st o ri es 
Telling stories in all the various ways they are told has a venerable history 
as an effective tool for passing down moral understandings and delineation of 
boundaries from one generation to the next. Hesiod's Wo rks and Days is both an 
account of everyday life and an indication of values. It tells how evil62 and work63 
originated in the world and how to understand and escape misery.64 It talks about 
62. Works and Days, hereafter WD, 59-105 
63. WD 176-77. 
64. WD 274ff, 314ff. 
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various forms of justice,65 hard work,66 honesty,67 and social relations.68 Hesiod 
offers guidance on everyday conduct69 and suggests that we should learn from 
gods about leading a good life.70 His Th eog o ny tells about the gods who preside 
over justice and about what that means for humans. 71 The Homeric tales provide 
a glimpse into the thinking of an aristocratic warrior society that is on the verge 
of becoming an embryonic democracy with a very different economic system. 
Largely through Achilleus and Odysseus, Homer72 suggests that gods and fate, 
along with luck, together play a significant role in men's lives and that these may 
be outside the domain of what is properly within human control. 73 This account 
of the provenance of fortune has not left us; we are still subject to the uncertainty 
of not knowing the limitations of what is properly within our reach. 
The stories-whether from Hesiod, Aeschylus, Shakespeare, or Samuel 
Clemens-tell us who we are and who we aspire to be. They tell of what is 
important to us. They tell what we value about being human and point toward 
those qualities without which we would feel either less human or less of what we 
65. WD 9, 39, 213, 217, 219, 221, 230, 250, 254, 262, 264, 272, 712, and elsewhere. 
66. WD 22-24. 
67. WD 281. 
68. WD 328ff. 
69. WD 293ff. 
70. WD 1-9. 
71. Theogony 89ff., 121ff., and elsewhere, especially at 217ff the description of the birth of 
the fates (Klotho, Lachesis, and Atropos), who .. bestow upon mortals their portion of 
good and evil," which controls the transgressions of both men and divinities. It is these, 
too, who .. never remit their dreaded anger until whoever has done wrong gives them 
satisfaction" (221ff.). Also see the mad 24.527-33 on the urns that contain fated suffering 
and happiness. 
72. This is discussed in detail in section 3, the Odyssey. 
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want to be. They give us just enough knowledge to see glimpses of our 
weaknesses and enough ambiguity to sometimes mistake weakness for strength. 
Aristotle suggests that stories are needed to supplement philosophical 
ideas when he argues that abstract ideas of goodness are not enough, that what 
is needed are practical ideas of specific goods or evils that can be seen or felt or 
otherwise experienced in this life.74 From ancient Greek tragedy to medieval 
religious plays to Shakespeare and to Walker Percy and Isaac Bashevis Singer, 
stories speak about the immediate social and private concerns of an age and a 
culture; they provide Aristotle's "specific goods or evils" and, looked at 
historically, they show how the values of each period fit into the cultural 
continuum. This might be thought of as somewhat like the method employed in 
the Jewish tradition by Halakhic commentators who look at how things have 
been thought about in the past to determine how we ought proceed today. 
To say, as I just did, that 'stories speak about the immediate social and 
private concerns of an age and a culture' should raise the same cautionary 
concern expressed elsewhere in this dissertation: because stories are culture­
bound, the likelihood is that the moral code articulated in them may inescapably 
be centered on justifying existing power and ideology. It might be as Fredric 
Jameson explains in the following, that 'what is good is what belongs to me:' 
. . .  as Nietzsche taught us, the judgmental habit of ethical thinking, of 
ranging everything in the antagonistic categories of good and evil ( or their 
binary equivalents), is not merely an error but is objectively rooted in the 
inevitable and inescapable centeredness of every individual consciousness 
73. See below, section m.c, the Odyssey. 
7 4. Nichomachean Ethics 1140a24ff. Hereafter NE. 
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or individual subject: what is good is what belongs to me, what is bad is 
what belongs to the Other (or any dialectical variation on this 
nondialectical opposition: for example, Nietzsche showed that Christian 
charity-what is good is what is associated with the Other-is a simple 
structural variant of the first opposition. 75 
But I will argue in chapter 11.e that while a moral code and the canonic 
literature that expresses it can be used to suppress difference and heterogeneity, 
this does not have to be the only use to which stories are put. The idea that 
stories can be a valuable tool when employed in discussions about values is the 
thesis of much of Martha Nussbaum's work.76 She asks about the connection 
between on the one hand the philosophical methods and cosmologies of Plato 
and Aristotle and on the other the depiction in Greek tragedy and other stories of 
practical dilemmas in human life. She argues, following Aristotle, that both 
genres are necessary to the full understanding of human life.77 Similarly, Bernard 
Williams,78 Baruch Brody, 79 along with Edmund Pellegrino, David Thomasma, 80 
and others claim that secular and religious literature provide guideposts for the 
practical dilemmas of health care and genetic manipulation. 
75. Jameson 1981, 234. 
76. Nussbaum 1990, 1983, 1986, and 1994. 
77. She defends the position taken in her books from an attack by Richard Posner in 
MExactly and Responsibly: A Defense of Ethical Criticism," in Philosophy and Literature, 
1998, 22: 343-365. Also Richard Posner, # Against Ethical Criticism," in Philosophy and 
Literature, 1997, 21: 1-27, and II Against Ethical Criticism: Part Two," in Philosophy and 
Literature, 1998, 22: 394-412. Allen Dunn, 1990, argues that her position is not shared by 
many modem interpreters of literature. 
78. Williams 1973 and 1995. 
79. Brody 1990 and 1988. A reply to Brody's resUITection of Locke's view is in Charles 
Taliaferro 1992, 11God's Estate," in Journal of Religious Ethics, 20.1, 69-92. 
80. Pellegrino and Thomasma 1993. 
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In the Greek, Jewish, and Christian lineages, humans acquire some kinds 
of knowledge only over the objections of gods. The stories say they sometimes 
recklessly acquire the intellectual means by which they can seek understanding 
of the universe and the technological skills with which to master it. In the Greek 
tradition, Prometheus is the means by which humanity obtains knowledge that 
previously was limited to gods. In the Jewish and Christian traditions, the 
Genesis stories explain humanity's overstepping divine boundaries. The sacred 
literature provides the added dimension of combining creation stories and 
concepts of the divine as well as providing over time the impetus for stories of 
family and social development. They show the changing way we came to view 
ourselves as a part of a larger experience. Genesis, for example, and the story of 
Job, are attempts to understand archetypal patterns of value in that they raise 
questions about God's place and humanity's place as well as demarcate the limits 
of what they claim we should know. In each tradition, the gods act quickly to stop 
further incursions, especially into the secrets of immortality. The cautionary 
edicts of gods in the Greek, Christian, and Judaic narratives are the foundation 
for fears that further incursions may bring catastrophes. Seeking immortality 
may be a tempting goal, they say, but beware of what you wish for. 
This dissertation concentrates on ancient Greek stories because I believe it 
is there that we find the early formation in the West of this culture's perception 
of itself, both in the ways we think we are and the ways we would like to be. If we 
can begin to see how and perhaps why these ideas developed, we could kindle 
understanding into how we may want to proceed, perhaps what we would like to 
become and what we would not like to become. I also consider the Genesis story 
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of the Judaic and Christian traditions because it suggests convergences with and 
divergences from the Greek tradition as Western cultural attitudes developed. 
e. Stories portray moral image, reveal ""thicknesses" 
By looking at certain of our culture's stories it is possible to see where 
there are convergences of moral beliefs. This sort of convergence can be thought 
of in the way Bernard Williams says that some ideas become ''thicker" to the 
degree that other ideas converge with them. He argues that the thicker the idea, 
the more justified we are in claiming that it is a socially objective concept.81 
Thomasma says these thicknesses of experience, "remain time and culture bound, 
but as they pass from century to century they acquire a validity that approaches 
'objective' truth. In my view, this is the greatest and only form of 'objectivity' that 
ethics can approach . . . .  "82 
Nussbaum argues that our judgments are made in concrete situations and 
that stories encompass the particularities of those situations in a way that 
reasoning processes such as consequentialism and deontology do not.83 She 
follows Aristotle, who regards Oedipus and other poetry as speaking of what is 
universally true: "Hence poetry is something more philosophic and of graver 
import than history, since its statements are of the nature of universals, whereas 
those of history are singulars."84 
81. Williams 1985, 129, 140-145, 163, 192, 200. 
82. Thomasma 2000, 83. 
83. Nussbaum 1993, 71. Also Nussbaum 1990, 3ff. 
84. Poetics 9.1451b4-5. 
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J. L. Mackie argues that ""there are no objective values,"85 which may be 
true in the sense in which he makes the claim, but it does not mean that we have 
neither generally accepted moral beliefs nor beliefs founded in the objective 
experience of human existence. Williams' s thicknesses, for example, when 
viewed together over time, may be seen as developing into what Putnam calls the 
""moral image" of ourselves, a kind of conceptual map of our culture's valuational 
scheme. Putnam describes moral image as ""not a declaration that this or that is a 
virtue or a right . . .  (but) rather a picture of how our virtues and ideals hang 
together with one another, and what they have to do with the position we are 
• ,,86 m. 
In this sense, the views of Mackie and Putnam coincide: morality is 
invented over time. But as it is invented over time and out of experience, it has 
the force of objectivity in that moral ideas become a part of our feeling and 
thinking selves. While perhaps lacking universality among all of humanity and 
without either eternal existence for any one group or absolute demonstrability, 
they nevertheless are almost unshakeable within a culture. Their grip on us is 
most apparent in the stories we tell about ourselves. The convergence of ideas 
found in the stories points to thicknesses and the thicknesses taken together 
point in turn to the moral image of ourselves. This does not deny entirely the 
validity of MacIntyre' s observation that in our pluralistic culture we lack shared 
moral assumptions and that as a result value claims become merely ""pure 
85. Mackie 1977. 
86. Putnam 1987, 37ff, 51. Also see Putnam 1990, 211ff. 
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assertion and counter-assertion."87 Instead, I claim only that in those places 
where the thicknesses get thickest, we can find some small indication that there 
are certain beliefs most of us share about what we value in our conceptions of 
ourselves, at least for a period of time, and in this one culture. At our best, these 
valuations develop so as to expand rather than shrink moral encompassment. 
f. Justice (dike) and related boundaries 
Because one of the tasks of our stories is to ferret out where we should go 
and where we should not, stories show the ways in which ideals 'hang together' 
and what happens when those ideals are violated. One way of violating an ideal 
is to overreach human limitations by pursuing what only the gods should 
pursue-or what should not be pursued at all. But this is not a discretely 
contained topic in the lineage of the West's stories and ideas. Discussion of this 
boundary must necessarily bleed into related boundary problems. It would be 
unsatisfying, for example, to speak about the human/divine boundary without 
also speaking about the line at which human laws are said to transgress on areas 
properly delimited by the divine. Sophocles' Antigone speaks to one aspect of 
this in asking whether Creon oversteps the boundaries of human law when he 
issues orders that Antigone believes violate divine laws.88 
The veil between mortality and immortality is also related to this project, 
and speaks to issues of limits on extending life. This boundary may also be 
related metaphorically to questions about whether our curiosity leads us into 
areas properly attended by divinity. The crossing of categories is applicable as 
87. MacIntyre 1981, 8. 
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well, in that there may be constraints on the crossing of humans and other 
beings in issues such as xenotransplantation. These elements-the various ways 
boundaries are discussed-are coextensive with issues of human/divine realms; 
they contribute to arriving at a picture of the lineage of how we think about 
limits. 
For the ancient world especially, discussion of crossing boundaries is 
contained within the larger issue of justice, dike, and so in chapter III I consider 
carefully how ancient stories depict justice as being done or not done in 
relationship to whether we overreach proper limits. Scholars disagree about how 
Greeks defined justice, especially on when it came to include a moral component. 
By the early fourth century89 Plato's Republic clearly delineates justice as a moral 
concept, but for Homer, Hesiod, and others in the Archaic period (roughly from 
the eighth through sixth centuries ), it was largely a legal and political concept, 
although with at least suggestions of moral implication.00 Justice operates in 
these sources on the human, divine, and cosmic levels as a claim about Hwhat is 
right," which Shirley Darcus Sullivan argues can be thought of as ""what is just" 
88. Antigone 21:ff., 450:ff. 
89. Because I refer mostly to the ancient period, hereafter assume BCE for all dates unless 
otherwise noted. 
90. Arguing for a strictly legal conception of dike during the archaic period are Michael 
Gagarin ("Dike in Archaic Greek Thought," Classical Philology, 1974, v.69, 186-97, "Dike 
in the Works and Days" Classical Philology, 1973, v. 68, 81-94); Eric Havelock 1978; 
Havelock and V.A. Rodgers 1971. Those finding a moral component to dike in Homer, 
Hesiod, and others include Arthur Adkins 1960, Werner Jaeger 1945, and Hugh Lloyd­
Jones 1983. More recently, Tandy and Neale 1996 argues that it is in Homer, but not in 
Hesiod that dike has moral force and refers to proper or just behavior. But they say 
Hesiod uses derivatives of Dike, such as dikaios and adikos to refer to a moral force that 
can be translated as "just' and "unjust." 
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or what is a N due share" or "due portion" for both gods and humans. 91 In the 
presocratic philosophers, justice is often the divine or ruling principle of the 
universe, which acts as a pattern for human justice. Ideas about justice show up 
in words other than dike, and so the concept will arise again and again in 
discussions of Homer, Hesiod, Aeschylus, and others. "Justice," dike, in all its 
connotations and formulations is the concept that explains and demarcates 
Nboundary." The opposite of dike is hybris, which figures prominently in Homer, 
Hesiod, and Aeschylus as arrogance or pride that leads to a reckless disregard 
for the claims of others, a disregard for dike.92 
The boundary between human and di�ne may also be thought of as the 
boundary between natural and supernatural. Isaac Newton believed that the laws 
of nature hold for the entire universe, including God's realm; everything 
constituted the natural for him, including his studies of mysticism and alchemy. 
In an unpublished draft of Query 31 of the Optics, written around 1705, Newton 
says of the laws of motion: Nif there be an universal life and all space be the 
sensorium of a thinking being who by immediate presence perceives all things in 
it, the laws of motion arising from life or will may be of universal extent. "93 
Ronald Giere asserts that in other writings Newton made the medieval 
distinction between what is necessary for God's creations and what is necessary 
for the deity itself. "Both Descartes and Newton were 'voluntarists,"' Giere 
91. Sullivan 1995, 175. 
92. M. Dickie discusses hybris in M Dike as a Moral Term in Homer and Hesiod," Classical 
Philology, 1978, 73.99, Jaeger, Paideia, 103, 168, and Havelock, Greek Concept, 85, 185-7. 
This subject is covered helpfully in Kerrigan 1990, 20-21 (Oresteia), 35 (Oresteia), 91 
(Medea), 120 (comparison with justice in Genesis), 365 (Hecuba). 
93. In Westfall 1971, 397. Also see Giere 2000, 182. 
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explains, Nin that they believed God could have chosen other laws for the 
world. Descartes notoriously even held that the laws of arithmetic and geometry 
could have been different if God had so willed. "94 Newton argued that while the 
laws may be contingent, and thus could have been different if God had so willed, 
it is the case that God apparently mandated that the same laws apply in heaven 
and on earth. 95 
The rise of the experimental method has tested our willingness to follow 
Milton's, Frankenstein's, and Aquinas's dicta about limits. At what point, we 
wonder, do we enter into the inquiry that aspires to become greater than our 
nature will allow? Is it in creating humans without the benefit of sexual 
reproduction? Transgenic manipulations? J. Robert Oppenheimer thought he 
might have entered the forbidden by creating the atomic bomb: 6We thought of 
the legend of Prometheus, of that deep sense of guilt in man's new powers."96 The 
struggle between what we create and who we want to be seems to arise again 
and again. When we began implanting fetal pig brain cells into human brains, 
was that the act that will be the last straw holding god's impatience at bay? We 
are susceptible to a dangerous arrogance in our ability to convince ourselves that 
because we are able to do something, we should-especially when we think good 
will come of it. 
The claim for absolute, or mostly absolute, boundaries is related to a 
Platonic position that is opposed by Aristotle. Plato argued that the good exists 
94. Giere 2000, note 7, 182. 
95. Also see note 39 above. 
96. Oppenheimer 1947, 193. 
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independently of what human beings think or do; the absolute forms are mostly 
unattainable by human striving. Christianity was markedly influenced by this 
idea, especially in the theology of Augustine, and then of Protestants who 
believed that the good and God's grace is radically independent from human 
ideas and wishes. In the Phaedrus, Plato's myth refers to souls approaching the 
boundary of heaven where, ,uof that place beyond the heavens," are located the 
absolute forms of ethical ideas, of justice, temperance, knowledge-"'the veritable 
knowledge of being that veritably is" rather than ��knowledge that is neighbor to 
becoming and varies with the various objects to which we commonly ascribe 
being . . .  " These forms are eternal and do not change. The gods see and 
understand them completely. Our souls see less clearly.97 
Boundaries, on Plato's account in the Phaedrus, are specifically 
demarcated. Right behavior and proper choice are based on an unchanging line 
separating what is good from what is not. Those whose lives have held to the 
good, will-after the death of the body-be "'borne aloft by Justice to a certain 
region of the heavens, there to live in such manner as is merited by their past life 
in the flesh" while the others "are taken to be punished in places of chastisement 
beneath the earth."98 This is profoundly different than Aristotle's claim that ethics 
seeks the good of the human being and is entirely an account of human life as we 
experience it. In the Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle suggests that wanting to live 
as a god is wishing for a life that cannot be lived by a human being; it is thus 
97. Phaedrus 247c-248e. 
98. Phaedrus 249a. 
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incoherent, and is certainly not good for us because our nature differs from 
that of the gods.99 
Chapters III and IV will consider in more detail the nature and 
implications of all the boundaries I have mentioned: the boundary we cross when 
overreaching human limitations, or when encroaching divine territory; the 
demarcation between human law and divine law, between mortality and 
immortality, the natural and the supernatural, and between justice and injustice. 
But first, chapter II seeks to justify using stories to gain understanding about 
boundaries and about the values employed in claims about proscribed limits. 
99. NE 1159a1ff, 1166a15ff. 
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Chapter II: Justification 
Summary 
In this chapter, I discuss in more detail many of the topics raised in the 
previous chapter. This will include explication of how stories give us information 
about the moral image we have of ourselves. I also consider the ways in which 
stories are used to establish cultural identity. The ancient quarrel between 
philosophy and poetry is examined, partly to show that stories give us moral 
understanding in a way that the usual manner of philosophical discourse cannot. 
This chapter also explains why stories from antiquity can be employed to gain 
more understanding about current issues. Finally, I suggest a possible method by 
which the culture's canonic stories can be plumbed for the kind of moral 
understanding that is not merely identification of values that have persisted. 
Instead, I argue that literature can be used to see more clearly those enduring 
values that have enabled the continuation of ideologies harmful to human well­
being, as well as those that contribute to human thriving. In this way we can 
begin to see both the limitations of persistent values and the possibilities offered 
by the best of them. 
I argue that stories point to our moral beliefs and that one of the functions 
of certain narratives is to hand down from generation to generation what has 
been learned about moral obligations and values. This claim rests on the 
presumption that looking at stories will lead to the moral thicknesses spoken of 
by Williams and to the moral image suggested by Putnam. If this is true, they are, 
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as Mary Warnock claims, ""perhaps the most important vehicle through which 
values, the nice and the nasty, the terrifying or the cozy, are conveyed. "100 
This will be, following Aristotle, ""generally for the most part true. "101 It 
does not mean that stories consistently, and universally converge in certain 
moral values. Many stories can be found that contradict one another, and indeed 
that argue against a collective moral image at all. Some stories argue fiercely 
against any boundary between the human and divine realms, that, following 
Protagoras, man is the measure of all things.102 
The Promethean model of rebellion is always close at hand, weaving its 
way through stories as a counterpoint to divine ownership and control of the 
universe. It would therefore be nonsense to claim there is neither variability nor 
uncertainty of interpretation. For example, in the story of Abraham and Isaac, 103 
in which Abraham is commanded to sacrifice his son, the value traditionally 
drawn from the story is obedience to God: While God's commands may at times 
be unfathomable to humans, they are still God's commands and must be obeyed 
because we cannot know God's mind-which was Agamemnon's position when 
he sacrificed his daughter. Others argue that, no, the story depicts Abraham's 
failure to question God-again paralleling the questions raised by the Iphigenia 
episode. This argument holds that God's mind, whatever that is, perhaps can be 
100. Warnock 2001, 111-24. 
101. Nicomachean Ethics 1094b21 . 
102. Cratylus 386a: "'For he (Protagoras) says that man is the measure of all things, . . .  " 
Theaetetus, 152a: "' . . .  man is the measure of all things-alike of the being of things that 
are and of the not-being of things that are not." 
103. Genesis 22: 1ff. 
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known and Abraham should have argued with the command, should have 
complained that the command was so entirely outside the parameters of 
goodness that Abraham was obligated to resist. 
For either reading, the central issue in interpreting the story is the 
location of the boundary demarcating human limitation. Are there times God 
should be questioned? Does God sometimes overstep his limits? Are there limits? 
Where is the line drawn? Is seeking to understand God a forbidden task? Plato 
raised a similar question in the Euthyphro when he asks whether something is 
good because Zeus or the gods say it is good or whether the gods say it is good 
because it is good.104 Before the modern period, this question was answered 
mostly by claiming that what God commanded was necessarily good. Beginning 
with the Enlightenment, a more secular society began shifting to acceptance that 
God's pronouncements are rooted in a justice or a Good that underlies both 
human and divine realms, which suggests-if the same laws indeed apply to 
both-that in some matters the curtain between the two does not exist. This 
marked a change in a valuational scheme that was no doubt furthered and 
described in stories of that period. 
My claim that certain stories we tell describe a boundary between the 
human and the divine-or the natural and the supernatural, or justice and 
injustice-presupposes that stories tell us something about values. The 
justification for and limitations on this presupposition follow in II.a, Stories as a 
reflection of a moral image. In II.b, Stories and cultural identity, I examine the 
ways stories are used to creat cultural identity. The following, Ile, The ancient 
104. Euthyphro 5dff. 
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quarrel between philosophy and poetry, is a more specific effort to justify using 
literature to fully understand philosophical concepts. Part 11.d, Using ancient 
sources for modern understanding, argues that we can use andent 
material-Greek, Judaic, and others-to shed light on modern issues. The last 
section of this chapter, 11.e, Learning from literature, suggests a method by which 
we can read stories that may help us determine which values found in canonic 
stories are worth keeping, and which are not. 
a. Stories as a reflection of a moral image 
Mary Warnock describes the importance of looking at stories by using an 
argument from C. S. Lewis's essay "On Stories," in which Lewis says that certain 
central values are pointed to most clearly and become immediately intelligible in 
stories such as Jack the Giant-Killer.105 Lewis says the tale conveys a tangible 
understanding of the terror induced by having an experience of the monstrous 
and Warnock argues that what Lewis does is to point to places where value 
words are made tangible in the telling of stories: 
. . .  there must be some connection between our various uses of a value 
word, 'terrifying' for example or 'honest', so that we can recognize 
instances of the concept and understand the situations in which the word 
is intelligibly used. But this does not entail the prior possession of a fixed 
and immutable value. It is rather that individual occasions and instances 
exemplify for us an instance of the value. We evaluate the instance, in the 
context of the historical use of the word. It is the function of imagination 
to see this general concept in the particular instance. And this entails 
further that to use and understand a value word, such as 'terrifying' or 
'honest' is to make use of a shared concept. To write or tell a story, 
whether Jack the Giant-Killer or Anna Karenina is to show that you 
assume an understanding of its "point', the significance it contains; or at 
least that you believe that in telling the story you will cause your readers to 
understand the point through sympathy with the characters . . .  The 
105. Warnock 2001, 118-119. 
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background of a language which ascribes values to things is a shared humanity, a shared 'form of life'. This does not entail total conservatism 
with regard to values. But it does entail continuity . . .  106 
Warnock adds that what we value may change and the reasons we give 
for liking or disliking things may change, but that we remain the same species 
and that our moral sensibility is made possible by the exercise of imagination. 
This is accomplished by sharing our likes and dislikes, sorrows and pleasures in 
the telling of stories about our lives and the lives of those we imagine. 
Warnock cites Hume's theory of morality as furthering the idea that it is in 
the shared notion of a moral sensibility that we come to understand ourselves 
and what it is that brings value and disvalue to our lives. Morality, Warnock says, 
may be dependent on our own sentiments of pleasure and pain, but it also is 
""founded on sympathy and our ability to be moved by the pleasures and pains of 
other people."107 On Hume's account, it is not just any sentiment of pleasure or 
pain that "denominates an action virtuous or vicious' . . .  'Tis only when a 
character is considered in general, without reference to our particular interest 
that it causes such a feeling or sentiment as denominates it morally good or 
evil.'108 For Warnock, the crucial words in this passage are 'without reference to 
106. Warnock 2001, 118. 
107 . Warnock 2001, 118. 
108. Hume, David An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, 3.3 .1. Hume begins 
this section with the observation that "moral distinctions depend entirely on certain 
peculiar sentiments of pain and pleasure." In conversation, Richard Aquila says that 
halfway through the section Hume concludes that it is necessary to recognize the role of 
a certain sort of self-correction with respect to our sentiments, whereby we 11correct the 
momentary appearances of things, and overlook our present situation. "  Specifically, in 
judging of personal character, "we overlook our own interest in those general 
judgments . "  
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our particular interest'. "'What I may want for myself is irrelevant to my 
judgment, if that judgment is to be properly described as moral."'109 
Warnock explicates a justification for looking at stories to find what we as 
a community believe are the most important values to be passed along, from 
person to person and generation to generation. Thus she says: 
. . .  human beings are very like one another, will like and dislike, broadly 
the same sorts of things, and, being possessed of imagination can share, 
understand and take seriously the likes and dislikes of people other than 
themselves. But it is also necessary to face the fact that human beings, 
though possessed of these unique gifts of imagination and sympathy are 
naturally prone to selfishness and greed, to seeking goods and power for 
themselves at the expense of others. The development of a moral sense in 
an individual, or the invention of a moral system for a society is the 
founding of systems, institutions and sentiments which will mitigate 
human selfishness . . _ 11° 
Similarly, Gary Wihl employs Rorty, Kundera, and Nussbaum in his 
project contrasting Nthe moral significance of detailed, richly descriptive 
vocabularies" with the ascetic language of philosophy, which does not permit the 
irony required for Nperspicuity in the areas of ethical conflict and competing 
social agendas."111 
Wihl says the way we best develop an understanding of the Aristotelian 
notion of virtuous character is not by reading Nichomachean Ethics; it is by 
reading Homer .112 To get a visceral feeling for the virtues of moderation or 
familial obligations or avoiding the seductions of immediate gratification, for 
109. Warnock 2001, 119-120. 
110. Warnock 2001, 121. 
111. Wihl 1995, 6. 
112. Wihl 1995, 27. 
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example, read the passages in the Odyssey when Odysseus refuses Calypso's 
offer of immortality and instead chooses to continue his journey home to be with 
his wife .113 Or listen to what Homer says when he talks about Odysseus's men in 
the Land of the Lotus-Eaters: 
. . .  any of them who ate the honey-sweet fruit of lotus was unwilling to take any message back, or to go away, but they wanted to stay there with the lotus-eating people, feeding on lotus, and forget the way home . I myself took these men back weeping, by force, to where the ships were, and put them aboard under the rowing benches and tied them fast, . . . 114 
Leon Kass used the cautionary power of stories by asking members of the 
President's Council on Bioethics, which he chairs, to read Nathaniel Hawthorne's 
short story "The BirtJ?.mark. "115 The story is about a scientist, Aylmer, who loves 
his wife but kills her in the attempt to remove her single imperfection, a 
birthmark on her left cheek. He became so obsessive he tried to bring to bear all 
his learning and resources to remove the flaw, whatever the cost. Kass used the 
story because he understands, like Kierkegaard, that there are limits to what 
philosophical discourse can describe. Kierkegaard argued that there are 
subjective matters that are important, but which cannot be stated directly, only 
indicated.116 In this way, poetic discourse can say what philosophy cannot. In 
later writings, even Sartre, who in 1947 dismissed poetry as Nharmful,"117 came to 
agree with Kierkegaard. By 1965, Howells asserts that Sartre wrote that poetry is 
a less direct way of revealing understanding and so is an essential element of 
113. Odyssey 5.43:ff. 
114. Odyssey 9.94-100. 
115. See http://www.bioethics.gov/meetings/200201/intro.html. 
116. Kierkegaard 1992. 
117. Sartre 1947, in Howells 1990, 140. 
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reflection, revelation, and disclosure, and thus H changes the nature of our 
relations to the world and ourselves.118 
Nussbaum and Wihl argue that the philosophical use of stories leads to an 
expansion and understanding of certain deep truths of human lives, and that 
while the Socratics may argue that the truths were arrived at by procedures they 
would find untrustworthy (as we shall see later in this chapter, II.c), their veracity 
is suggested by how clearly we see these truths hanging within the larger web of 
a culture's life. The Greeks understood this. They viewed the stories as the 
embodiment not just of accounts of great events and deeds, but as the 
embodiment of those values and concerns most central to the community. 
Segal says the Homeric epics in particular "provide models for heroic 
behavior and for the ideal warrior and ruler, especially in an aristocratic 
society. "119 The tragedies and comedies, too, were so important in this sense that 
the entire citizen body attended civic festivals to watch them. They may have 
been the one civic event that women were allowed to attend.120 Not merely an 
excuse for gathering, however, they were, as Segal puts it, "a kind of mirror in 
which the city can view itself from the perspective of the whole heroic tradition 
and the values, ideals, and modes of behavior crystallized in the myths."121 In this 
sense, they were a communal and individual effort to examine justice and 
118. Howells 1990, 146. 
119. Segal 2001, 19. 
120. By the early fourth century women did attend the dramatic festivals; the evidence is 
inconclusive for the period before that, but it would be at least somewhat odd if they 
were not there given the important roles women had in the plays. See Jeffrey Henderson 
(1991, 133ff.) who argues they did attend the theater. 
121. Segal 2001, 19. 
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injustice, good and evil, punishment and responsibility, the cause of suffer1ng, 
and the nature and power of gods. These are issues that arouse complex and 
heated emotions, as when we feel that one more step in some direction will 
violate the gods' final line in the sand. But this is precisely what Nussbaum says is 
needed in moral philosophy, an understanding of and a deliberate expressing 
and arousing of emotion.122 She says emotions are not simply ""blind surges of 
affect, nonrational forces that push or pull the agent, apart from thought and 
discrimination. Instead they are highly discriminating elements in the 
personality, very closely linked to beliefs about the good, about what is 
worthwhile and what is not. "123 
In western philosophy, Nussbaum argues, the view often is that emotions 
should be dismissed, not merely because they are not rational, but also because, 
in the case of emotions generated by tragic drama, they are at least partly 
created by faulty judgments. As we shall see in examining Plato's argument 
against using tragic drama, some argue that those judgments are not merely 
faulty, they are dangerously false. 
In her study of the psychology and philosophy of moral decision making, 
Sidney Callahan also says that prevalent in the Western moral tradition has been 
a ""dismissal and neglect" of emotion. She asserts that "" . . .  an exclusive focus 
upon analytic methods of rational moral decision making and the content of 
arguments wrongly ignores the self who is inevitably informed and shaped by 
emotions, tacit personal knowledge, intuition, imagery, developmental history, 
122. Nussbaum 1993, 51:ff. Also Nussbaum 1990 and 1994, throughout. 
123. Nussbaum 1993, 52. 
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and group experience." 124 Passions, emotions, feelings, and desires were 
ujudged to be arrayed adversarially against reason and to rebel against the 
higher nature of the soul." Much of Callahan's project is to challenge this 
rejection of the importance of emotions in moral decision making. Like 
Nussbaum, and following C.  S. Lewis,125 Callahan argues that it is in literature 
that we find Nabiding moral truths." 
That we may find abiding truths does not mean those truths should 
continue to abide. David Parker, a literary critic who is part of the movement in 
critical studies to use ethical theory in its analysis of literature, speaks to the issue 
of using stories not just to define our moral image but to recognize the 
limitations of that image and alter it to fit a more pluralistic conception of the 
good.126 His thesis that the reader should actively use stories to understand the 
limitations of society is discussed in more detail below, in Il.e.127 
In a manner similar to what Parker suggests, it is by way of stories that we 
can best experience qualities of other people. By experiencing their way of being 
in the world, we can incorporate that into our moral image in a way that expands 
our moral encompassment of others. Cordner explains this role for imaginative 
literature by arguing for the ability of stories to reshape our lives by 
understanding more about other lives: 
124. Callahan 1991, 6. He develops this assertion at 115:ff. 
125. Lewis 194 7 /1978, 39-53. 
126. Parker 1994, throughout, but especially 1-57. 
127. Also see Freadman and Reinhardt 1991, 60-95. 
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We become engaged by the mode of aliveness whose otherness draws us 
to it, extending us imaginatively and emotionally-which is to say 
morally-in our attempts to realise the distinctive character of that 
otherness in our engagement with it. This involves both our eliciting its 
relations to our own life-our feelings, values, hopes, fears, loves and 
needs-and equally an implicit re-shaping of our own life in the opening 
out of response to the distinctive character of the text's whole mode of 
aliveness. 128 
In addition to what Cordner says is the capacity to change the way we 
experience others, stories can be actively read in ways similar to those suggested 
by Parker, but to affect our emotional responses in such a way that normative 
judgments are reconsidered. E. M. Dadlez, for example, argues that stories can 
be morally significant partly because many emotions are linked to evaluative 
beliefs that can be regarded as normative. Not every emotional response is a 
moral one, but emotions sparked by a story "can sometimes involve changes in 
and challenges to our repertoire of normative judgments." In this way, stories 
can "invite us to imaginatively consider ways in which life could or should be 
lived."129 When we reconsider normative judgments, we also redraw our moral 
image of the world in relation to anger, fear, contempt, resentment, love, pity, 
and other expressions that may have emotional elements. Ronald de Sousa 
suggests, similarly, that emotional reactions to stories can form the beginning of 
new emotional structures, which provide us with new ways of looking at 
situations with altered moral perspectives.130 Dadlex describes the way 
something like this might work: 
128. Cordner 1991, 78. 
129. Dadlez 1997, 105ff. 
130. De Sousa 1990, 263. Also see Peter Lamarque and Stein Haugom Olsen, 1994, Truth, 
Fiction, and Literature: A Philosophical Perspective, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 121, 96-101 . 
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A hitherto unconsidered thought might prompt us to call a belief into question or to expose conflicts between one normative judgment and others, leading us to alter or add to our fund of evaluations. Thus . . .  fiction can afford unique and sometimes transformative opportunities for insight into our normative appraisals. (1bis is because) fiction is intended to convey meaning and, ideally, to place the nature of certain kinds of human capacities and experiences into sharp relief131• 
It is not the case that any emotional response to reading a story or 
watching a play is morally significant. Many are morally trivial. But it does 
become morally signficant when our response makes us question an existing 
ethical norm constituted in our moral image. It is also significant when emotional 
responses substantiate our understanding. Dadlez speaks to this by arguing that 
"Fictions can have moral significance when what they depict or describe . . .  
affords a construal of human life and experience that goes beyond the particular 
fictional objects and events that demonstrate it . . . .  (or) a work could simply 
demonstrate the way that one particular perspective on life and how it should be 
: lived could play itself out. "132 
b. Stories and cultural identity 
Social anthropologists and others have long looked at the way cultures 
employ stories to define themselves. They examine primitive societies to see how 
their stories both support and determine the way people see and speak about 
their group. Telling stories seems to help make sense of the group's relationship 
with the rest of the world and to differentiate and define relationships within the 
131. Dadlez 1997, 115. 
132. Dadlez 1997, 115-16. 
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group. But understanding what the stories mean and the function they serve in 
culture is entangled in various definitional problems. Even the idea of what we 
mean by culture is a knotty issue, and those who study it are aware of the 
difficulties when they try to sort out the intricacies. In a study of literacy's effect 
on human culture, Jack Goody asserts that the ll soggy language of sociological 
discourse" makes clarification of phrases like 'the social organization' or 
'structure' or 'culture' very difficult. 133 This difficulty of clarification is 
compounded because scholars make the mistake of applying the same analytical 
tools to the study of Oedipus, Genesis, and even contemporary literature, "with · 
little sense of the basic incongruity involved."134 
Nevertheless, within limitations, he says there are commonalities. One of 
these is that the rise of literacy, wherever it occurred, led to changes in 
relationships and social identity. Secondly, literacy changed the use of stories 
and other transmitted material in such a way that it became at least theoretically 
possible to trace later ways of categorizing and understanding back through the 
lineage to the sources. Finally, literacy led to the development of ways of thinking 
that resulted in creation of certain fundamental institutions that persist in 
contemporary civilization. It provided a reference point for individual and social 
behavior, especially the verbal behavior we think of as symbolic. As we shall see, 
the result included democratic participation in the community and categories of 
thought such as Aristotle's logical methods and Locke's subsequent use of 
Aristotle's division of the sciences. Early on, writing encouraged the growth of 
magico-religious activity, Goody asserts, so that "just as religious myths become 
133. Goody 1968, 7. 
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crystallized in the words of the Holy Book, so too magical formulae become 
perpetuated . . .  (and) spread throughout the literate world. "135 These claims 
reinforce my thesis that we can examine ancient stories to seek understanding 
about our moral image today, and that literacy contributed to that ability. Had 
literacy never developed, the oral tradition would over time transmute in such a 
way that it would be impossible, given sufficient time, to see connections 
between the distant past and the present. 
Some of the foundational work in understanding the employment and 
. effect of stories in cultures was done by Claude Levi-Strauss . . The twentieth 
century French social anthropologist claimed there are universal facts that are 
true about the human mind and the way the mind goes about constructing 
relationships in the world.136 He was not the first to make claims of this sort. 
James Frazer made a similar assertion decades earlier in The Golden Bough.137 
But Frazer employed a different argument, claiming that because all human 
beings belong to the same species, there must be psychological universals that 
should manifest themselves in the occurrence of similar customs among peoples 
Nwho had reached the same stage of evolutionary development" all over the 
world. The difference between that and what Levi-Strauss argued was that Levi­
Strauss claimed not that there would be this or that custom manifested similarly 
in various disparate cultures, but rather that the similarity in the human mind 
occurs at the level of structure. He argued that we may usefully compare the 
134. Goody 1968, 7. 
135. Goody 1968, 16. 
136. I rely throughout on Leach's explication of Levi-Strauss's work (Leach 1970). 
137. Frazer 1911-15. 
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patterning of the relations that link together sets of human behaviors, but we will 
not learn anything by simple comparisons of single cultural items.138 
His conclusion, after examining primitive societies in South America and 
elsewhere, was that despite differences in time and place, the structure of 
primitive thought is present in modern minds.139 He qualified the assertion in 
various ways, but always he claimed that it is not helpful to think of the human 
ego as existing by itself, isolated in time and space. There is no 'I' that is not part 
of a We,' and that each 'I' is a member of many We's' that exist over time.140 
Using that claim, he then argued that human beings become self-conscious, and 
aware of themselves as members of we-groups only when they become capable 
of employing metaphor (and thus, story) as an instrument of contrast and 
comparison. 
Verbal categories then become what enables humanity to create a 
mechanism through which "universal structural characteristics of human brains 
are transformed into universal structural characteristics of human culture. "141 
Goody points out that language enabled human beings to achieve social 
organizations "whose range and complexity were different in kind from that of 
animals" because social organization was largely learned and transmitted 
verbally rather than occurring instinctively and genetically transmitted.142 
138. Leach 1970, 16. 
139. Leach 1970, 16. 
140. Leach 1970, 36. 
141. Leach 1970, 38. 
142. Goody and Watt 1970, 27. 
53 
One of the mechanisms employed in social organization is myth, the 
expression of tradition about the past that is used by nearly all human societies. 
In this expression, Levi-Strauss looked for the unconscious nature of collective 
phenomena-principles underlying myth that point to areas that are universally 
valid for all human minds.143 In his way of using it, mythology begins as oral 
tradition associated with religious ritual, but over time as it is written down and 
transcribed, it becomes divorced from the original religious context but still 
retains the essential structural characteristics. 
To understand the universal characteristics, Levi-Strauss asserted that it is 
necessary to get beneath the recurrent themes of incest, -patricide, fratricide, 
cannibalism, and so forth, and find the structural commonalities. He gets at this 
by employing some of Freud's claims, including that myths express unconscious 
wishes that are inconsistent with conscious experience. The hidden universal 
message in myth is thus usually concerned with the resolution of contradictions. 
One of these, Leach says, is that among primitive peoples, the continuity of the 
political system is dependent upon perpetuation of alliances between small 
groups of kin. These alliances are 
Created and cemented by gifts of women: fathers give away their daughters, brothers give away their sisters. But if men are to give away their women to serve social-political ends they must refrain from keeping these women to themselves for sexual ends. Incest and exogamy are therefore opposite sides of the same penny and the incest taboo . . .  is the cornerstone of society.144 
143. Leach 1970, 54-55. 
144. Leach 1970, 57. 
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Another contradiction is that the concept of life entails the concept of 
death. What is living is not dead; what is dead is not alive. Leach says Levi­
Strauss thought that one of religion's tasks is to try to separate these 
interdependent concepts by creating myths accounting for the origin of death, or 
that claim death is the way to eternal life. New members of a society who hear 
these myths are being taught by the bearers of tradition to assimilate and 
understand the way contradictions are resolved. Using the Greek stories about 
Oedipus, Orpheus, Euridice, and Dionysus, Levi-Strauss says that one of their 
functions-as well as that of mythology generally-is to explain publicly the 
ordinarily unconscious paradoxes of the culture's construction. The public 
explanation is part of the various elements that go into the making of what 
Putnam means when he employs the term "moral image." 
Leach argues that throughout Greek stories, the common ''message" is 
that "If Society is to go on, daughters must be disloyal to their parents and sons 
must destroy (replace) their fathers. This is the apparently "irresolvable and 
unwelcome contradiction." The message sometimes seems to thoroughly 
contradict fundamentals of human morality, which is why, on Leach's account, 
There are no heroes in these stories; they are simply epics of unavoidable human disaster. The disaster always originates in the circumstance that a human being fails to fulfill his or her proper obligations towards a deity or a kinsman and this, in part at least, is what Levi-Strauss is getting at when he insists that the fundamental moral implication of mythology is that . . .  "self-interest is the source of all evil."145 
Goody says one generation hands on its cultural heritage to the next 
partly in the form of ways of acting and as information about natural resources, 
145. Leach 1970, 80. 
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about cooking food, handling children, and so forth. But transmission is also in 
the form of ideas of space and time, and the generalized goals and aspirations of 
the group. The relative continuity of these categories is primarily ensured in an 
oral tradition by language Nin a long chain of interlocking conversations between 
members of the group," which allows for a direct relationship between symbol 
and referent. This is sometimes done in everyday interaction, but also occurs in 
ritual conditions when formalized patterns of speech are employed along with 
musical instruments and professional remembrancers. As these occur over time, 
those parts of the tradition that continue to be relevant are told and what is no 
longer relevant is eliminated in a communal process of forgetting .146 As we shall 
see, the emergence of literacy fundamentally changed this process. 
When stories are told containing lists, especially when they are 
genealogies of ancestors such as those in the Pentateuch, the lists are not merely 
to ensure that names will be remembered. Goody says they serve as mnemonics 
. for systems of social relations. For example, when Jacob delivered prophecies 
about the future of his twelve sons, he referred to them as the twelve tribes or 
nations of Israel.147 The genealogies in Genesis and elsewhere refer on Goody's 
account to contemporary groups rather than to dead individuals and so serve to 
regulate social relations among the tribes. 
Until they were written down, it is likely that the genealogies changed 
significantly over time to reflect changes in environment and social situation. The 
adjustments in the story were made to ensure that the tale continues to carry out 
146. Goody and Watt 1968, 29--31. 
147. Genesis 49: 28-33. 
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its function as a mnemonic of social relationships, rather than merely a 
remembrance of the past. Further, because they were not faithful historical 
records of times past, an oral tradition of storytelling allowed the teller to change 
the tale as social relations adjusted. A similar adaptability was possible in 
religious transmission. Deities who no longer serve any purpose can easily be 
dropped from the contemporary pantheon or transformed in meaning or 
personage. This does not mean transformations were no longer possible in 
literate cultures. We find in various Greek writers, for example, a range of 
descriptions of deities and heroes. Prometheus and others were constructed 
differently, or at least their characteristics and capacities were emphasized in 
different ways depending upon the context and the teller of the story.148 But a big 
difference in pre-literate societies is that the oral tradition tends not to recognize 
contradictions between what they say now and what they said many years earlier 
because no records exist for comparison. When stories were written, and 
maintained as a part of the cultural framework, the result was that myth and 
history merge into one.149 
Among reasons we cite for claiming ancient Greece as the source of 
Western ways of conceiving the world is that it was there, in the eighth and 
seventh centuries, that alphabetic writing began to allow development of a 
society that was literate. This changed the whole structure of the way cultural 
tradition was passed along.150 Whereas oral societies had been able to forget 
certain details and thus transform parts of their tradition, literate societies cannot 
148. See below, section ill.d., Hesiod. 
149. Goody and Watt 1968, 34. 
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easily discard or transmute the past in the same way. Instead, .utheir members 
are faced with permanently recorded versions of the past and its beliefs; and 
because the past is thus set apart from the present, historical enquiry becomes 
possible. "151 Hence, while this does not mean the myths and .uhistories" were 
unchangeable once literacy spread through the Near East, it does mean the 
changes were noticed. This awareness allowed analysis and objection by later 
readers. Hecataeus, for example, who wrote a history of Egypt around 300 
claiming Egypt as the source of civilization, said, ""What I write is the account I 
believe to be true. For the stories the Greeks tell are many and in my opinion 
ridiculous. "152 Hecataeus and others employ the writing of stories in this way to 
criticize previous myths. Thus Xenophanes in 540 rejected the old fables and 
replaced the gods of Homer and Hesiod who did H everything that is disgraceful 
and blameworthy among men" with one supreme god who was very different 
than the anthropomorphized gods of the past. Similarly, on this account there 
would be no Darwin had there been no book of Genesis.153 
As the oral tradition was recorded, there arose-instead of the simple 
individual adaptations of past traditions-a process of looking at the written 
stories and evaluating the inconsistencies in beliefs and categories of 
understanding. This criticism was applied especially to ideas about gods, the 
universe, and the past. Solutions to the inconsistencies were written and these 
became the source of further speculation. The effect was that limits were placed 
150. Goody and Watt 1968, 41. 
151. Goody and Watt 1968, 67. 
152. Goody and Watt 1968, 45. 
153. Goody and Watt 1968, 46. 
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on the arbitrary creation of new stories. The old ones could be questioned and 
new ways of thinking about them postulated, but they could not be readily 
forgotten or altered as the stories of an oral tradition could be. 
Cultural inheritance in literate culture then becomes composed of 
two different kinds of material: "fiction, error and superstition on the one hand; 
and, on the other, elements of truth which can provide the basis for some more 
reliable and coherent explanation of the gods, the human past and the physical 
world. "154 But learning which is which is not always readily apparent, and in the 
Phaedrus Socrates criticizes the development of writing because he feared it 
would lead to a shallow kind of wisdom. He argued that truth can only be found 
by a process of question and answer in a dialectic between people.155 
Despite Socrates, literacy spread quickly, and Goody asserts that as it did, 
the new methods of communication facilitated many of the institutions that 
would become characteristic of Western culture. For example, literacy enabled 
development of political democracy in that Greek citizens could read the laws 
and take an active part in the polis. They were also instrumental in creation of 
Aristotle's logical methods, as well as his taxonomical categories-both of which, 
Goody argues, are ways of sorting out the world that could develop only as 
literacy spread. Aristotle's sorting out became possible because once historical 
enquiry was employed, skepticism developed not only about the legendary past 
but also about ideas describing the universe. The next step, Goody argues, "is to 
see how to build up and to test alternative explanations; and out of this there 
154. Goody and Watt 1968, 49. 
155. Phaedrus 259e, 276a. 
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arose the kind of logical, specialized, and cumulative intellectual tradition" that 
Aristotle inherited.156 The kind of analysis involved in syllogistic logic, for 
example, is dependent upon writing. When people can write down statements 
and dissect them, systems can be formed. 
Further, we can recognize in our thought processes the lineage that leads 
from Aristotle to John Locke's treatment of the forms of argumentation and of 
the division of the sciences.157 And so Goody asserts that ''in some important 
ways" the literate culture of the West and of the world can recognize in itself the 
lineage extending from Aristotle to Locke and to us-a result of the development 
of literacy. In this way, Goody argues, the debt of contemporary thinking to 
ancient Greece is the result not so much of the 'Greek genius' as of the 
development of literacy.158 An implication of literacy is thus that "certain aspects 
of the past continue to be relevant (or at least potentially so) for the 
contemporary scene . . .  "159 
When the Greek poets beginning with Hesiod and the Homeric writers set 
the stories to paper, the possibility formed that their ways of thinking about 
family, death, divinity, limits, and relationship would become ours-transmuted 
by circumstance, but structurally of the same lineage. Then, as now, the 
stories-whether oral or written-serve social purposes and thus are 
instrumental in formation of cultural identity. Ruth Finnegan's study of the 
156. Goody and Watt 1968, 67-68. 
157. Locke 1959, 4.17: 84. 
158. Goody and Watt 1968, 55. 
159. Goody and Watt 1968, 66. 
60 
effects of oral poetry argues that stories can serve to uphold the status quo, to act 
as a mythical or sociological charter: 160 
Court bards strengthen the position of rulers, poets act as propagandists 
for authority, the accepted view of life is propagated in poetic composition 
and, when poets are an established group, their own power and interests 
are often fortified by their performances. The social order is also 
maintained through the performance of poetry in ceremonial settings, 
where established groups express solidarity and social obligation in 
song.161 
Finnegan says the stories can also be employed to disrupt and alter the 
social order, as well as in rituals of healing, exerting social sanctions, articulating 
imagination, and adding validation to ritual and ceremony. They are employed, 
therefore, in all the possible configurations that lead to creation of identity: to 
propagandize, conserve, cajole, attack, soothe, remind, and authorize. As such, 
the Hcontent and context of literature, and the way literary activity is organised 
are closely correlated with the institutions of the society in which it is situated." 
On Finnegan's account, poets play an important part in creating and 
maintaining cultural unity. In Ethiopia, for example, wandering azmari poets 
helped to create uniformity among otherwise heterogeneous groups, and in early 
Ireland, poets acted as a national institution where there were no towns or 
central civic system. The same phenomenon has been observed throughout the 
world, she asserts, and so it seems clear that none can neither understand the 
organisation of literary activity in isolation from its social setting, nor grasp the 
160. Tandy (1997) makes this same point in reference to the use of Hesiodic and Homeric 
poetry to support changes in economic and social systems during the eighth century. See 
below, section ill.b, the Iliad. 
161. Finnegan 1977, 242. 
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functioning of the society without reference to the poetic activity which takes 
place among its members."162 
Two schools assert different views of whether poetry develops .out of 
social conditions or poetry is the active and initiating factor in social 
development. The first suggests poetry as a reflection of environment and social 
norms. The second sees poetry as a social force. It is not the case, of course, that 
either is wholly true or false. Poetry both reflects and causes social conditions, 
and the two possibilities often act synergistically so that it is often difficult to 
separate the interrelated elements. Because of its effect, the question of who 
controls the activity of poetry has been important in understanding how it is 
employed. Tandy, for example, argues that the Iliad, the Odyssey, and Hesiod's 
Theogony abet "the attempt to disguise recent radical changes in the economic 
infrastructure" and seek to show that the nonelite will benefit from the changes, 
or at least should go along without complaint.163 He says they were used as tools 
by emerging economically powerful elements to further their ends.164 
Finnegan supports this view when she asserts that control over poets and 
poetry has been a Mconstant preoccupation of those in authority through the 
ages. "165 Unlike Goody, Finnegan argues that in its various uses poetry affords no 
clear differentiation of effect whether it is oral or written. She rejects the idea 
that oral poetry can be distinguished from written poetry in its social context or 
162. Finnegan 1977, 245. 
163. Tandy 1997, 191. 
164. Tandy 1997, 192. 
165. Finnegan 1977, 270. 
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function.166 Instead she suggests that the distinction should be viewed more like a 
continuum than a sharp break between categories. She further questions 
assertions (perhaps like those of Levi-Strauss) that claim poetry is the product of 
social structure or of unconscious urges or the result of deep cognitive and 
symbolic mental structures that are beyond the poet's power to affect. Instead, 
she thinks of poetry as the result of an active, imaginative, thinking being. It 
expresses people doing things and making choices. But, 
"People doing things' does not just refer to the outward and observable acts by which people organise poetic activity or use poetry to achieve political power, economic reward and cooperation, religious satisfaction, aesthetic pleasure . . .  There is also a sense in which they use it to "create' the world around them.167 
For the people involved, she asserts, ""the nature of the world is what they create 
and picture it to be in their poetry." She means by this that stories are not just 
passive repetitions of morality tales and the like. Instead, they are the work of 
people actively creating the world around them: ""It is through poetry-not 
exclusively, certainly, but surely pre-eminently-that people create and recreate 
that world."168 
The arguments of Goody, Levi-Str�uss, Finnegan, and others is that in all 
their forms and various purposes, stories are the primary element by which 
individuals and cultures define themselves and transmit their views about what is 
important to the group. As such, the stories themselves, including the way they 
166. Finnegan 1977, 272. 
167. Finnegan 1977, 273-74. 
168. Finnegan 1977, 274. 
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transmute over time, can be used to understand areas of continuing relevance 
in our efforts to decide how we want to create ourselves in the future. 
c. The quarrel between philosophy and poetry 
MacIntyre in After Virtue claims that ancient debates about words like 
""good," ""justice," and "happiness" set the foundation for all subsequent moral 
talk in the West.169 It was in the dialogues that Plato set the framework for one of 
these debates when he claimed philosophy superior to poetry, which he saw as 
philosophy's rival in its ability to instruct and describe values. The claimed ""old 
quarrel" between philosophy and poetry was constructed by Plato in the 
Republic, 170 where the boundary first came to be demarcated in an explicit and 
systematic way. 171 
The visceral feeling evoked by an emotional response to suffering and 
other actions is among the reasons Plato and the Socratics cite in objecting to the 
use of certain kinds of poetry in philosophical education. Suspicions about the 
intent and effect of poetry led Plato to urge banning poets from the education of 
an ideal citizenry. They based this suspicion partly on their belief that the 
""irrational" response to poetry was not conducive to rational reflection, but 
perhaps more importantly on grounds that the representations of poets are an 
169. MacIntyre 1981. 
170. Republic 10.607b. 
171. Wilson 1996. 
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improper use of pathos to encourage sacrilege and irrational behavior.172 Their 
objection was based on the ancient Greek rather than the modern use of the 
term. For Greeks, pathos was perhaps the most important element in art: the 
enactment of catastrophic suffering by a great man or god-suffering that is 
usually not fully deserved. Today, ��pathos" is merely the ability to evoke a feeling 
of pity, compassion, or sadness. But for Plato, pathos was an impious evocation 
of unjust divine action. In Aeschylus's Agamemnon, for example, the gods 
provide men with understanding through pathos by causing terrible injustices; it 
is a device used partly to get one's attention-as when Iphigeneia's sacrifice is 
demanded in return for providing wind so that the fleet can sail on to 
Troy173-and partly to depict humanity's reliance on the gods, even when one of 
them acts whimsically. 
Plato and the Socratics argue that the gods do not condone injustice and 
would never cause an injustice (whimsically or not). When tragic poetry suggests 
otherwise, it is sacrilegious and the tragedians are guilty of encouraging impiety 
in their audience. Socrates and Plato argue in the Apology174 that nothing can 
destroy the happiness of a truly good person and that the gods guarantee this. 
Thus Socrates says we should #refuse to accept Homer's or any other poet's 
mistake concerning the gods when they err without understanding and say that 
�two urns stand on Zeus's threshold filled with fates, one with good, the other 
172. Republic 10.605b, 7.540 d-541 a; Also see Gorgias 268a-b, where he breaks with his 
usual condemnation of rhetoric. A full discussion of the quarrel is in Gould 1990. 
173. Agamemnon 146-254. 
174. Apology 41 c-d. 
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miserable.'"175 Socrates refers to the Iliad, 1 76 where we read that mortals who 
receive allotments from both urns are sometimes happy, sometimes not, but 
others, who receive lots only from the urn of unhappiness are outcasts, who live 
and die in misery. Hesiod has a similar claim-that Zeus provides the good or evil 
that men experience: 
through him mortal men are equally unspoken and spoken, famed and unfamed by the aid of great Zeus. For easily he makes a man strong, but easily he presses hard the strong; easily he diminishes the illustrious and increases the unknown; easily he straightens the crooked man and withers the arrogant, does Zeus the High-Thunderer.177 
For the Socratics, this left too much to chance, too much out of the control of the 
man who properly employed philosophical study. In the Republic178 Socrates 
complains that the stories told to children teach them to accept the idea of 
injustices caused by gods and, even when the stories are explained and placed in 
context� children are more impressed by the story than by the explanation.179 If 
one acts badly, Plato suggests, it is because understanding has been diminished 
by too much misleading poetry and not enough philosophy.180 
Aristotle hesitates before Plato's assertion that the pathos of tragedy is 
anathema to moral education, but nevertheless accepts part of Plato's 
formulation. In the Poetics, he agrees that a story depicting the suffering of an 
175. Republic 379c-e. 
176. mad 24.527-33. 
177. WD 2-8. 
178. Republic 387b-c. 
179. Republic 378d-e. 
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entirely blameless person would be an impious story, a polluting influence 
(miaron). But Aristotle qualifies this by arguing that a good tragedy always 
shows that suffering is traceable in some way to the person's failure to act or 
choose well, and that if the suffering is not at all depicted as the result of the 
person's improper behavior, then the tragedy's construction is faulty. Departing 
from the Socratics, Aristotle maintains that a tragedy must show that the 
suffering is to some degree not deserved because this is the device that generates 
pity, which is essential to the task of tragedy.181 
Nussbaum says she understands why Socrates rejected tragic drama: "For 
tragedy presents reversals of fortune that happen to good people as highly 
significant, as occasions for emotions of fear and pity that themselves ascribe 
significance and weight to them." And this, she says, contradicts the claim that 
the good person cannot be harmed.182 
Wihl follows Nussbaum in arguing for seeking ethical and philosophical 
guidance from stories, but Nussbaum goes further, asserting that philosophical 
training has erred in that it has followed Plato's advice. She says the existing 
model should be altered. She wants, first, to expand the intellectual activity of 
moral education to include emotional knowledge. Second, she wants to give 
priority in moral education "to the perception of particular people and situations, 
180. Republic 10.607b-c. Laws 12.967c-d suggests that poets were hostile to philosophers 
because of their materialistic astronomy, but the M quarrel" in most of Plato clearly refers 
to the issue of pathos. A discussion is in Gould 1990. 
181. Poetics 13 and 14. 
182. Nussbaum 1993, 71 . 
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rather than to abstract rules. "'183 The implication of her claims is that Plato's 
formulation of an ideal education as one that excludes impious poetry from 
philosophical training is precisely what has been accomplished by the 
academy-indeed, that the philosophical academy has exceeded Plato's dictum 
by mostly ignoring all poetry in its educational effort rather than excluding 
merely the poetry that the Socratics believed was sacrilegious. Plato's fear of 
employing poetic narrative in moral philosophy has a firm hold on the modern 
discipline, she believes, and the hold should be broken. Ethics, she says, finds its 
"most appropriate expression and statement in certain forms usually considered 
literary rather than philosophical . . .  "184 She insists that we should broaden our 
conception of moral philosophy: 
. . .  there may be some views of the world and how one should live in 
it-views, especially, that emphasize the world's surprising variety, its 
complexity and mysteriousness, its flawed and imperfect beauty-that 
cannot be fully and adequately stated in the language of conventional 
philosophical prose, a style remarkably flat and lacking in wonder-but 
only in a language and in forms themselves more complex, more allusive, 
more attentive to particulars.185 
She thus condemns Plato's claims, and, further, argues that the way of telling 
stories can be as instructive as what is told in the tale: 
The telling itself-the selection of genre, formal structures, sentences, 
vocabulary, of the whole manner of addressing the reader's sense of 
life-all of this expresses a sense of life and of value, a sense of what 
matters and what does not . . .  of life's relations and connections.186 
183. Nussbaum 1990, 3:ff. 
184. Nussbaum 1990, 3:ff. 
185. Nussbaum 1990, 3. 
186. Nussbaum 1990, 5. 
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Nussbaum follows Proust and Henry James in asserting that we err if we 
believe that the communication of values can, in a mature mind, be accomplished 
equally well by studying abstract philosophical theory alone. Proust believes, for 
example, that human values and psychology cannot be understood by intellectual 
activity alone, by studying only philosophical theory; they can be fully felt and 
understood only if they are known emotionally, and Nknowing emotionally" is 
best portrayed in stories.187 Similarly, Nussbaum says that powerful emotions 
have an .uirreducibly important cognitive role to play."188 
As Nussbaum argues that embedded in literature are the values of a 
community, so Arthur Adkins argued throughout his career that it is possible to 
examine value terms in literary and philosophical texts and from them educe 
some understanding of ancient moral systems.189 Adkins's assertions are 
challenged, however, by critics who say that the recurrence of certain values in 
Homer's epics is not sufficient reason to assume that those same values are 
widespread in ancient Greek communities.190 A. A. Long, for example, objects 
that Adkins 
a finds it perfectly legitimate to interpret many Homeric contexts as if the 
society which they are claimed to reflect had some autonomous existence, 
outside the poems . . .  In fact, of course, our knowledge of Homeric values 
is not extended by any sound evidence independent of the Iliad and 
187. Proust 1981. For more on Proust and philosophy, see Mary Rawlinson, M Art and 
Truth: Reading Proust," in Philosophy and Literature 1982, 6: 1-16. 
188. Nussbaum 1990, 7. 
189. Adkins 1960. Also Adkins 1971, and elsewhere. Adkins defends his position in 
#Merit, Responsibility, and Thucydides," 1975, in Classical Quarterly 25.2: 209-220. 
190. Richard Robinson, review of Merit and Responsibility, Philosophy 32: 279; Hugh 
Lloyd-Jones, The Justice of Zeus, 1971, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2-3; 
Dover, Greek Popular Morality, 4�50; #The Portrayal of Moral Emotions in Greek 
Poetry," Journal of Hellenic Studies, 1983, 103: 35-48; and Adkins, 1978, 0Problems in 
Greek Popular Morality," in Classical Philology 73: 143-158. 
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Odyssey. Inferences drawn purely from Homer about ethical language cannot be assumed as historical axioms. It would certainly be remarkable if the moral standards found in Homer bore no relation to the life and language of actual peoples. But Adkins makes little or no allowance for the absence of any authoritative historical check on this . . .  "191 
Thirty-two years after Long wrote this, supporters and detractors of Adkins are 
still debating whether he was justified in educing ancient Greek moral schemes 
by examining how core value terms seem to be used in stories such as the lliad 
and the Odyssey. But in a collection of essays honoring Adkins, editor Robert 
Louden argues that even his opponents concede that he nhelped to stimulate the 
currently burgeoning interest in the relationship between Greek literature and 
moral philosophy."192 Further, even if Adkins erred and Homeric values should 
not be extended to suggest anything about ancient moral beliefs, this would not 
preclude our drawing .understandings from those same literary sources about 
later periods if it can be shown that there is considerable additional evidence 
existing in those periods to support the claims. 
If Adkins is correct in claiming that examining literary texts provides clues 
about moral systems, then there should be strong justification for .asserting that 
if ancient literary texts are examined and compared to values found in later 
works, the confluences that appear may be thought to reflect a society's deeply 
held beliefs as they develop over time. What we can get from this is at least partly 
confounded by the problems of commensurability, but all the same there should 
be sufficiently comparable values from one century to the next to allow claims for 
a lineage of beliefs. If similar values about loyalty, for example, are found in the 
191. Long 1970, 121-139. Long refers here to Adkins's thesis in Merit and Responsibility 
(1960). 
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second century as in the third, we can reasonably conclude they are talking about 
comparable beliefs. And if that continues century after century, the persistence of 
that value over time probably says something important about how most human 
beings think of loyalty as a value. This does not mean that the priority we assign 
to the objects of loyalty-family, state, religion, friends-necessarily remains 
constant, although it might. It does mean that loyalty can be considered a 
persistent value in human community, at least for this culture over this expanse 
of time. It also means that to contravene loyalty would be to significantly alter the 
nature of human relationship as it has developed. 
My project is a part of the interest in the relationship between Greek 
literature and moral philosophy to which Louden refers, and in it I make only the 
claim that where over time we find enough recurrence in literature of certain 
values, it would certainly be remarkable, as Long says, if they bore no relation to 
our lives. Hesiod thought similarly: .uNo talk that many people talk perishes 
completely."193 Aristotle cites Hesiod's remark several centuries later in his 
discussion of the pursuit of pleasure as perhaps the chief good because 11 all 
things, both brutes and men, pursue pleasure . . .  " He claims as part of his 
reasons for this claim that over time many people have said the same, including 
Hesiod. Thus, .uNo voice is wholly lost that many peoples . . .  (have repeated)."194 
192. Louden 1996, 6. Louden was referring to a statement from Blundell 1989, 5. 
193. WD, 762-763. 
194. NE VII.1153b25-28. Nussbaum clarifies her position on this in "'Reply to Papers," in 
Philosophical Investigations 16: 1, 46-86, saying she does not conclude from Aristotle's 
remark that a universally held view could never be false (78). "'What I actually say, on 
page 248, is that 'nothing universally believed is entirely discarded'." 
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One of the voices Aristotle cites is Sophocles', who, in Oedipus, asks the 
universal question, Why do our lives turn out to have the shape that they finally 
have? In his study of Oedipus, Charles Segal says the play �rings together the 
question of how we make sense of our individual lives and how we make sense of 
our world given the elusiveness of final truth, the mysterious remoteness of the 
gods, and the slipperiness of language. "195 Oedipus faces this question in 
reflecting on the world order and in the mystery of his life, and Segal says that 
for centuries people have found value in the various answers they find in 
different aspects of the play. The story directly confronts the mystery of a world 
in which we continue to wonder whether the suffering we find is due to design, 
to chance, or to something else. We can be cautious about assuming that our 
values have much in common with ancient values, but what Segal suggests in 
relationship to Oedipus is that, following Aristotle, too many of us for a long time 
have been seeing our concerns in the general concerns of OC and OT. 
Nussbaum says both literary analysts and philosophers would profit by 
using stories as sources of philosophical and ethical insight because that is where 
they will find the confluence of belief to which Hesiod and Aristotle refer. 
Literary analysts, she says, should consider philosophical and ethical implications 
as well as the usual qualities of philology and aesthetics; philosophers should use 
stories to fill out the abstract ideas of philosophical analysis. This is not how it is 
typically done. The study of ethics traditionally has tended to learn what was said 
by the presocratics, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, the sophists, the medievalists, 
Descartes, Kant, Hume, Sartre, Rawls, and the rest of the canon. When 
195. Segal 2001, 5. 
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philosophers discuss ethics, it is to these they usually turn, not to Aeschylus, 
Sophocles, Marlowe, and Faulkner, and that limitation, Nussbaum believes, has 
impoverished us.196 The impoverishment is a phenomenon that most ancient 
philosophers, despite the Socratic complaints, would have found both Nunnatural 
and unilluminating": 
For the Greeks of the fifth and early fourth centuries B.C., there were not 
two separate sets of questions in the area of human choice and action, 
aesthetic questions and moral-philosophical questions, to be studied and 
written about by mutually detached colleagues in different departments. 
Instead, dramatic poetry and what we now call philosophical inquiry in 
ethics were both typically framed by, seen as ways of pursuin�, a single 
and general question: namely, how human beings should live. 97 
Dramatic poets like Euripides and Aristophanes were the Athenian 
ethicists. They, along with Aeschylus, Sophocles, and others provided the forum 
for the community to examine questions related to how the polis should be 
organized, the role of citizens in the polis and in the family, and the good of the 
polis and the individual.198 The process of teaching and understanding, using 
both abstract ideas and communal poetry, as well as other methods was referred 
to as psuchagogia Oeading of the soul).199 Later, the Hellenistic period began to 
develop ideas that literature could be thought about in purely aesthetic terms, 
without practical purpose. 200 But for the most part the two-aesthetic and 
196. There are exceptions. Donald Davidson taught a seminar class at Stanford during 
the 1970s for which the reading list included Sophocles, Aeschylus, and several other 
ancient poets. 
197. Nussbaum 1990, 15. Also see Nussbaum 1986, Interlude 1, uPlato's anti-tragic 
theater," 122ff. 
198. A discussion of this is in Segal 2001, especially chapters 2 and 7. 
199. Nussbaum develops this idea in "Therapeutic Arguments: Epicurus and Aristotle," in 
The Norms of Nature, 1985, ed. M. Schofield and G. Striker. Cambridge, England: 
Cambridge University Press. 
200. Nussbaum 1985, 32. 
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practical-were not separable genres for the dramatists. Nussbaum argues that 
this is as it should be, that the philosophical academy has evolved a practice that 
focuses on the practical and too often ignores the aesthetic value of literature. 
The ancient dramatists demonstrate in this way the argument Aristotle would 
make when he asserted that practical reasoning must be accompanied by 
emotional knowledge to attain practical wisdom (phronesis2°1). For example, he 
claims that emotional knowledge is that which leads to temperance.202 
Plato and the Socratics laid siege to this argument, claiming either that 
emotions are unreliable and irrational, thereby distracting from rational inquiry, 
or that they are entirely false. The essence of this latter objection is related to 
Plato's objection to pathos, and similarly, to what Nussbaum describes as the 
objection Nthat the emotions involve value judgments that attach great worth to 
uncontrolled things outside the agent; they are, then, acknowledgments of the 
finite and imperfectly controlled character of human life."203 Thus Plato's desire 
for self-sufficiency in moral behavior is compromised by uncontrollable forces, 
whereas Nussbaum' s project is to recognize the existence of uncontrollable 
forces and find in literature rich depictions of human emotions responding to the 
vagaries of those forces. She avoids foundationalism concerning the emotions, 
201. NE VI.5. 
202. NE 11.4, 1105b1-18ff. Also, Aristotle argues that without emotional knowledge one 
may act against one's best judgment, a defect he refers to as incontinence. Much of NE 
VII is a response to the problem inherited from Socrates, which Aristotle frames as a 
problem of knowledge or understanding (episteme}: �\ . .  it would be strange-so 
Socrates thought-if when knowledge was in a man something else could master it and 
drag it about like a slave"' (NE VII.2, 1145b23-4. Also Protagoras 352b-c. Nussbaum's 
project in Fragility is partly a claim that it is in literature that we most clearly understand 
Aristotle's argument. 
203. Nussbaum 1990, 42. 
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accepting that they can be unjustified or false and that they are not self-certifying 
sources of ethical truth. Instead, she makes the narrower claim that emotions 
enrich wisdom. 204 She argues, nevertheless, that it would be wrong to think that 
"emotions are unlearned or innate."205 She claims that each emotion involves 
believing a certain proposition and that these beliefs are acquired largely 
through socialization. For these reasons, she says, we continue to read tragedies, 
both Greek and others, because they continue to inform and, as part of the 
process of socialization, they 
Tell stories of reversals happening to good but not invulnerable people, and to tell these stories as if they matter for all human beings. And the form sets up in its audience responses, particularly those of pity for the characters and fear for oneself, that presuppose a similar set of beliefs.206 
If as the Socratics would have it a good person is invulnerable to bad luck 
and suffering, and if goodness can be learned by a philosophical education in 
abstract intellectual knowledge, then what can be learned from tragedy and 
other poetry is superfluous. And if this is the case, then tragic poetry, or for that 
matter any good story, as on Richard Posner's account, has value only to the 
extent it has aesthetic value. Citing Cleanth Brooks, Tolstoy, Bentham, and 
George Orwell as similarly minded, Posner says edification is the function of 
religion "but not of poetry."207 He says the examples of Wagner, Celine, Pound, 
Heidegger, and de Man should be cause for skepticism about the edifying effects 
of education in general "and of literature in particular." Dismissing Nussbaum as 
naive, he suggests that we read merely .uto enjoy life a bit more." 
204. The full discussion of this issue is in Nussbaum 1990, 42, 261-313. 
205. Nussbaum 1994, 79. 
206. Nussbaum 1990, 17 
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Posner mistakes Nussbaum' s position on several counts, but most 
importantly in believing she claims that literature should .uproduce models of 
. modern moral behavior." Because good literature produces models of all sorts of 
behaviors, good and ill, Posner says it is not necessary that one consider the 
moral elements of the story to educe its value. He is helpful in noting that a 
story's moral position does not determine its value as literature, but he errs in his 
objection to Nussbaum. Following Aristotle, Nussbaum argues merely that the 
best of tragic poetry and other stories develop moral understanding. She would 
not claim Medea as a moral exemplar. She would say that our response to her 
actions develops in us feelings of compassion, understanding, pity, fear, and 
questions about appropriate justice, among others. 
Nussbaum sums up her views on this in an article responding to critics.208 
She argues that there are views of what human life is and how to live it that 
cannot be adequately expressed in the form and language of abstract 
philosophical writing; literature not only completes the expression, it is an 
essential ingredient of it. She says, for example, that the Aristotelian ethical view, 
· as an alternative to Kantianism and Utilitarianism, is comprised of four theses 
and that they are best expressed in imaginative literature: 
(a ) that there are many intrinsically valuable things in a human life, and 
that these are not commensurable by any single quantitative standard; (b ) 
that in certain ways . . . particular perceptions are prior to general rules, 
(c ) that the imagination and the emotions are valuable and ineliminable 
elements in good deliberation; (d ) that events of life that lie beyond our 
control can have serious ethical significance. 209 
207. Posner 1997, 1-27. Also Posner 1998, 394-412. 
208. Nussbaum 1993 
209. Nussbaum 1993, 71. 
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It would not be sufficient to investigate these theses by examining our own 
lives, she says. Exploring literature is necessary because, following Henry James 
and Marcel Proust, literature is "the record of the experience of a fully alert and 
attentive and responsive being-which is not what most of us are most of the 
time. It thus sees more and better, feels more keenly and deeply, than we usually 
do."210 This is why Mary Warnock claims stories are "perhaps the most important 
vehicle through which values, the nice and the nasty, the terrifying or the cozy, 
are conveyed. "211 
When philosophy took its positivist turn midway through the nineteenth 
century, its entrancement with scientific methods and results led to a formulation 
of its processes that was similar in attempted precision to scientific rigor. 
Wittgenstein referred to this when he said philosophers "constantly see the 
method of science before their eyes, and are irresistibly tempted to ask and 
answer questions in the way science does." But, while this tendency is the source 
of metaphysics, Wittgenstein added, it ""leads the philosopher into complete 
darkness."212 Ethical thought proceeded using descriptions of systems like that of 
Spinoza and then like that of the utilitarians, all of which lent a mechanistic tone 
to the endeavor. The quantitative excesses of Bentham's ethics seemed to be the 
foundation for the tone even after Mill and others set aside his ideas as too 
simplistic. In that atmosphere, the uncertainties, irrationalities, and 
bewilderments that plague human life depicted in literature must have seemed 
210. Nussbaum 1993, 73. 
211. Warnock 2001, 111-24. 
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sufficient justification to doubt that poetry, drama, and novels had a useful 
place in philosophical understanding. They could depict emotions, certainly, but 
emotions were an element of human life that should be controlled by reasoned 
analysis, not looked to for real knowledge . .ult is no chance matter we are 
discussing," Plato warned, "but how one should live."213 The poets, too, believe 
that they are writing about how one should live, but they recognize that how one 
lives often is indeed a matter of chance, and so it is to poetry that we often turn 
because at its best it may give us deep understanding of what is said in 
philosophical discourse. 
Nussbaum says that certain literary texts and others like them are not just 
helpful in philosophical inquiry, they are indispensable: " . . .  sources of insight 
without which the inquiry cannot be complete."214 They are indispensable 
because they depict in large ways a kind of picture of a way of life that one 
cannot see by examining alone the doctrines of Spinoza, for example, or Kant, or 
any combination of abstract philosophical schemes. It is by way of both 
philosophers' doctrines and poets' words that we can begin to understand 
Williams's thicknesses and Putnam's moral image. It is what Henry James refers 
to as becoming "finely aware and richly responsible'"215 such that one develops 
the practi<:al wisdom of which Aristotle speaks-not merely a mechanistic 
process of logic but a larger ability to perceive important truths about human life. 
And by so doing we can begin to understand what has become important about 
212. Wittgenstein 1949/1973, 18. 
213. Republic 352d. 
214. Nussbaum 1990, 23. 
215. James 1934, 62. 
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how we live, how we describe ourselves, how we want to be, and how we do not 
want to be. We cannot get the fullness of understanding by reading Plato and 
Aristotle alone that we can achieve by reading Antigone along with them. 216 
What I mean by this is what Aristotle and James refer to when they say 
that in order to understand any single feature (a boundary between the human 
and the divine, for example), it is necessary to see how that feature is connected 
to all around it-to its context, to other human activity, to both the concrete and 
the abstract.217 Responses to concerns about violating a sacred boundary are 
emotional responses that evoke feelings of fear, dread, and uncertainty. Hence, 
the tracing in literature and art of the idea of divine boundaries is also the tracing 
of an emotional idea. 
Responding fully to those (Plato, Posner, and others) who argue against 
using stories, or some kinds of stories, to develop moral understanding is not 
216. A helpful discussion of Nussbaum's position in reference to literature and 
philosophy is in Stephen Halliwell, "'Philosophy & Literature: Settling a Quarrel?"' in 
Philosophical Investigations, 1993, 16: 1, 1-17 (especially page 4 where he asserts that 
literature and philosophy in the Greek tradition rested on a shared basis of ethical 
concerns and interests. [in my binding "'goodness & fragility"']) 
217. James 1934, 60; Aristotle refers to this delimiting necessity in various ways 
throughout Poetics, but especially from chapter 9 and following. At 9.1451b30, for 
example, he urges using the concrete examples of history in the writing of poetry; at 
24.1460a.25:ff he says "'The story should never be made up of improbably incidents"' 
because it is best to use for the plot incidents that are both concrete and probably; at 
25.1461a.4:ff he says to consider not only the intrinsic quality of a word or deed, but also 
the actuality of the person who says or does it; at 25.1461a.30ff he discusses the 
difference between the abstractness of metaphor and concreteness of that to which it 
refers; also see 3 .1448b.5:ff where he explains that realistic representations of animals or 
other things in art make the abstractness of art more "'delightful.
"' 
Bernard Williams 
discusses aspects of this in reference to the context of friends, family, society in "'Persons, 
Character and Morality,"' and "'Moral Luck"' in Moral Luck; and Ethics and the Limits of 
Philosophy, especially chapter 3. 
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within the scope of this project. Nussbaum and others do that.218 My purpose 
here is to build on their general defense by providing more specific examples for 
using ancient stories as a source of finding and perhaps understanding concepts 
and beliefs that are widespread in our culture today-namely beliefs related to 
the idea that there are boundaries between the human realm and the divine 
realm and that it is thought that fearful consequences loom when humans 
transgress that boundary. 
If we were to follow the Socratic suspicion that poetry is not to be trusted 
because it evokes unreliable, even impious, emotions, then my project would be 
moot. I argue, however, that the belief exists that there are proscriptions against 
violating certain boundaries and that it is an important part of our view of 
ourselves. Understanding this view is essential to making decisions about how 
we should proceed in any endeavor. And the only hope we have of a truly 
developed understanding is to experience, by way of literature, the playing out in 
people's lives of the ideas talked about by Plato, Kant, Rawls, and the rest. When 
the endeavor is as important as the integrity of the human genome and its future 
evolution, it behooves us to pay close attention to all possible sources of moral 
insight. 
218. See especially Stephen Halliwell (1984), who argues in support of Nussbaum's claim 
that moral understanding is best developed by a combination of philosophical analysis 
and the use of poetic literature . He discusses and tries to refute Plato's argument that 
poetry tends to be harmful. In "'Plato and Aristotle on the Denial of Tragedy," Proceedings 
of the Cambridge Philological Society 30: 49-71 . 
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d. Using ancient sources for modern understanding 
It can be argued that incommensurability precludes making claims about 
even the thinnest commonality among values, thereby injuring the chances that 
stories from the past can help us understand modern issues or make decisions 
about modern dilemmas. There are traps to avoid in such an effort, but they are 
not sufficiently dangerous that in attempting to avoid them we should set aside 
all efforts to understand the present by examining the past.219 Bernard Knox 
argues regularly and fiercely for the continuing value of ancient literature: 
The great writers are of course of an age, but also for all time . . .  The masterpieces of our literature retain their hold on the mind and emotions of generation after generation. Created for their time, they outlast it, winning new readers and audiences in a world unimaginably different from their own. They can still move us to tears or laughter, shock or beguile us; they remain contemporary because they present us with a unique vision of their own time that addresses our own deepest hopes and fears. They often seem more powerful, more meaningful, more modern than what is being written by and for our age.220 
Matthew Arnold hoped: ""If the instinct for beauty is served by Greek literature 
and art as it is served by no other literature and art, we may trust to the instinct 
of self-preservation in humanity for keeping Greeks as part of our culture."221 
Shelley, Keats, Byron, and the other radical Romantics used the Greeks as their 
models. ""We are all Greeks," Shelley said. ""Our laws, our literature, our religion, 
our arts, have their roots in Greece."222 Prometheus was their inspiration for 
defiance. Robert Kennedy said his favorite reading was Greek tragedy. General 
George Marshall argued that no one could understand World War II who had 
219. This issue is also addressed below in III.b (the Iliad) and III.c (the Odyssey). 
220. Knox 1996, 77. 
221. Gerhard 1980, 22-35. 
222. Shelley 1822/1970, 3. 
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not read Thucydides, and the United States military has followed his advice, 
several times inviting Bernard Knox to speak on Thucydides at the Naval, 
National, and Air Force war colleges.223 The Greek stories have had nearly 
continuous interest in Western art, and the persistent attention they have 
received has influenced the way Western awareness developed. 224 Nussbaum 
justifies her use of ancient material in this way: 
Thinking about the ancient texts has always been for me an especially 
fruitful way of reflecting about the issues: in part because of the increased 
self-understanding promoted by a clearer view of the history of ideas and 
conceptions that deeply influence us; in part also, however, because the 
ancient Greek traditions bring to the fore concerns that have been less 
prominent in contemporary philosophy, and organize the ethical 
questions in revealingly different ways. It was, then, not only the closeness 
of the Greeks' problems to important continuing problems (together with 
their historical influence on our view of the problems) but also the 
illuminating strangeness and difference of their approach, that led me to 
feel that a long look at their accounts might help us reflect better. 225 
She does not, however, suppose that there are "timeless" problems and 
""timeless" truths about human life "that stand altogether outside of the flow of 
history." Instead, she argues, with Aristotle, that no such truths are available: 
.,., . . .  all truth is in some sense bounded by human experience, and thus by human 
history." She says ethics must be context sensitive "'given Aristotle's insistence 
that ethics is about the experiences of a creature that is fundamentally a moving 
and changing creature. "226 Yet even allowing for movement and change, she says 
there is "substantial continuity and overlap" that result from the fact that the 
223. Knox 1989, 159. 
224. A detailed account of the influences of Oedipus and other Greek stories on later 
literature is in Jane Davidson Reid, 1993. The Oxford Guide to Classical Mythology in the 
Arts, 1300-1990s. New York: Oxford University Press. The influence of Sophocles's 
Oedipus on later art, literature, and film is discussed in Segal 1991, especially chapter 12. 
225. Nussbaum 1993, 4 7 
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Greeks profoundly shaped our conceptions of things and, more importantly, 
because human life, while shaped by belief and cultural interpretation, -'-'has a 
recognizable shape wherever it turns up." This is the result of common problems: 
mortality, limits of the body, the movement from infancy to maturity to death, a 
reliance on nature. It also results from common capacities: friendship, practical 
reasoning, wondering about the universe, humor, and delight. For Nussbaum, .,.,It 
seems clear that even these shared experiences are to some extent shaped ·by 
culture; but I insist that there is sufficient overlap to make the notion of our 
., common humanity' a rich and meaningful one, and a reasonable basis for a 
philosophical investigation."227 
In the United States, Euripides's Trojan Woman, Bacchae and Iphigeneia in 
Aulis were produced several times as either protests against the Vietnam War or 
in support of other protest movements. In France, protests against the war in 
Algeria were supported in the theater by productions of The Trojan Women. Jean 
Anouilh and Bertolt Brecht produced their own renderings of Antigone. In 
Brecht, the prologue is set in Berlin, in April 1945: two sisters discover, hanging 
from a meat hook, the corpse of their brother, a deserter from the front executed 
by the SS. This was his response to those who, like Matthew Arnold in 1853, said 
that there was no longer any interest in Antigone's duty to her brother's corpse 
because England viewed the exposing of an enemy's corpse as no longer possible 
because sensibilities had sufficiently evolved beyond such barbarism. Anouilh 
also knew better than to believe humanity had changed: he lived in Paris when 
226. Nussbaum 1993, 47. 
227. Nussbaum 1993, 48. 
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German occupiers routinely exhibited the corpses of executed Resistance 
fighters. 228 
Often dominated by female characters, the Athenian tragedies we know 
about clearly and forcefully speak to issues related to women and their role in 
community. As such, ancient depictions of women consider issues like those that 
have been the focus of women today. Knox says of Medea, especially the speech 
to the chorus: 
. . .  with its recital of woman's wrongs and its defiance of the male claim to mastery on the basis of its role as warrior, has long served as a primal text for feminism, . . .  in fact, both Medea and The Women of Trachis contain passages that seem intent on explaining the female project of selthood. 229 
Similarly, George Steiner says of Sophocles' Antigone that it is one of the 
enduring and canonic acts in the history of our philosophic, literary, political 
consciousness and that 0New "Antigones' are being imagined, thought, lived 
now; and will be tomorrow."230 Some of the new historicists argue against 
Steiner by asserting that reading our concerns into ancient literature is 
wrongheaded: their concerns, as their culture, were so entirely unlike ours that 
we err in thinking ancient authors could speak to questions about our values. But 
reading the stories shows quite otherwise. When Medea says ""What they say of 
us is that we have a peaceful time living at home, while they do the fighting in 
war. How wrong they are! I would very much rather stand three times in the 
front of battle than bear one child,"231 she speaks from an emotional and familial 
228. Knox 1989, 160 
229. Knox 1996, 80. 
230. Steiner 1984, 304. 
231. Medea 248-251. 
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understanding that is familiar to modern audiences when the play is performed 
today. 
Even some who warn against finding similarities between ancient and 
modern thought accept that there are limits to claims that the ancient is entirely 
foreign to our experience. For example, E .  R .  Dodds, who warns against finding 
modern parallels in ancient sources, says nevertheless that " . . . as a man cannot 
escape from his own shadow, so no generation can pass judgement on the 
problems of history without reference, conscious or unconscious, to its own 
problems."232 We look for parallels because ethical knowledge has been derived 
by each generation's reading of the mythology, scripture, and literature of 
previous generations. 
Even though the modern world stretches round the earth and draws into 
itself other traditions as well, Bernard Williams argues that to learn about the 
Greeks is an immediate part of self understanding. "Those other traditions will 
give it new and different configurations, but they will not cancel the fact that the 
Greek past is specially the past of modernity" because the modern world was a 
European creation "presided over by the Greek past."233 
When we make decisions in our lives about this issue or that, we tend not 
to educe understanding from abstract and universal ethical theories, although 
they indirectly contribute to beliefs. Instead, our understanding derives largely 
from experience and from cultural norms portrayed in story and is confirmed by 
yet more experience. We take this combination of norms, experience, and 
232. Dodds 1951, 253. 
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learned understandings and place all of it together in a web of deep 
understanding-Putnam's moral image-that is drawn upon for making 
decisions. 
Because this decision-making method does not build from universally 
demonstrable principles, however, it is vulnerable to skeptical challenge. But 
indubitable principles do not incorporate the full range of human experience, the 
emotional as well as the rational, which is the advantage of understanding 
derived from stories. David Thomasma claims, in relationship to the way we 
develop understanding and make decisions, that he cannot ""imagine any choice 
that does not involve a balancing of goods or cherished values." 234 The 
postmodernists thus get it right, he said, when they observe that the 
Enlightenment project is dead and that not only is there no chance to develop a 
completely rationally coherent basis for ethics, but such efforts produce deadly 
results. Deadly, Thomasma insists, because they ""are formed by the systems of 
thought in which reason dominated all other versions of reality, eliminating the 
emotional, irrational, impulsive, and incoherent features of human beings and 
nature itself. 
That said, can the same understandings be drawn by an audience today as 
in Athens? No, but the stories are expressions of _themes that are common to 
human experience: a sense of injustice, of suffering, of not being heard or 
understood. The subject of an ancient tragedy or a Shakespearean drama may 
speak directly to its time, but the themes of great literature are universal to 
233. Williams 1993, 3. 
234. Thomasma 2000, 67ff. 
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human experience. The subject of Anti.gone or Medea is a woman's experience in 
the ancient world, as the subject of King Lear is English politics and social 
confusion in the sixteenth century. But the themes are justice, honor, the 
irresistibility of sin, the desire for power, the terrible difficulties of life's 
turnabouts, the fear of growing old, and the pain of betrayal. These do not seem 
to change with time. We gain understanding about such experiences from the 
Greeks because, as Knox says, we inherited from them their virtues and vices and 
so their heritage defines us. It "makes us a people different from those who have 
grown up in the religious faiths and philosophies of the East; it is for better or 
worse, the driving force of that civilization we call Western."235 
e. Learning from literature 
I have shown previously in this chapter that stories depict persistent 
values and that their persistence provides justification for the limited claim that 
they form elements of the moral image we have of ourselves. 236 I have also said 
that awareness of the persistence of these values can help us when we enter the 
communal fray about how we should proceed in the future with a variety of 
human endeavors.237 In addition, I have shown that stories can lead to 
understandings about human life that are very different than those that flow 
from traditional philosophical discourse. In this regard I said that we learn 
235. Knox 1989, 161. 
236. See above, II.a and Ile. 
237. See above, 11.d. 
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something from the Biblical parable of the good Samaritan, for example, that 
we cannot learn from a Kantian text. 238 
Finally, in my introduction I said there are ways to read stories by which 
we can sort out which values we want to continue honoring and which we might 
want to shed from our moral image. The current section is an attempt to enter 
one part of the effort to refute the skeptical postmodern doubts that the step can 
be made from noting the persistence of some values to showing that they should 
persist, and further that they can usefully contribute to discussions about how to 
· proceed in the future.239 
The tendency in literary theory, as in philosophy, has been to suppress the 
claims made by humanistic and religious traditions that useful ethical 
understanding is to be found in the literature of poetry, tragedy, and the novel.240 
· These claims about using literature are related to an assertion made by Charles 
Taylor, who says that getting a sense of who we are is done by orientating 
ourselves in the evaluative framework of a moral space. Thus to be without an 
"" evaluative framework" would leave one psychically disorientated. The evaluative 
frameworks Taylor refers to occur in various forms, but an essential one is a 
culture's stories.241 
238. See above, Il.c. 
239. I rely in this section partly on David Parker's suggestions for developing what he 
calls a new evaluative discourse (in Parker 1994). 
240. There are exceptions of course, including Nussbaum, Parker, Richard Rorty, and 
others. 
241. Taylor 1989, chapter 2. 
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Those who argue against evaluative value in literature have their 
beginnings in Enlightenment rationalism, which sometimes argued that ethics is 
entirely a cultural construct that seeks to find permanence in the ephemerality of. 
value. They reject ethical evaluation of literature as either ideologically and 
subjectively compromised, or as inherently pointless. John Carey argues both 
objections in asserting that an account of value in literature has no credibility '"in 
the godless universe which most people now inhabit." He goes on to assert that 
0 good and evil and other such ephemera were created by the human mind in its 
attempt to impose some significance on the amoral flux which constitutes 
reality. ,,242 
There is little disagreement that some of our enduring values should be 
left behind. Some outlived their time because they have been shown to lead to the 
unjust oppression of other beings, others because they tend generally to lead to 
harm rather than well-being, 243 and some because, indeed, they were used to 
support ideologies we can no longer tolerate. But that some persistent values 
should be shed does not entail that none should continue to be honored. This 
section addresses the issue by considering how we can read stories so that we 
may use tp.em to differentiate those values that increase well-being from those 
that perpetuate human suffering. In addition, following the arguments above in 
11.c and elsewhere, I will discuss this issue in relationship to my claim that stories 
242. Carey 1980, 204. 
243. This may be thought about in reference to a wider focus of concern than the familial, 
communal, and erotic relationships of human beings. Our values have effect on 
ecosystem$, on the earth generally, on other kinds of beings, and perhaps on the entire 
universe. I do not speak to these here only because the focus of this dissertation is on 
values related to human relationship. 
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tell us things that philosophical discourse cannot, and further that they do it in 
a way that is more accessible and powerful than the usual genres of philosophy. 
It is partly because of this that beginning in the mid-1980s, literary 
theorists increasingly turned to moral philosophy to discuss stories-a shift 
Martha Nussbaum characterizes as "a marked turn toward the ethical."244 
Similarly, moral philosophers began a 'turn' toward the literary at about the 
same time. 245 Richard Rorty asserts that this 'turn' resulted partly from a shift in 
philosophy from a culture of positivism to a culture of pragmatism, which views 
science as a genre of literature, or, stated another way, literature and the arts as 
inquiries on the same footing as scientific inquiries: 
Thus it sees ethics as neither more 'relative' or 'subjective' than scientific theory, nor as needing to be made 'scientific'. Physics is a way of trying to cope with various bits of the universe; ethics is a matter of trying to cope with other bits. Mathematics helps physics do its job; literature and the arts help ethics do its. 246 
Rorty also suggests that there is no need to find philosophical foundations 
that make moral codes as 'objective' as we once thought were needed for 
physics, and so it is not necessary to decide whether to choose from two 
possibilities: foundationalism or "intellectual and moral chaos."247 While I do not 
share Rorty's pragmatic skepticism, his move away from foundationalism 
244. Nussbaum 1990, 29, 38:ff. Literary theorists comprising this 'turn' include Parker, 
Lionel Trilling, Barbara Johnson, J. Hillis Miller, Murray Krieger, Richard Freadman, and 
Wayne Booth. 
245. These include Nussbaum, Alasdair MacIntyre, Charles Taylor, Richard Bernstein, 
Sanley Cavell, Richard Rorty, Frederick Olafson, and Cora Diamond. 
246. Rorty 1991, xiii. 
247. Bernstein 1986, 10-11. 
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supports my thesis that it is not necessary to ground ethical evaluation of 
literature in universal objectivity in order to claim criteria for evaluation. 
Abstract and universal ethical theories filter through a culture in such a 
way that they contribute to our individual and communal decisions. But our day­
to-day decisions are usually not made by directly applying theory. Mostly, we 
decide based on a combination of experience, learned understandings, and 
cultural norms that have come into our consciousness by way of stories, which 
are then confirmed, or not, by additional experience. All these elements gather 
together in a web of knowing that Putnam calls our "moral image' of the world. 
The troublesome element in any attempt to consider social problems by 
employing the values found in stories is that as stories assemble in a common 
cultural inheritance, they are of different kinds: some contain elements of truth 
that can assist in efforts to enhance human thriving; others contain outright 
error, superstitition, and oppressive nonsense. Further, because our decision­
making processes do not build from universally demonstrable principles, they are 
vulnerable to the skeptical challenge I mentioned earlier. But one of the reasons 
we tend not to directly consult such principles is that they are largely barren of 
the full range of human experience. They are thus limited in their ability to 
convey meaningful information about the living of a human life. What is needed 
is a method by which we can educe from stories those values that not only 
persist, but that are helpful in forging an equitable human community. 
The first element of such a method is to work from a premise that stories 
have certain effects employed for various purposes, sometimes conscious, 
sometimes not. For example, I showed previously that in antiquity, as now, 
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stories of all kinds are instrumental in formation of cultural identity. One side of 
this is that they can serve the social purpose of upholding vested interests; they 
can provide a kind of mythical justification to enable and further the goals of the 
status quo-for good and ill. Ruth Finnegan, for example, says poetry has been 
used as propaganda to strengthen the position of rulers. 248 But stories also can be 
employed to disrupt and change society. Bob Dylan did this, and continues to, in 
his stories about the barbarities of the improper use of power and the 
possibilities of change. 
So if Goody, Levi-Strauss, Finnegan, and others have got it right,249 stories 
serve as the primary instrument by which individuals and cultures define 
themselves and transmit their views about what is important to the group. In this 
way, stories are more than mere repetitions of cautionary tales; they are the 
instrument by which we create our world and by which we can change it. 
Stories, and the way they transmute over time, can thus help us decide what 
aspects of ourselves have continuing relevance. They also become essential in 
knowing how we want to create ourselves in the future, which is a part of the 
next element of the method I am suggesting. 
The second element is contained in an assertion made by David Parker, 
who believes stories can actively be used not just in their role as one of the 
currents that form our moral image of the world, but as an important impetus in 
recognizing social limitations and to alter our image to create a better, more just 
image. He argues that readers can actively use stories to understand the 
248. Finnegan 1977, 242. Also see Tandy 1997 and above, section II.b. 
249. See the discussion of this, above, in section 11.b. 
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limitations and cruelties of human society and that this can lead to efforts to 
change the society.250 Stories show the values employed in cultural processes and 
practices, and so canonic literature can point to habitual categories and 
behaviors related to social codes and ethnocentrism. 
Novels that endure in a culture dramatize and thus bring fully to our 
awareness the various values and disvalues to which we are habituated. By 
seeing these places of acculturation, we are more likely to get new ideas about 
their effect, as well as alternatives to these culture-bound habits. They can also 
show us the way people live lives in different cultures, and thus reinforce both 
the idea that there are underlying commonalities and that there are other 
possibilities. By showing patterns of conformity, stories can help readers 
acknowledge and reconsider their beliefs. It is often in this way-seeing patterns 
of conformity-that new ideas come into our awareness. In relationship to 
Aristotelian examination of universally held ethical beliefs, Nussbaum describes 
how it is, by looking carefully at beliefs and the way they are lived out by 
different people and cultures, that one's own ideas can be altered; sometimes 
entirely new ideas formed. The method makes possible "'new discoveries, radical 
departures, or sharp changes of position . . .  "251 
A third element is the claim that stories can provide a truer, more full­
blooded view of the way moral values play out in human lives. Nussbaum says 
that certain canonic stories are not just helpful in elucidating philosophical 
250. Parker 1994, 32ff. 
251. Nussbaum 1986, 258. 
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understanding, they are necessary sources of insight. 252 But I go further than 
claiming they are merely another element of philosophical insight, a kind of 
addenda to Kant's description of the rational duty to follow moral law. I argue 
instead that reading Kant, or reading one of Mill's ethical treatises, is a source for 
a particular kind of understanding. Reading Euripides, Dickens, and Faulkner is 
not only a different source, it provides understanding of an entirely different 
kind. On Nussbaum's account, for example, stories encompass the particularities 
of situations in a way that reasoning processes such as those of Mill and Kant do 
not.253 Aristotle, too, says poetry is different, and has ,,,,graver import" because 
,l,lits statements are of the nature of universals . . .  "254 Henry James asserts that it is 
by way of poetry that we become ,1,1:finely aware," 255 because it allows us to 
understand what is important about our lives, how we describe ourselves, how 
we want to be, and how we do not want to be. We cannot get the fullness of 
understanding by reading Plato and Aristotle alone that we can achieve by 
reading Antigone. Gary Wihl compares the detailed, ,l,lrichly descriptive 
vocabularies" of narrative with the ascetic language of philosophy, concluding 
. that philosophical discourse does not permit the irony required for ,l,lperspicuity 
in the areas of ethical conflict and competing social agendas."256 
Parker insists that tragic poetry in particular has a way of bringing home 
to the audience, ,l,lin a way that systematic philosophy could not, the painfully 
252. Nussbaum 1990, 23. 
253. Nussbaum 1993, 71. Also see Nussbaum 1990, 3ff., 23. 
254. Poetics 9.1451b4-5. 
255. James 1934, 62. 
256. Wihl 1995, 6. 
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complex, indeterminate, intractable nature of ethical deliberation to human 
beings caught up in the midst of it."257 By his, and by Nussbaum' s, account, this 
view of human life is more than just distinctive as a philosophical source, it 
claims that some views of life that should be seriously considered cannot be 
understood by means of anything other than imaginative literature. 
The value of stories on all of these accounts is that they are able to bring 
alive to a reader or an audience a sense of what matters, and of how our intimate 
as well as our communal connections have important emotional elements that 
cannot be drawn clearly in any form but that of narrative and poetry. Proust 
believes, for example, that human values and psychology cannot be understood 
by intellectual activity alone, and clearly not by studying only philosophical 
theory; they can be fully felt and understood only if they are known emotionally, 
and Nknowing emotionally" is best portrayed in stories. 258 
The fourth element is a denial of the skeptical argument that rejects ethical 
evaluation of literature on grounds either that it is too ideologically 
compromised, and thereby subjective, or that it is inherently pointless because 
values are merely human constructs that have no enduring reality. That 
evaluation is ideologically and culturally compromised does not contain the 
conclusion that evaluation has no worth. Similarly, that the values contained in 
stories are the result of human imagination and the living of human lives does 
not infer that they have no enduring reality: they point to places where there is 
something we share in our conceptions of ourselves, in this culture, over time. 
257. Parker 1994, 35. 
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They do not contain objective reality, but they nevertheless have the force of 
objectivity in this narrow sense. 
Thomas Nagel tries to get at this when he argues that the subjective is 
indeed a side of reality. He argues that there is something that it is like to be a 
bat.259 It is also what Alasdair MacIntyre has in mind when he argues that the 
post-Enlightenment tradition has raised rationality to undue heights and lowered 
valuational and emotional understanding to non-importance.260 He argues for a 
kind of objectivity in values similar to that of Nagel's claim. There are moral 
traditions, he says, and we would do well to attend them: 
I am never able to seek for the good or exercise the virtues only qua individual . . .  I inherit from the past of my family, my city, my tribe, my nation, a variety of debts, inheritances, rightful expectations and obligations. These contribute the given of my life, my moral starting point . . .  For the story of my life is always embedded in the story of those communities from. which I derive my identity. I am born with a past; and to try to cut myself off from that past, in the individualist mode, is to deform my present relationships. 261 
Similarly, Parker says our individual identities are embedded in communal 
stories, 11which helps us to see why the so-called literary cannon, in so far as it 
has contributed to the shaping of Western culture, is so important for us." The 
moral traditions of stories are partly inherited and partly created and so are 11in 
some sense already within ourselves."262 
258. Proust 1981. For more on Proust and philosophy, see Mary Rawlinson, 11 Art and 
Truth: Reading Proust," in Philosophy and Literature 1982, 6: 1-16. 
259. Nagel 1979. 
260. MacIntyre 1981, 175. 
261. MacIntyre 1981, 204f. 
262. Parker 1994, 17-18. 
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The fifth element is partly based on the existence of "thick" evaluative 
concepts embedded in culture and which turn up in the culture's stories. 
Following Williams, our ethical terminology includes such thick concepts as 
'coward,' 1ie,' 'brutality,' gratitude,' and others. A skeptic would argue that these 
are "action-guiding," but Williams says they are uworld-guided."263 He argues 
that the existence of these thick ethical concepts makes a difference in our lives, 
but admits that they are "indeed open to being unseated by reflection . . .  " 
Nevertheless, 
to the extent that they survive it, a practice that uses them is more stable in the face of the general, structural reflections about the truth of ethical judgments than a practice that does not use them. The judgements made with these concepts can straightforwardly be true, and, for the people who have those concepts, the claim involved in assenting to them can correspondingly be honored. 264 
That 'thick' ethical concepts are open to be unseated by reflection is important to 
this aspect of what I am suggesting. This is not the same thing as saying they are 
ephemeral cultural constructs that have no validity. 
Having the capacity for being unseated, Williams' s 'thick' ethical concepts 
are more resistant to the skeptical argument against employing the literary canon 
as a source of moral value. This skeptical argument can be thought about in two 
ways. The first is that assigning such valuation is circular: the canonical texts are 
great because they point to important and timeless human values. How do we 
know they are important and timeless? Because they are in the texts. A second, 
only slightly different version of this is that the texts point to enduring truths 
263. Williams 1985, 142. 
264. Williams 1985, 200. 
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because they have endured. If they did not offer something important, why 
would we keep reading them?265 A skeptical critic, Barbara Herrnstein Smith, 
argues that there is less to be found in canonical texts than proponents claim to 
find. Some works survive for a variety of reasons other than that they offer 
important values that should be honored. Once a text survives, she argues, 
survival itself increases its prospects for canonical status. Then the text begins 
to perform certain characteristic cultural functions by virtue of the very 
fact that it has endured . . .  the canonical work begins increasingly not 
merely to survive within but to shape and create the culture in which its 
value is produced and transmitted and, for that very reason, to perpetuate 
the conditions of its own flourishing. Nothing endures like endurance.266 
This suggests even more circularity in that the story, following Parker, points to 
important values only because the story itself provided the importance to these 
' values in the first place. But this is merely another version of saying that a 
literary canon is culturally constructed and culturally relative-which becomes 
troublesome, Parker says, only if one argues for an essentialist and universalist 
assumption about human nature. 267 If we set aside such assumptions and claim 
only that the canonic values are deeply embedded in this culture and thus tell us 
something about ourselves in this one culture for this period of time, then we can 
go on to employ the strategies I am suggesting to learn more about what is 
helpful and what is not. Thus the reason Williams' s description of "thick' concepts 
is resistant to the skeptical objections is that he grants in the beginning that if 
with considered examination we find that the use of certain thick concepts as 
265. This description is a paraphrase of a discussion of this issue in Parker 1994, 21. 
266. Herrnstein Smith 1988, 50. 
267. Parker 1994, 22-3. 
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ethical values is harmful to human thriving, then they can be set aside as no 
longer relevant to the kind of people we want to be. 
The sixth element is to accept Rorty's assertion that there are no non­
circular justifications. The seventh is to claim that finding useful values in 
literature must be done "within an interpreting and evaluative community"268 that 
brings to the task the moral progress, experience, and understandings that have 
accrued over time. 
The eighth element is . to understand, as background to the effort, 
something about Charles Taylor's historical account of the making of the modern 
identity.269 He says we live by way of a wide-ranging array of goods that 
developed in the culture over a very long time and for various reasons. It is a 
mistake to think that because many of those goods have often been mistakenly 
employed or misused by shortsighted people, the goods themselves should be 
dismissed. By bringing to bear the full range of the culture's goods, canonical 
texts can be plumbed in such a way that the various goods act as checks and 
balances on one another. These goods are a part of modern cultural identity, 
Taylor asserts, in that they are aspects of three mutually conflicting strands 
intertwined as formative threads beginning in antiquity and continuing today. 
The three strands are (a) an other-regarding Kantian-moral one derived 
from the Judaic and Christian traditions; (b) one that privileges disengaged 
rationality, autonomy, freedom, human equality, and universality, which comes 
268. Parker 1994, 24-5. 
269. Taylor 1989, 107ff. 
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from the Enlightenment; and (c) the Romantic one, which emphasizes the 
demands of nature, human fulfilment, and expressive integrity. 270 
Taylor's reason for emphasizing the three strands is to assert that it is not 
helpful to think of our moral understandings solely by way of the explanatory 
accounts of either Aristotle, Kant, Sartre, Nietzsche, Rorty, MacIntyre, or anyone 
else. Instead, all the various conceptions of the good that have influenced the 
Western psyche continue in some way to have relevance. All of the inextricably 
woven-together strands are included in who we are. As such, one of the lessons 
that might be drawn from Taylor's account is that instead of dismissing as no 
longer helpful some aspects of our moral inheritance, it might be more useful to 
examine them in such a way that we devel�p more understanding about when, 
whether, and how to employ them. In this sense, all of the values found in 
canonic stories can be helpful in our effort to understand who we are and who 
we want to become. 
To sum up, the eight elements that I suggest be brought to the effort of 
sorting out which values to keep and which to set aside are that 
(1) stories have effect, including, for good and ill, the forging of cultural 
identity; 
(2) stories can be actively used to impel change because they can help us 
recognize limitations and encourage alterations in our moral image of 
the world; 
(3) stories provide something different than philosophical discourse, 
including a more full-blooded understanding for the living of human 
lives; 
270. This synopsis of Taylor's historical account is from Parker 1989, 20. 
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(4) it is possible to refute the skeptical argument that rejects all ethical 
evaluation of literature on grounds that it is irredeemably 
compromised by ideology and the ephemerality of human 
construction; 
(5) 'thick' evaluative concepts can be found in the literary canon, but they 
can be unseated by reflection, and while their thickness relies for 
justification on a certain circular argument, this would be a problem 
only if I were to claim essentialist and universalist assumptions, which I 
do not; 
(6) following Rorty, there are no non-circular justifications; 
(7) the effort to find useful values in stories must be done within an 
interpreting and evaluative community that brings to the task the 
moral progress that has accrued over time; and, finally, 
(8) we must employ Taylor's account of the three strands of modern 
identity, as well as the full range of goods comprised by that identity, 
in any effort to understand the continuing value and relevance of 
canonic stories. 
By combining these eight elements, it may be possible to arrive at a way to 
resist the lingering argument against finding useful and relevant values in the 
literary canon. Much of the skeptical argument is the belief that those who want 
to find useful ethical values in stories mistakenly rely on the claim that certain 
values are useful because they point to constants in human nature and 
timelessness in moral understandings. Skeptics say that values, like human 
nature, are contingent and relative, and thus ephemeral. Further, they say values 
are usually employed to maintain traditions of oppression directed toward those 
who lack power, or who are in some way regarded as the "other.' 
I argued previously that this is too simplistic a view. While values 
employed in stories can be used to oppress and to maintain the power of 
whatever group has control, this is not the only purpose and not the only 
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understanding to be gotten from literature. My claim about values in stories 
argues that the values we want to resist shedding are neither illusory, arbitrary, 
nor ephemeral. They are, as Parker asserts, the product of a system that 
transcends both naive objectivism and dismissive skepticism. Through stories we 
can have an experience that speaks to issues related to the actual living out of 
human lives. If read by people who will interpret what they read through the lens 
of human experience and evaluate it by employing various elements of the 
culture's accrued understandings, something very different than support for 
oppression and suffering can emerge. By bringing Aristotle's practical wisdom 
to a text, the occlusions of the 'usual' interpretations can be replaced by new 
ways of seeing. 
Mark Twain's Huckleberry Finn may provide a good example of what I 
think is possible when we bring to bear the full weight of a discerning and 
evaluative reading community. Valuation of the nineteenth century novel's worth 
has varied. Some have unabashed admiration for its depiction of a slave with the 
full emotional complexity of all other human beings. Others dismiss the story for 
perpetuating oppressively harmful myths about African Americans. Christopher 
Clausen's analysis of the issue asserts, for example, that those who attacked the 
book "were mistaken in their interpretation of it (but) they were by no means 
wrong in identifying an important basis for evaluating it" when they said it 
condoned slavery and racism.271 
These very different evaluations of the same story might be seen as 
evidence that finding ethical values in literature is a doomed enterprise that will 
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founder in the difficulty of fixing certainty. But I think not. It is important that we 
have both views at hand, along with many others. With enough voices and the 
disparate views they express, we will find represented the full range of values 
and disvalues that are a part of our moral image. The process of differentiating 
those that may helpfully contribute to the makeup of our future moral image 
from those we want to set aside is accomplished together, in concert, as we 
decide which cause suffering and which help us to thrive by applying some 
process such as that I suggest. 
The process of differentiating is comprised of having an awareness of and 
employing the eight elements I listed. I said previously that this rests on a certain 
trust in moral progress as well as acceptance that there are no non-circular 
justifications. Given sufficient time and the understanding that comes from the 
confluence of human experience, it is possible to sort out this value from that in 
the canon. In Huckleberry Finn, for example, we have generally settled on the 
qualities of sympathetic feeling, equitable treatment, loyalty, familial duty, and 
arguably even honesty as the embedded values that we continue to admire. We 
also take from it what a lineage of criticism has taught us: that while the story's 
portrayal of Jim creates him as a fully formed human being, it also can have the 
effect of perpetuating stereotypical assumptions. These assumptions occur partly 
in the use of language, partly in the story's imagery, and partly in the relationship 
between Jim and Huck. 
Are these the views of everyone in the culture? No. But when Huckleberry 
Finn is used as an instructional text by a discerning reader or teacher, these 
271. Clausen 1986, 3. 
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various qualities and problems are discussed, evaluated, and placed in the 
context of other strains in our moral image. They are considered in light of all 
that we have learned during the century and a half since slavery was a part of 
this culture. The result is not an unthinking following of the dominant group's 
efforts to oppress the vulnerable. Over time, with sufficient attention paid to the 
full range of discussion and to the various goods that Taylor urges us to attend, 
we can take from Huckleberry Finn the beginning of new configurations in the 
moral image. We do this partly because of the communal discussion, and the 
discussion incorporates a deeper understanding of the issues because 
participants have a visceral knowledge of the people and their lives. They would 
not get this from, say, the discussion of justice in a text by John Rawls. Hearing 
Huck's struggle, and having the picture in our imagination of Huck and Jim 
floating down the river, talking, caring about each other, learning from Jim about 
his family, and trying to understand their situation-all of this creates an 
awareness that cannot be generated by a text on ethical or political theories. 
In a similar way, we examine texts from antiquity with the understanding 
and experience of not just a century and a half, but from the vantage of more 
than two thousand years. As we probably do not draw from Huckleberry Finn 
what would have been drawn by a reader in the antebellum South, so we do not 
draw from Antigone what an ancient Greek would have. We bring the 
understanding of generations and generations of experience, change, and new 
awarenesses. We see expressions of value that are part of a larger moral code, 
and we evaluate them with the experience of eyes that have seen the �esult of 
slavery, of overweening power, of oppression, and of injustice. We also see it 
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through the prism of a culture that allows disparate views to be expressed and 
arguments to be joined. 
As we try to understand what limits circumscribe our lives, the expression 
of many values alter. But some aspects of them persist to suggest commonality 
across time. Loyalty may be one of these, the persistence of which probably says 
something important about human beings. This does not mean, as I said earlier, 
that the priority we assign to the objects of loyalty-family, state, religion, 
friends-necessarily remains constant. But when we see Antigone's expression of 
loyalty to her brother and then see Huck's loyalty to his friend Jim, we not only 
admire it, we begin to see that it is an important element of human relationship 
that we would not want to be without. Does this mean all expressions of loyalty 
are admirable? Of course not. Some loyal acts cause human suffering. But when 
we put an expression of loyalty in the web of other human goods, we can develop 
the ability over time to sort out which is which. It then becomes possible to 
portray loyalty itself as a persistent value in this culture, such that when it is 
expressed in a way that contributes to human well-being, we conclude, based on 
experience and received knowledge, that it has the capacity to enrich our lives. It 
also means that to eliminate loyalty as a value from our moral image of the world 
would be to significantly alter the nature of human relationships in ways that we 
would not want to occur. 
The last argument I will make to claim justification for finding useful 
ethical values in literature is that stories- whether told in literature, theater, or 
film-are the most accessible way to develop moral understanding. If we can 
encourage people to thoughtfully employ them as a resource for making sense of 
their lives, they will not be at the mercy of accepting the moral evaluations of 
105 
others. When people read stories that contain the culture's long-held beliefs 
about family, friendship, honesty, loyalty, and other values, they may put them 
together in various individual configurations, but the weight of time and the web 
of other values, can provide a platform from which they can with more wisdom 
further the task of expanding moral encompassment. If on the other hand we 
encourage suspicion of the literature of the past because the past contains 
cultural skeletons we want to leave behind, then we will find ourselves without 
the benefit of generations of wisdom. We would then be left in the situation 
Parker fears: being imprisoned ''in the peculiar perspectives of the present, and 
making it necessary, from the ethical point of view, to reinvent the wheel from 
generation to generation. "272 
This does not mean that we need constantly to look for reiterations of 
what honesty means, or the value of living a good life, or other truisms that can 
show up in stories. What marks most of canonic literature is ambiguity and 
complexity, not conceptions that are either essentialist or simplistic. For Parker, 
this means the stories we should be attending are those that demand 
the fullest, most engaged and most intelligent examination. Ethical or moral answer-giving is what ultimately fails to satisfy interest, especially if it is of a kind that suppresses other sorts of answers. Those works that most sustain interest in the long run are the ones that present both interference and dynamic interrelationship between different ethical systems or conceptions.273 
This is why Charles Taylor argues that stories which do not account for the full 
range of goods in a pluralistic culture will not be adequate for long. When they 
272. Parker 1994, 196. 
273. Parker 1994, 197. 
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fail to expand our understanding of the three strands that make up our accrued 
identity, we will notice that they lack a certain awareness of the enormous 
complexities in our moral image. Those stories and the values in them will shortly 
disappear from our view, replaced by others that can better assist us in the task 
of encompassment. 
In the end, it may be a mistaken enterprise to claim too much for a method 
by which we deliberately sort out the helpful or 'good' values from the not-so­
helpful or 'bad' values in stories. Any too-systematic picking apart of the 
elements of a story can lead us to lose sight of the practical wisdom that 
distinguishes the way the literary imagination involves us in ethical 
consideration. The practical wisdom of stories is found not, as Parker argues, "in 
their direct enfleshment of preconceived commitments of moral belief, principle, 
or ideology," but rather, in the best of literature, wisdom is to be found "in their 
setting-up of exploratory interlocution between conflicting ethical claims."274 We 
should guard against the tendency of philosophy to treat the use of stories as if it 
were a technical problem that could be tidied up, or perhaps discarded entirely, 
by the application of strict logical theory. This would impoverish the endeavor, 
severing it from real human lives. 
So it is important that as we look for justification allowing us to discern 
which values found in stories continue to have relevance, we do not lose sight of 
a story's specific capacity to do something entirely different than is the function 
274. Parker 1994, 38. 
107 
of standard philosophical discourse. 275 This function is what sometimes is 
referred to as the spirit or the ethos or character of a story, "which involves both 
the sense of life that is expressed by the work as a whole and, implicit in that, the 
practical discernment which mediates between, and explores, the clashes of 
moral value it embodies. "276 In this sense, stories are important to our 
understanding in a way that is like the Aristotelian conception of poetry being 
important not merely because of the themes it embodies, nor by application of 
principles and categories, but instead by the vital engagement of all the senses, 
together, exploring imaginatively. 
275. For more on this, see Frank Palmer's (1992) discussion of what philosophy can learn 
from literature. 
276. Wayne Booth (1988) and S. L. Goldberg (1993) both discuss the value of the literary 
imagination in this way, as does Parker 1994, 38ff. 
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Chapter III: Stories 
a. The variety of boundaries 
In what follows, I examine how certain secular and religious stories 
contain ideas that form parts of our Western moral image. They provide a 
glimpse of the part of ourselves that perceives limits, the part that understands, 
despite Protagoras, that we may not be the measure of all things. This is why we 
can know that while Creon's argument for the primacy of human law seems a 
reasonable position, it is the concern about divine, or perhaps universal, law 
expressed by Antigone that stirs deep places in our hearts, warning that we must 
beware. 
Where these ideas form thicknesses we find clues that can help us in 
current discussions of issues related generally to health care and specifically to 
genetic manipulations, including cloning. The ideas pointed to in these 
thicknesses serve as guides when we make valuational choices, especially those 
choices that move us from the familiar to the unfamiliar, from places we believe 
are in our realm toward places we believe are forbidden ground, perhaps God's 
realm. The dilemma is clearly enunciated in tragedy, where, as Allen Dunn says, 
#The spectacle of suffering and extremity . . .  functions . . .  both as a reminder of 
the limits of human values, their timebound, artificial fragility, and an invocation 
of the beauty of this fragility."277 
That there is a boundary between the human and the divine, or the natural 
and supernatural, sometimes encompasses and sometimes occurs in addition to 
109 
other beliefs about boundaries, including both aversions to crossing categories 
and inclinations toward honoring the separations in dualities. For example, a 
boundary exists in Western cultural between humans and beasts.278 It is a 
demarcation imposed by dint of commonly held cultural beliefs that the 
universe-perhaps God (or some divine process)-created categories, either 
intentionally or at least with some inherent logic to it. And, further, that 
separations between categories are both .unatural" and 11good." The connotations 
of .unatural" and .ugood" here are dependent upon the beliefs of some who claim 
that divine actions are necessarily good and that honoring boundaries between 
categories is a necessary part of accepting that God has his reasons that humans 
cannot know. 
When some express revulsion at the mixing of genetic materials from 
humans and beasts, it is an expression of a cultural understanding of natural 
boundaries. Humans and gods mate with some frequency in the Greek stories. 
These instances generally produce offspring that in one way or another cause 
chaos for humans. As we shall see, Dionysus, Achilleus, and others upset the 
balance in the world and stir in us questions about proper respect for limits. 
Similarly, when humans merge with beasts, as occurs with centaurs, the Sphinx, 
and at least metaphorically in the festivals of Dionysus, difficulties inevitably 
ensue. When in A Midsummer Night's Dream, Bottom is transformed into a 
creature half human and half beast who is nevertheless loved by Titania, the 
queen of the fairies, Shakespeare uses our aversion to crossing categories for 
277. Dunn 1990, 657. 
278. 1bis is clearly not the case in all cultures, especially those that practice animistic 
religions. 
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both comic and serious purpose. 279 The supernatural intervenes in the world, 
causing an upsetting of the regular order. The story shows us what harm can 
befall us when uncontrolled forces are let loose, boundaries crossed, and 
categories mixed. 
In his study of Sophocles, Charles Segal discusses boundaries and 
crossing categories and treats as fundamental to tragedy the precariousness of 
the line between human and beast.280 Similarly, James Davidson argues that 
u civilization itself is built on the containment of animal passions within 
boundaries of rules and protocols . . .  If these rules are broken or inverted . . .  
then civilization itself is in jeopardy and a daimon [roughly, spirit] is loose in the 
oikos [household] who will turn the table over." 281 
Shakespeare's ideas for Bottom as well as for other crossings of 
categories were drawn from depictions in Greek art and theater. During the 
period from the sevent� to the first centuries BCE, men and women are 
frequently portrayed as consorting with various deities and near deities-gods, 
nymphs, satyrs, giants, centaurs, and other inhabitants of the netherworld. A 
painting from the second half of the fourth century found on the wall of a royal 
tomb at Vergina, shows Hades clutching Persephone with one arm and the reins 
of his chariot with the other as he takes her to the underworld. 282 The picture 
alludes to the demarcation between the underworld and the human world, but it 
279. A Midsummer Night's Dream, 4.1. 
280. Segal 1981, 87-88. See especially Ajax, 129-131, 139; Antigone, 157-158; Electra, 
269-270; OT, 211, 216-217, 223-224; The Women of Trachis, 95-98, 104-105. 
281. Davidson 1998. 
282. Boardman 1986, 293. 
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suggests the possibility that the two worlds may be accessible to each other, 
that inhabitants of one can be involved with those of the other. Hades' land may 
be a different place, but this seems merely a matter of geography. The veil 
between this world and his is very thin, but it is still a veil, and the separation is 
meant to serve as a proscription against human intrusion. Even Aristotle 
honored the veil, claiming that while this world is made of earth, air, fire, and 
water, the outer worlds of the moon, sun, and stars are composed of ether, which 
is both pure and divine.283 Isaac Newton would eventually disabuse us of beliefs 
that this world operates under different laws than control the cosmos, but even 
with his explanations, the perception persists that there is something 
fundamentally different about the makeup and operation of whatever regions 
exist beyond our reach. 
The tension that results, between what we think we know and what we 
think perhaps we should not enter, is much like the tension that developed as 
monotheism began enveloping the West. The old pagan and chthonic gods284 
were in our midst, close at hand, accessible, and comforting in their participation 
with our world. Sacrifices to them could be thought of as sharing a meal with 
them. Their presence was immediate, apparent in the day to day events of rain, 
283. On the Universe 392a5. 
284. Chthonic derives from the Greek chthon (earth) and refers to the deities, spirits, and 
other beings dwelling under the earth. The principal Greek deities included the twelve 
Olympians-Zeus, Hera, Athena, Apollo, and so forth-along with the chtonic gods, 
including Hades and his wife Persephone. The souls of the dead were generally thought 
to be taken to the underworld by Hermes (See page 111 for more on this). Simon Price 
(Price 1999, page 101ff.) has an interesting discussion about the use of '"curse tablets" to 
seek the assistance of the chthonic powers for help in legal and political disputes, 
rivalries, and sexual matters. Kerrigan 1996, 34ff., also discusses curse tablets and issues 
related to the Greek view of death and treatment of the dead. Also see Segal 1981 on 
related issues involving magic, and Burkert 1977/1985, especially194-9, on issues related 
to death, the afterlife, and chthonic deities. 
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childbirth, death, and bad luck. Monotheism brought a distant, transcendent, 
unknowable, and ungovernable deity. The change was neither fast nor easy. As 
we shall see in Genesis, the Israelites' attitude toward divinity moved back and 
forth, hesitantly, between the old, close-at-hand local gods, and the new idea of a 
universal but distant God of the cosmos. 285 The wrestling of Jacob with God, or at 
least an angel of God, may be seen as an indication of the struggle to sort out the 
implications of the shifting ideas.286 Similarly, the difficulties at Sinai287 between 
the competing notion of the unseen God of Moses and the immediately present 
god, Baal, who could be seen in the golden calf, represent the tension between 
the old and the new. As the perception of God thus changed, with it came 
concurrent uncertainty about the divine/human relationship, and thus about 
boundaries and limitations. 
These and other allusions to boundaries mark the development of cultural 
ideas related to human limitations. It may be helpful to understand how these 
ideas occur in Western stories so that we are more aware of their implications in 
questions related, for example, to whether important boundaries are violated by 
cloning or by some versions of genetic manipulation. If there is a possibility that 
we are seeing the beginning of a shift from begetting children to manufacturing 
children, is this a violation of a boundary that surrounds cherished ideas about 
children and family? The discussion between Paul Ramsey and Joseph Fletcher 
285. A possible example of this hesitance occurs at Genesis 18.1 when God seems to 
appear as three gods at the entrance to Abraham's tent. 
286. Genesis 32.24. 
287. Exodus 31.18ff., 32. 
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raised this question thirty years ago and it has not been resolved. 288 These 
understandings also can be usefully employed in other questions as well: Do our 
stories about boundaries tell us anything about our responsibilities to future 
people? About intergenerational justice? About whether intrinsic differences 
exist between using genetic technology to enhance intelligence and other means 
to accomplish the same end? Perhaps even about the sometimes conflicting 
responsibilities of protecting public well-being versus a physician's duty to 
individual patients? 
In each of these issues are embedded emotional and imaginative 
responses that affect how we view the specific dilemmas. They occur 
concurrently with the rational elements we also bring to the discussion. Some of 
these emotional and imaginative qualities are inherent to Western thought 
generally, but some are peculiar to specific religious or social environments. For 
example, one of the reasons there are not more people willing to donate organs 
after death is fear among some about what may or may not happen to their 
bodies and souls after death if their bodies are not intact. 289 This fear arises partly 
from theological concerns, but it arises too as a result of fears and revulsions 
expressed over time in stories that in turn lead to commonly held emotional 
responses. A similar phenomenon arises in response to creating what is 
288. Essays by each appeared in The Hastings Center Report, with Ramsey arguing that 
we are in danger of altering the paradigm to manufacturing children, and Fletcher 
asserting that gaining more control over childbearing affords more advantages than 
disadvantages. Fletcher in The Hastings Center Report 2/5 (Nov 1972), 1-4 and The 
Hastings Center Report 4/5 (December 1974), 4-7. 
289. Although the Nicene Creed affirms only the "resurrection of the dead," resurrection 
of the flesh was included in the Apostles' Creed. In the Book of Common Prayer, 
resurrection of the flesh was assumed. Despelder 1996, 551ft'. Also see John Hick 
1976/1985 and David Edwards 1999. 
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sometimes thought of as artificial life. Stories of golems created by practitioners 
of practical Kaballah, for example, and stories centered on the Frankenstein tale 
have a tight grip on our imaginations, so that when scientists talk about cloning, 
our emotions go directly to these stories. Our emotional imagination is where we 
first consider issues such as cloning, xenotransplantation, genetic manipulation, 
and �ther possibilities. 
We can eventually hold emotional responses in abeyance while we 
rationally examine the ideas, but they are always on the periphery of our 
thoughts. Nussbaum argues that emotional response is a valuable contribution to 
the process of understanding moral claims and making sense of specific moral 
dilemmas. She claims ethical value for emotions on grounds that they involve 
both cognitive structure and 11beliefs about how things are and what is 
important."290 
Emotions at their best entail discriminating responses to what is valuable, 
good, and proper. And these responses are best developed and understood by 
the imagination of the novelist. Thus, following Aristotle, practical reasoning 
unaccompanied by emotion is not sufficient for practical wisdom. If we do not 
incorporate and consult emotion in attempts to understand life, we are 
preventing 11a full rational judgment-for example by preventing an access to 
one's grief, or one's love, that is necessary for the full understanding of what has 
taken place when a loved one dies."291 A richer understanding of this is made 
available to us by reading literature because it shows us features of our lives that 
290. Nussbaum 1990, 40 
291. Nussbaum 1990, 40-41. 
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we otherwise might not notice and so would not include in moral 
consideration. It creates the possibility of reflective consciousness in a way that 
allows us to grasp truth and understand ourselves.292 
For these reasons, I begin this chapter looking at the stories of Homer and 
Hesiod, because in their tales we find the earliest examples in the West of ideas 
that form our emotional and imaginative responses to issues that touch on the 
existence of a boundary between the divine and the human realms. The boundary 
can be thought of in ancient literature as relating to issues of justice, or dike. I 
then turn to the Greek tragedians and then to Genesis. 
I stop there not because it is the end of the discussion but because an 
examination of the continued development of this thesis is for another project. It 
could be argued that as the Christian era progressed the existence of 
divine/human boundaries became more apparent. The absolute transcendence of 
the divine was a strong element of the Protestant movement and with it arose a 
clear and fixed role for humanity: do not transgress God's domain; do not try to 
#play God." But, while Christianity often focused on what should not be done 
with God's creation, a much more complex struggle with this issue developed in 
Judaic thought. For Jews, the natural world is to be understood and improved. In 
the Jewish doctrine of Tikkun Olam, the world is imperfect and one of humanity's 
tasks is to assist in working toward its perfection. 293 As such, Jewish ethicists and 
292. Nussbaum 1990, 41ff. 
293. Tikkun Olam is discussed in Frank and Leaman 1997, vol. 2, 478, 871. Also see 
Yehuda Liebes, Studies in Jewish Myth and Jewish Messianism, 1993, Batya Stein, tr., 
Albany: State University of New York Press, 100, 112, 115-117, 126-128, 130-137, 139, 
140-149, 194-200, 204-205, 208, 210; Blumenthal, David, 1988/1994, God at the 
Center-Meditations on Jewish Spirituality, Northvale, NJ/London: Jason Aronson, 
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commentators tend to argue for the acceptability of projects intended to enhance 
life and reduce suffering.294 Thus, while God is transcendent and there are 
limitations on humanity's reach, there is little evidence that the tradition believes 
endeavors such as genetic manipulation are proscribed as unacceptably treading 
on God's province. This suggests that the provenance of the boundary issue in 
this context is not in the difference between humanity and divinity-because that 
exists in the Judaic no less than in the Christian tradition-but, rather, in 
something else. The difference between the two traditions as they incorporated 
into themselves elements of the Greek tradition may be in the perception of 
humanity's purpose, which will be explored in some of the following stories. 
A recurrent image in many of these stories is the Promethean rebel, which 
provides the counterpoint to our fears about crossing divine boundaries. 
Prometheus turns up again and again in literature because he reminds us, as 
Protagoras did, that it may be there are no boundaries except those we hold in 
our emotions and our imaginations. Like Prometheus, Dionysus represents what 
is outside the norm, what is disruptive to established values. In some ways, the 
occurrence of an example outside the norm may speak to our understanding of 
the norm itself. For example, the common depiction in Greek art and literature of 
distinct domains preserved for men and for women is pointedly apparent by the 
uniqueness of Aspasia' s appearance in ancient philosophy and her apparent 
xxvi-xxii, 22-27, 54-55, 66-68; Wurzburger, Walter, 1954, Ethics of Responsibility, 
Philadelphia/Jerusalem: The Jewish Publication Society, 47ff. 
294. For example, conservative Jewish medical ethicist Rabbi Elliot Dorff (Dorff 1998, 317) 
says of cloning that it is morally neutral, .ults moral valence depends upon how we use it. 
Its enormous potential to affect us both negatively and positively requires that we be 
especially alert to the uses we plan for it" Later, on page 319, Dorff is more clear: ii • • •  if 
used to cure disease or overcome infertility, it is a permissible activity for us as God's 
partners." 
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involvement in Athenian politics. She lived with Pericles as his mistress,295 and 
shows up in Xenophon's Memorabilia296 arguing with Socrates about human 
nature. In the Achamians, Aristophanes parodies her critics who complain that 
she induced Pericles to start the Peloponnesian war.297 This, at the same time, on 
Thucydides' account, that Pericles in his funeral oration says, 111e greatest virtue 
of a woman lies in never being mentioned, either in praise or blame."298 So, like 
Prometheus and Dionysus, Aspasia and other women seem at times to appear in 
poetry to provide alternative perspectives on cultural norms. As Parker suggests 
about the use of stories to point to cultural limitations, they may act by way of 
their poetic character as catharses for changing those norms.299 
a. Homer. The niad 
Summazy 
The Iliad narrates the events of a few days near the end of the ten-year­
long Trojan War, which was caused by Paris's seduction of Helen and her 
abduction from Sparta. It focuses on the Greek hero Achilleus's angry 
withdrawal from the battle after he is insulted by his commander, Agamemnon. 
The poem defies easy summarization. Books 2 to 23 cover only four days and two 
nights. Aristotle says about this that Homer is superior to other poets in that ""He 
295. Blundell 1995, 148. 
296. Memorabilia Il.6.36. 
297. Achamians 515-39. 
298. Thucydides 2.45. 
299. Parker 1994, above, section IT.a. 
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did not attempt to deal even with the Trojan war in its entirety, though it was a 
whole with a definite beginning and end-through a feeling apparently that it 
was too long a story to be taken in .one view, or if not that, too complicated from 
the variety of incident in it. "300 
The son of Peleus and Thetis, Achilleus is mortal, and yet approaches 
divinity. He arrives at Troy leading fifty ships, wins many battles, and takes 
captives, including the woman Briseis. 301 He alone among the Iliad's characters 
keeps up the old practice of making elaborate offerings, including human victims, 
at a funeral. These and some of his other behaviors are condemned as evil, 302 
especially his treatment of Hector's body after killing him. 303 He is condemned 
too for his ungovernable anger, which is the element on which the plot turns. He 
admits the weakness and fears it may override his feeling of pity for Troy's king, 
Priam. 304 At the height of his fury he spares no one and has no respect for the 
gods, allowing his anger to override justice.305 
In Book 1, Agamemnon, the Greek commander, refuses to return his 
captive, Chryseis, to her father, Chryses, a priest of Apollo. Chryses had come to 
the Greek commander with the proper ransom, "carrying gifts beyond count and 
holding in his hands wound on a staff of gold the ribbons of Apollo who strikes 
300. Poetics 1459a.30-34. 
301. lliad 2.690. 
302. lliad 23.171. 
303. lliad 22.395. 
304. lliad 24.560. 
305. lliad 22.15-20. 
1 19 
from afar . . .  "306 He had said that the Greeks could proceed with the plundering 
of Troy, then return home victorious, "but may you give me back my own 
daughter and take the ransom, giving honour to Zeus' son who strikes from afar, 
Apollo."307 Agamemnon resists and an undefined pestilence that follows for nine 
days is said to be the result of his unjust act. 
Ravaged, Agamemnon's troops demand that he return Chryseis. He does, 
but in her stead he takes Briseis from Achilleus.308 Furiously angry, Achilleus 
refuses to continue fighting and persuades his mother to seek Zeus's help in 
gaining revenge. 309 Zeus punishes Agamemnon by luring him into a losing battle 
with the Trojans, who take advantage of Achilleus's having left the fray. Seeing 
that his forces are overwhelmed, Agamemnon offers Achilleus payment for 
Briseis and asks him to return. Achilleus wrongly refuses the payment and 
declines to rejoin the fighting. Instead, he accedes to letting his friend Patroclus 
return to the battle to prevent the Trojans from burning the Greek camp. 
Patroclus is killed by Hector during the battle, 310 which kindles another anger in 
Achilleus, who returns to the battle, kills Hector in bloody revenge, 311 and then 
lets his wrath lead him over the edge when he improperly desecrates Hector's 
body. 
306. mad 1.13-15. 
307. mad 1.18-21. 
308. mad 1.134. 
309. mad 1.352. 
310. mad 16.786ft'. 
311. mad 19-22. 
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Two important events of the future-the killing of Achilleus by the 
combined efforts of Paris and Apollo and the brutal ravaging of Troy by the 
Greeks-occur after the poem ends, but they are depicted as inevitably following 
from the events of the poem.312 It is left to the Odyss ey to describe the fight over 
Achilleus's body, his funeral, and the mourning ofThetis.313 
Discussi o n  
The poem is an epic cautionary tale, warning that violations of rules 
established by both gods and men have consequences. It warns against 
overriding the dicta of divinities and oracles and gives clear proscription against 
behaving as if one's actions were as free of limits as the gods'. The first word of 
the poem in the original Greek is "wrath." It is usually translated as "anger," but 
some argue that "anger" does not convey the kind of lasting, festering, 
embittered hostility that Achilleus felt after Amamemnon's insult.314 
Lattimore, however, uses "anger," and in the context of the next few lines 
manages to fill out the full horror brought upon the Greeks by Achilleus's 
response to Agamemnon: 
Sing, goddess, the anger of Peleus' son Achilleus 
and its devastation, which put pains thousandfold upon the 
Achaians, 
hurled in their multitudes to the house of Hades strong souls 
of heroes, but gave their bodies to be the delicate feasting 
of dogs, of all birds, and the will of Zeus was accomplished · 
since that time when first there stood in division of conflict Atreus' son the 
lord of men and brilliant Achilleus. 315 
312. mad 22.359--60. 
313. Odyssey 24.35ff. 
314. Latacz 1996 makes this argument. Charles Segal in his 1971 study of the mutilation of 
corpses in Homer also uses "'wrath." 
315. mad 1.1-7. 
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That Agamemnon's captive woman was the daughter of a priest of Apollo 
provides the pivot around which much of the poem's improper action revolves. 
When the Greek commander unjustly refuses to return her for an appropriate 
ransom offered properly by Chryses, the insult to the priest becomes a violation 
of both human and divine conventions. With intimations back to Agamemnon's 
sacrifice of Iphigeneia during the journey to Troy from Greece, the violation of 
customary standards leads from one disaster to another. Hero after hero fails to 
circumscribe their actions within limitations established by gods and human 
beings; they overstep boundaries and are destroyed. 
When the nine-day-long pestilence scourged through the Greek camp, 
Agamemnon relented, but not without burying himself deeper into an abyss of 
future misery. uRaging, the heart within filled black to the brim with anger from 
beneath, but his two eyes showed like fire in their blazing," Agamemnon speaks 
bitterly to Kalchas, the seer who told him he must return the girl to stop the 
plague: 
Seer of evil: never yet have you told me a good thing. 
Always the evil things are dear to your heart to prophesy, . . .  
Now once more you make divination . . .  
because I for the sake of the girl Chryseis would not take 
the shining ransom; and indeed I wish greatly to have her 
in my own house; since I like her better than Klytaimestra 
my own wife, for in truth she is no way inferior, 
neither in build nor stature nor wit, not in accomplishment. 316 
Agamemnon says that despite this, he will return the woman, but he must be 
compensated by having Achilleus' s captive woman. Speaking directly to 
Achilleus, he says, 
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. . .  I shall take the fair-cheeked Briseis, 
your prize, I myself going to your shelter, that you may learn well 
how much greater I am than you, and another man may shrink back from 
likening himself to me and contending against me. 317 
With this, Agamemnon haunts himself with such a series of misery­
bringing errors that he is doomed. Beginning with the killing of his daughter, 
then the slight handed the priest of Apollo, the stupidity of angering Achilleus, 
and now the insult to his wife of saying he likes Briseis better than 
Clytemnestra-it is as if Agamemnon himself hands Clytemnestra the sword with 
which she will slaughter him. Achilleus would suffer as a result of the insanity of 
his anger; Agamemnon from the stupidities of his blindness. Their fates come 
because they lack the wisdom that comes from proper application of just action. 
Some Greek tales tell of undeserved suffering. Sophocles' The Women of Trachis, 
for example, depicts undeserved, uncompensated, and entirely unrelieved 
suffering. The enormity of Oedipus's suffering, as well, seems not deserved. But 
in Homer's hands, Agamemnon allows little claim for the undeserved dimension 
of suffering. 
It is uncertain that we can from our perspective assign either moral 
responsibility or culpability within the framework of Homeric epic. Our 
assignment of guilt to Agamemnon is made through the near opacity of 
incommensurability. But the extent of impenetrability is not clear. How much can 
we think of this story as telling us something about human experience that 
endures, more or less unchanged over time? Bruno Snell argues convincingly 
316. Iliad 1.106-15. 
317. Iliad 1.184-87. 
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that the framework of moral ideas within which the Greeks argued is very 
different than ours. 318 
When Achilleus decides against slaying Agamemnon for taking his captive 
woman, he stops, curbing his anger, not because of what we would think of as 
moral inhibition, but because it is to his advantage to obey Athena's order to do 
so, at least for the moment.319 Snell says the common formulation in Homer of a 
man deliberating with himself is: ''It seemed more profitable to him . . .  "320 What 
is good thus becomes what is predictably profitable: 
. . .  it is sized up and weighed on the scale . . .  Where there is profit, 
happiness cannot be far off, especially in a society which has as yet no 
knowledge of 'internal' happiness or bliss. In early Greece the happy man 
is olbi os: he is in a state of plenty. His existence is not narrowly 
circumscribed; he basks in the sunshine of prosperity and splendour: he is 
e udai mo n, i.e. he has by his side a good demon who helps him to succeed 
in everything he undertakes. "321 
When Homer says a man is good, agathos, he does not mean thereby that 
he is morally unobjectionable, Snell says, "but rather that he is useful, proficient, 
and capable of vigorous action . . . .  Similarly a rete, virtue, does not denote a moral 
property but nobility, achievement, success and reputation. "322 
And yet there is ambiguity here. Snell also says that these words, agathos 
and arete "have an unmistakable tendency toward the moral because, unlike 
'happiness' or 'profit', they designate qualities for which a man may win the 
318. Snell 153-90. 
319. Iliad 1.207. 
320. Snell 1953, 156. 
321. Snell 1953, 157, 
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respect of his whole community. In this way, Snell argues that Homer marked the 
beginning of a change in the conception of morals and of human personality that 
would continue with the early lyric poets, the dramatists, and then Socrates. 
11 Aret e is 'ability' and 'achievement,' characteristics which are expected of a 
'good', an 'able' man, an aner a gath os. From Homer to Plato and beyond these 
words spell out the worth of a man and his work. Any change in their meaning, 
therefore, would indicate a reassessment of values."323 That change in meaning 
would become clear between the Homeric period and Plato. This was 
accomplished, Snell says, because the early motivations in calls to virtue-profit, 
happiness, and honor-were altered to adapt to new moral objective: 11Extend the 
time range after which a profit is expected, and the notion of private benefit 
becomes invested with a moral, not to say almost philosophical complexion. "324 
Snell argues, and Nussbaum makes a more recent claim, that these changes can 
be seen by examining the shifting sensibilities as they appear in literature. 325 
Arthur Adkins attempted to clarify the character of Greek ethical thinking 
by examining the Greek attitude to the concept of moral responsibility: 111f we can 
discover why the concept of moral responsibility is so unimportant to the Greeks, 
we shall go far towards understanding the difference between our moral 
systems, and discoveri�g the nature of each. "326 
322. Snell 1953, 158. On agathos and the aristocratic ideal in antiquity, see Donlan 1999. 
323. Snell 1953, 158-59. 
324. Snell 1953, 160. 
325. Also see Macintyre 1966. 
326. Adkins 1960, 3. Also see Glenn Graber, dissertation, for a discussion arguing that the 
law conception of ethics was introduced by the Stoics and that along with this came 
notions of duty, obligation, and a religious reference to God as lawgiver. 
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His and related discussions represent more than mere philological 
quibbles, because they clarify the evolution of moral beliefs stretching from the 
archaic period in Greece to the point at which they contain the seeds of modern 
moral beliefs. The way the changes occurred, the examples of them in literature, 
and the force of their significance is important to understanding our experience 
of moral statements. 
Adkins's solution to the problem he addressed is in his thesis that in 
Homer and for some time afterward, the Greeks assigned greatest value to the 
virtues attached to success rather than to intention. Adkins says this is most 
apparent in that the noun arete (excellence) and its adjective agathos are "the 
most powerful words of commendation," and the noun kakotes and its adjective 
kakos are the corresponding words of denigration. 327 Arete, Adkins says, is 
typically used to denote ,,courage' or 'skill' and primarily in a competitive 
context:328 ,, • • •  agathos and arete were reckoned by results rather than intention 
"329 
J.L. Creed argues against Adkins on this, asserting that Adkins's claims 
for the near universality of meaning in arete and kakotes are unfounded: .uFirstly 
there are obvious dangers in too confidently constructing a scheme of the 
development of moral values in the fifth century on the basis of the scanty 
evidence which we possess, and in supposing that we can infer very much from 
327. Adkins 1973, 218. 
328. Adkins 1960, 30-1, 44-5, 158. 
329. Adkins 1960, 157. 
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the relative frequency of certain terms used in certain ways."330 On this and other 
arguments, Creed mistakes Adkins in that he finds in Adkins more certainty that 
Adkins himself claims. In a response to Creed, Adkins says that Creed's criticism 
refers to someone who "manifestly holds views which differ in a number of 
important respects from my own."331 
Adkins argues that some Greeks value justice Hbecause and only because 
(or if and only if) the gods reward it."332 He points to Works and Days and to 
Aeschylus's Eumenides for support in the thesis that justice is valued because of 
the fear of divine punishment. As we shall see, the issue also arises for several 
important figures in the Iliad. 
The central day333 described in the poem tells much of how Achilleus' s 
wrath led to such enormity of misery and destruction. On that day, the Trojan 
hero Hector storms the Greek wall, reaches their ships, and then kills Achilleus's 
friend Patroclus, strips away his armor, and tries to seize the body "in order that 
he might cut off the head from the shoulders and drag the corpse to give to the 
dogs of Troy."334 His victory and the killing of an enemy are tainted, however, 
because he ignored the will of Zeus. Hector had been told by Zeus that he would 
grant him the power to kill Htil he makes his way to the strong-benched vessels, 
until the sun goes down and the blessed darkness comes over."335 But Hector 
330. Adkins 1960, 218. 
331. Adkins 1975, 209-220. 
332. Adkins 1975, 210. This is also discussed in the section below, Hesiod. 
333. Iliad 11.1-18.23�. 
334. lliad 17.125-7. 
335. lliad 11.192-94, also at 11.207-09. 
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ignored the order and rejected the advice of his brother, the seer 
Poulydamas, 336 who had warned that he should follow Zeus's guidance. Instead, 
Hector said, "'Poulydamas, these things that you argue please me no longer . . .  "337 
Instead, at the moment when the sun goes down, Hector says pridefully, ,,But 
now, when the son of devious-devising Kronos has given me the winning of 
glory by the ships, to pin the Achaians on the sea, why, fool, no longer show 
these thoughts to our people"338• 
Frenzied with grief over the death of his friend, 339 Achilleus rejoins 
Agamemnon, routs the Trojans, and angrily kills Hector.340 His actions revenge 
the death of Patroclus but Achilleus does not stop with proper vengeance. He 
also desecrates Hector's body, a violation of just standards as certainly as Creon 
violated divine laws by refusing to bury Polyneices . 
In another of a series of failures caused by exceeding the limits of human 
action, Hector's death meant he had failed as the protector of his people, and he 
understands how his failure to respect limitations led to defeat: "'Now, since by 
my own recklessness I have ruined my people, I feel shame before the Trojans 
• • •  "
341 Earlier, Hector's prayer for his son reveals both the ancient morality that 
praised heroic glory and fame and the cause of future events: "' . . .  grant that this 
boy, who is my son, may be as I am, pre-eminent among the Trojans . . .  and let 
336. Iliad 12.235-6. 
337. mad 18.285. 
338. Iliad 18.293-5. 
339. Iliad 18.15ff. 
340. mad 19-22. 
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him kill his enemy and bring home the bloodied spoils, and delight the heart of 
his mother."342 But Hector, like Achilleus later, was unable to stop with the 
limitations set by Zeus. Had he done so, his actions would have been considered 
proper and his reputation would have been enhanced. But he thought divine 
proscriptions did not apply to him, ignored the seer's warning, and let bloodlust 
override caution. 
Achilleus fared no better. His very nature has been constantly difficult. His 
goddess-mother Thetis laments that from his birth he has been set apart by hard 
fate: HNow it has befallen that your life must be brief and bitter beyond all men's, 
To a bad destiny I bore you in my chambers."343 In a study of the theme of 
mutilation of corpses in the Iliad, Charles Segal argues that Achilleus' s 
troublesome nature reflects the polarities of Homer's heroic world: ""immense 
capacities for love and for hatred, social responsibility and self-centered 
recklessness, devotion to personal ties and tragic isolation." Like Oedipus, 
Achilleus' s nature commits him to suffering and the outrage he commits by 
mutilating Hector's corpse is 8: manifestation of this. 
The Iliad ends with Hector's funeral and much of the last third of the poem 
is dominated by the treatment and maltreatment of the dead, just as the first few 
lines of the poem refer to the mutilation of corpses by ""dogs, and all the birds."344 
Segal argues against some readings of Homer that suggests the treatment of 
341. mad 22.1-5. 
342. mad 6.4 76-81. 
343. mad 1.417-18. 
344. mad 1.4-5. 
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Hector's body was an acceptable part of war.345 Samuel Bassett, for example, 
claims that the body of an enemy slain in battle is the property of the slayer, and 
no stigma attaches to its maltreatment: ll • • •  It was entirely in accord with the 
Homeric code of honor to outrage the body of a foeman . . .  in order to avenge 
the death of a dear friend or kinsman."346 Segal says no, Homer offers the moral 
perspective of his own post-heroic age347 and Bassett errs by ""confusing 
Achilleus' justification in killing Hector with the question of his excesses in 
treating the body . . .  as he does. "348 And even if it were lllegally" justified, Segal 
says, it is not made less horrible: Hereon, we may recall, was legally justified in 
exposing the body of Polyneices."349 
More importantly for Segal, the mutilation points to Homer's real concern: 
It is part of the tragedy of the human condition that passions-athe greed of 
Agamemnon, the love and intensity of Achilles, the patriotism and social sense of 
Hector-lead to unexpected disasters of a magnitude far beyond what the 
original action intended or deserved."350 In this way, Achilles' passionate and 
extreme nature gets caught in a situation not entirely of his own making that 
leads to the shattering in his life of what is most precious and the alteration of 
345. Segal 1971, 12 and elsewhere 
346. Bassett 1993, 54. 
347. Segal 1971, 12. 
348. Segal 1971, 15. 
349. Segal 1971, 15. 
350. Segal 1971, 16. 
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""what is noblest in himself turned to bitterness and hatred,"351 and for this he 
curses his anger352 and the war itself. 353 
Anger, violence, and outrage build in intensity throughout the mad, 
ending with the killing and mutilation of Hector. His corpse is stabbed354 and then 
Achilleus .,., devised his deeds of outrage, piercing the ankles to tie the body 
behind his chariot.355 This, combined with Priam's vision earlier in book 22 of his 
sons killed, his daughters dragged away, his chambers plundered, and himself 
torn by dogs, provides an image of what Segal says encompasses ""all Troy, and 
in a sense all of civilization."356 The wrongness of Achilleus's behavior leads in 
books 23 and 24 to the intervention of the gods-first Apollo, who feels pity for 
Hector,357 and then to the others, including Zeus.358 Through book 24, Homer 
shifts the mood from violence to reconciliation and to an expression of Achilleus 
coming to better understand and control his anger. 
When he lifts Hector's body on to the bier, we see again the gentler side of 
Achilleus, but only in conjunction with his violence because his motive is the fear 
that Priam, Hector's father, will so lament his son's treatment that Achilleus's 
351. Segal 1971, 17. 
352. mad 18.107-11. 
353. mad 16.98-101. 
354. mad 22.375. 
355. mad 22.361-63. 
356. Segal 1971, 43. 
357. mad 24.19. 
358. mad 24. 75-76. 
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wrath will again be aroused and lead him to kill the old man. 359 It suggests that 
despite the events of book 24, which foretells establishment of a potentially more 
humane order, a tension still exists that holds future events constantly on the 
edge of breaking into wrathful madness and blood violence. Achilleus's violence 
has been excessive and is a violation of human laws, natural laws, and divine 
laws. He understands this when he thinks with dispassionate realism, 360 but he 
also knows that it remains as possibility. The tension that exists in Achilleus is 
similar to the tension of motivations that exists in all human life. There is little 
ambiguity in the Diad as to the deserved nature of the heroes' sufferings. Where 
ambiguity arises is in the question of whether human beings have the capacity to 
control the actions that lead to suffering, or whether it is merely a matter of 
whether they received allotments from both urns or only from the urn of 
unhappiness. 361 
Iliad 24 suggests an ambiguity in ancient values regarding Achilleus's 
treatment of Hector and Priam. In various other events in the Iliad, requests are 
made by supplicants on the battlefield but MacLeod points out that they are 
always rejected or cut short, and the suppliant killed. 362 This feature of war is 
deliberately stressed by Homer. But in Book 24, the supplication is accepted: 
And this act is far more than the fulfilment of a conventional duty; for the 
values of humanity and fellow-feeling implicit in the convention are fullf 
and profoundly represented in the scene between Achilles and Priam. 36 
359. mad 24.583-86. 
360. mad 24.542. 
361. mad 24.527-33. 
362. lliad 6.45ff., 10.454ff., 11.130ff., 20.463ff., 22.338ff. 
363. MacLeod 1982, 16. 
132 
Also, the description of Hector's death and concerns about its treatment 
are similarly exceptional. Macleod points out that on the battlefield opponents 
are taunted that they will not be lamented or buried.364 It is assumed in Homer's 
harsh description of war, Macleod adds, that anyone who dies in battle will be 
prey for dogs and birds. 
Macleod says that both the Odyssey and the Iliad suggest a conception of 
tragic poetry as: Nhuman passion and blindness, which lead to suffering, death 
and loss of burial; behind it all, the will of the supreme god, and above it all, the 
Olympians."365 When Achilleus explains Priam's troubles he knows his death will 
come soon and says that human beings cannot avoid some sufffering and that 
they are always under the control of the gods.366 Macleod says 
Here . . .  there is endurance and sadness, but no bitterness, no railing or 
cringing: the passage displays in fact a virtue often denied to the archaic 
Greeks, humility. This is also the fullest and deepest expression in words 
of Achilles' pity for the suppliant; for pity, as Homer and the Greeks 
represent it, is a sense of shared human weakness. And it is pity which is 
at the heart of Homer's conception of poetry. 
Zeus and other gods occasionally exhibit a measure of pity or kindness, 
MacLeod allows, but it is with the feelings of a detached observer. They are 
generally ""the heedless dispensers of misfortune to men. This may seem 
contradictory, but no more so than human contradictions. And whatever 
characteristics the gods exhibit, human choices must still be made within 
whatever framework the gods arrange: 
364. mad 4.237, 8.379-80, 11.395, 11.453-54, 13.831-32, 16.836. 
365. MacLeod 1982, 8. 
366. filad 24.525-51. 
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. . .  whether it is the gods' will that men pity and respect each oter, or 
whether men live together in subjection to gods who deal out good and 
evil at their inscrutable pleasure, in either case men cannot afford to be 
cruel or indifferent among themselves. 367 
As we shall see in the Odyss ey, one aspect of this ambiguous tension is 
between the several parts of human nature, but another is the tension between 
human actions and motivations on the one hand and, on the other, the result of 
fate, allotment from the urns, or what .uthe gods have spun out for wretched 
mortals."368 For Homer, human life must include passion and suffering. The gods 
can see and understand all of existence, seeing the vicissitudes and uncertainties 
of human life usually without feeling either passion or suffering, but for human 
beings, meaning arises out of the possibility of vulnerability, failure, and loss. 
Odysseus will choose this, taking his chances with the urns rather than resting in 
the certain eternal dispassion of immortality. Macleod says the Iliad is a great 
work 
Not least because it can speak authentically for pity or kindness or 
civilization without showing them victorious in life. Its humanity does not 
float on shallow optimism; it is firmly and deeply rooted in an awareness 
of human reality and suffering. 369 
367. Macleod 1982, 15. 
368. filad 24.525. 
369. Macleod 1982, 16. 
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c. Homer. The Odyssey 
Summazy 
The Odyssey is the story of Odysseus's wanderings during the ten years 
after the Trojan war. The son and successor of Laertes, king of Ithaca, Odysseus 
is the husband of Penelope and father of Telemachus. He is known from the niad 
to give good counsel370 and was a great hero of the war. During his journey he 
visits strange lands, including the home of Aeolus, who gives him a sack 
containing all the winds except the one that will take him home. He travels to the 
Laestrygonians, 371 then to Aiaia, the home of Circe, where he is told that to return 
home he must first sail to Hades and consult the ghost of the seer Teiresias. 
Teiresias tells him that when he reaches home he is to sacrifice to Poseidon in a 
place where salt is unknown and an oar is mistaken for a winnowing fan. The 
sacrifice will appease Poseidon's anger for Odysseus's blinding of his son 
Polyphemus during the hero's stop at the island of the Cyclopes. 372 He travels on, 
past the Sirens, sails between Scylla and Charybdis and lands on the island 
where the cattle of the Sun pasture. His men eat the cattle, which brings revenge 
from Helios, who destroys their ship with a thunderbolt when they leave the 
island. 
Odysseus escapes, drifts to the island of the nymph Calypso, and stays 
with her for seven years until she lets him go when he declines her offer of 
370. mad 19.154ff. 
371. Odyssey 10.19ff. 
372. Odyssey 9.39ff. 
1 35 
immortality so that he can return to his wife.373 His boat is wrecked by Poseidon 
but Odysseus survives and swims to shore at Scheria in the land of the 
Phaeacians. Battered by the sea, he is exhausted when he arrives from his 
adventure. He meets N ausicaa, daughter of the king, who helps him get to the 
city, which marks his return to civilization. From the land of the Phaeacians, he 
travels toward his home at Ithaca. 
The tale is a stark contrast with the Iliad where the setting was the single 
context of the Trojan War. In the Odyssey, the imaginative landscape constantly 
changes, moving from adventure to adventure with monsters, nymphs, 
goddesses, a pig farm, magical gardens, and struggles with strange beings. 
The second half of the Odyssey is an account of his eventual return home, 
where with the help of Athena he reclaims his position as leader of Ithaca. 
Disguised as a beggar, he enters his palace, 374 kills his wife's suitors, 375 and is 
:reunited with Penelope. The attempted vengeance by kinsmen of the suitors is 
stopped by Athena, who makes peace between them. 
Discussion 
The Odyssey is the story of a man being tested in various ways, including 
tests of his willingness to act properly in difficult situations and with temptation 
at hand to entice him into improper action. He must be patient, careful, smart, 
and courageous. Homer's Odysseus has heroic stature and reputation, loses it 
during his travels, survives, and returns to civilization and humanity, restoring 
373. Odyssey 5.43ff. 
374. Odyssey 16.1. 
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order in his life, at home, and in the minds of those who hear the poem of his 
adventure. 
Odysseus's story is told in the form of three primary trials. The first is the 
boar hunt that marks his passage from adolescence to manhood. 376 The second is 
his journeying back through the unknown by way of the Phaeacians, beginning 
when at the end of book five he escapes from the battering he has taken in the 
sea, emerging among Nausicaa's Phaeacian maidens. It is at that point that he 
moves from the world of his adventures to a life of civilization with the 
Phaeacians.377 The third is when he returns home to reclaim his wife and family 
and begins the process of moving toward the end of his life.37� With the 
movement through the three trials, or stages, the journey becomes a reflection of 
the experience of a human life. 
Like the mad, the Odysse y is a cautionary tale. It says divinities and oracles 
should be honored and that human beings live best when they follow the 
guidelines of proper behavior: showing hospitality, being loyal, and respecting 
the duties related to gods, to family, to others, and to citizenship. After leaving 
Calypso and declining her offer of immortality, 379 he is shipwrecked, left with no 
possessions but his wits. The unfolding of the Calypso episode demonstrates that 
Odysseus understands his limits and will honor his obligations. He is not a god, 
375. Odyssey 21-22. 
376. Odyssey 19.392ft'. Also see Rubin and Sale 1983, 141ft'. for a discussion of Greek 
myth employing the hunt as the image denoting passage to manhood. 
377. This part of the story begins at the end of book five, but the central narrative of 
Odysseus among the Phaeacians is in books nine through twelve. 
378. Odyssey 13. 
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and one of the results of this is that even when he thinks he has acted justly, 
with dike, 380 in continuing his journey toward home and family, he is subject to 
bad luck and the frailties of mortality. He experiences what Nussbaum describes 
as 11the peculiar beauty of human excellence"381-its vulnerability to aging, death, 
and the contingencies of life. His life will not play out in trying to become what he 
is not; he will return to his aging wife rather than be with the eternally beautiful 
Calypso because that is the nature of one who fully understands what it is to be 
human and to live well, and he accepts what suffer he finds along the way. 
After leaving Calypso, his ship is wrecked by Poseidon's stormy seas, and 
twenty days later he washes up on the shores of the land of the Phaeacians. This 
liminal episode symbolizes the transition that began with the end of the war in 
Troy, continued with the imaginary, nearly divine world of his fairy-tale 
adventures, and concludes with his return home to Ithaca and family. The 
movement is from the loss of identity to regaining it, from wilderness to 
civilization, youth to death, birth to death to rebirth. When he visits the dead 
from Hades382 after giving up the opportunity for immortality with Calypso, 383 he 
is made aware of what it is to be human and mortal; it is a part of his 
psychological maturity, a process that is completed when he understands his 
place as a mortal and as a husband, father, and leader. The various movements 
symbolized by his journeys are partly designed to illustrate both the nature of 
379. Odyssey 5.214-220. 
380. A discussion of dike is below, in II.cl, Hesiod. 
381. Nussbaum 1986, 2. 
382. Odyssey 11.50ff. 
383. Odyssey 5.100. 
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being human and the differences from life as a god. They depict the necessity of 
human responsibility and vulnerability and they suggest the sorting out of what 
is important from what is not. The transitions between places, or stages, is 
represented by the "great abyss of the sea."384 His sojourn with the Phaeacians is 
an in-between time, a liminal stopping over in a place not entirely human yet 
almost so. 385 He is moving back toward mortality, but needs time to understand 
what that means. Part of this understanding is depicted in his decision not to 
marry Nausicaa, a young girl who is ready for marriage. Odysseus recognizes 
that, like his offer from Calypso, it would mean rejection of his place in Ithaca 
with Penelope. N ausicaa is youthful, beautiful, and offers him a return to youth 
but Odysseus understands who he is and his stage in life; it is not with Nausicaa. 
Understanding is another reassertion of his mortal nature, and a recognition of 
his approaching death.386 An important theme from book five on is Odysseus's 
knowledge of his mortality, and that he accepts that this means he must suffer.387 
Another indication of his recognition of the limitations of humanness is when 
Alcinous suggests that Odysseus might be a god in disguise. 388 Odysseus replies 
that he is very mortal and has endured the suffering and the experiences of being 
human.389 
384. Odyssey 5.203. 
385. Odyssey 5.35. 
386. Toe idea that humanness is in many ways defined by mortality and an awareness of 
death recurs in Greek literature. See, for example, Iliad 6.145-49, Sophocles' Women of 
Trachis 1-3, and OC 1224-28. 
387. Odyssey 5.221-24. 
388. Odyssey 7.208ff. 
389. Odyssey 7.211-14. 
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Throughout, Athena assists Odysseus in his efforts to understand-his 
efforts to reach whatever next stage he is approaching. As such, Segal says she 
represents in Odysseus his rationality as well as 
his clear and integrated vision of himself as the man that he is, and 
therefore the reality of his bond with Ithaca and human life. She is the 
vitality and resiliency of his human spirit that has not ceased to work on 
his behalf . . .  "390 
Many of the delimitations suggested by the Odyssey may point to social, 
political, and religious changes in the culture-in that Greeks in the late archaic 
period were altering their relationships with each other, with the embryonic 
polis, and with the gods. G. S. Kirk believes the Iliad and the Odyssey, combined 
with stories about Prometheus, suggest a stabilizing of the relationship with the 
gods.391 David Tandy argues that both poems, along with Hesiod's Theogony, 
serve the political purposes of emerging economic forces. 392 He asserts that the 
poems are tools designed to convince those who may not benefit from the new 
concentrations of wealth that they should appreciate the changes. 
Tandy's thesis is that population pressures and changes in the economic systems 
led to increased concentrations of wealth as well as the changed role and status 
of wealth. For example, before the changes, wealth had followed status, after the 
changes status followed wealth. These and other alterations, he says, led to the 
beginning of private property, land alienations, debt, and the polis. They also 
created increased solidarity among the leaders of Greek communities with one 
390. Segal 1994, 16. 
391. Kirk 1970/1971, 175. 
392. Tandy 1997, 190ff and elsewhere. 
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another, Hsimultaneously separating them as a class from the rest of the members 
of their communities." The most important tool in creating acceptance of the 
changes, including the new class consciousness, was epic poetry. 
Tandy says the Ili ad, the Odyss ey, and Theogony abet "the attempt to 
disguise the recent radical change in the economic infrastructure"393 and seek to 
show that the nonelite will reap benefits from the changes, or at least should go 
along without complaint. He says elements in the poems also divert attention 
from the economic and political changes as the cause of social upheaval 
spreading throughout Greece.394 
His thesis suggests that, like Odysseus in recognizing his appropriate 
limits and responsibilities, those who heard the Homeric stories were meant to 
understand their proper role in the system. As the gods establish boundaries and 
roles for humanity and Homer shows that this is as it should be, so the economic 
system establishes appropriate boundaries and roles for workers and Homer 
suggests this too is good. Those who see this are happy, and, presumably, those 
who do not see risk social sanctions just as those who violate the order 
established by gods risk divine sanctions. In the Ili ad, for example, workers are 
shown Ngleefully" toiling, and heroes are said to be ''good men who deserve their 
wealth," just as, Tandy says about the late eighth century, "the big men of today 
have much wealth: therefore they are good men and deserve to have it and 
probably more."395 The epics attempted to equate heroes of the past and the 
393. Tandy 1997, 191. 
394. Tandy 1997, 192. 
395. Tandy 1997, 191-92. 
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leaders of the present." 396 In the Theogony, Hesiod likens powerful community 
figures, such as the b asil eus--or high-born leader-not merely to heroes, but to 
gods: 
All the people watch [the b as ileus] as he decides law cases with straight 
dika i; and he, speaking surely, would put a stop to even a great neik os. For 
therefore there are b asil ees with wise hearts, for when the people are 
being misled in the agora, they easily settle cases that might bring harm, 
moving them with soothing words. When he goes through the assembly, 
they greet him as a god, and he is conspicuous among those gathered. 397 
Thus, recitations of the Theogony and the Homeric poems are a useful tool that 
supports and gives near heroic status if not semi-divinity to the economically and 
politically powerful elite. The poems' authority is established by Eumaeus the 
swineherd, who says a good singer, or teller of the poems, learns the songs from 
the gods. 398 The instructions are divinely inspired. 
Tandy says that unlike Theogony and the Ili ad and the O dyss ey, the 
archaic oral tradition that includes Hesiod's Works and D ays expressed an 
antiaristocratic strain. Similar sentiment shows up in Archilochus, Tyrtaeus, 
Solon, Xenophanes, and others.399 He says Works and D ays was a Ncritical and 
negative response" to the changes and was O an overt rejection of polis hegemony 
• • •  "
400 But in the Theogony, like the Il iad and the Od yss ey, "the public expression 
396. Tandy 1997, 230-31. 
397. Theogony 84-92, tr. Tandy. 
398. Odyssey 17.518-19. 
399. See Donlan 1973, esp. 146--48. 
400. Tandy 1997, 232. 
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of such sentiment is demonstrably ill-advised."401 When Thersites in the mad 
seeks to complain about the basilees and of unfair acquisition of wealth, Homer 
viciously points out that he is the ugliest of the Achaeans, 
the basest man who came to Troy. He was bandy-legged, and lame in one 
foot. His two shoulders were hunched over, bent in over the chest, and 
above them was a pointed head, and a thin patch of fuzz grew on it.402 
Tandy says Thersites' appearance is shown to match his judgment, ""and 
his punishment is an object lesson for those who would emulate him" in 
criticizing the leaders.403 The message here, as in Theogony and the Odyssey is 
that those who cross proscribed boundaries will be destroyed. 
The crossing of boundaries as an example of improper dike has little to do 
in the Odyssey with moral blame or praise; more often it has to do with ""the way 
things should be done" or ""the way things are done,"404 as when Penelope 
describes Odysseus as ""never outrageous at all to any man," whereas ""that is a 
way (dike) divine kings have, one will be hateful to a certain man, and favor 
another . . .  " 405 
Those who find a moral component to dike in Homer point to instances 
when improper behavior is justly stopped, especially in the punishment of those 
who fail to show hospitality. This includes the actions of the suitors, who abuse 
Odysseus's property, seduce his servants, try to seduce his wife, and attempt to 
401. Tandy 1997, 194ff. 
402. mad 2.216-19, tr. Tandy. 
403. Tandy 1997, 196. 
404. A more extensive discussion of dike is in the following section, Ill.c, Hesiod. 
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kill his son. Their payment is severe. They are killed so that Nyou know in your 
heart, and say to another, that good dealing is better by far than evil dealing. "406 
Their behavior has offended both man and gods: '' . . .  fearing neither the 
immortal gods who hold wide heaven nor any resentment sprung from men to 
be yours in future."407 
Until the suitors are punished, there is uncertainty in the story about 
whether the gods care about right and wrong in the world. On their death, 
Laertes is relieved: ''Father Zeus, there are gods ind�ed upon tall Olympus, if 
truly the suitors have had to pay for their reckless violence."408 When Odysseus 
resolves the problem, order is restored, justice observed, and the boundaries of 
humanity's proper limit is set. 
O dysse y 11 depicts the final human limit, providing a glimpse of 
''Homeric" Greek beliefs in an afterlife and an account of how the dead should be 
treated. When heroes die in the epics, their ps ych ai (souls) leave their bodies and 
go to the "next life" in the underworld. Robert Garland describes their status in 
Hades: 
The Homeric dead are distinguished from their living counterparts in their 
lack of strength (menos), an attribute which they share with dreams . . . . 
The Homeric dead lack not only me nos, but also the full command of their 
faculties. Achilles remarks that although there is soul (p�che ) and image 
(ei do lo n) in Hades 11the phre nes (wits) do not exist at all. 
405. Odyssey 4.690-1. 
406. Odyssey 22.373-4. 
407. Odyssey 22.39-40. 
408. Odyssey 24.351-2. 
409. Garland 1985, 1. Also, on Greek views of the afterlife and the underworld, see John 
Kerrigan 1996, 34ff. 
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There are options to one's psyc he ending up in Hades. Hesiod says that those 
who died at Thebes and Troy go to �he Islands of the Blessed. 410 He says others 
just go into the ground.411 Always, however, their bodies must be buried, and as 
Antigone and Teiresias warned Creon, failure to honor this sacred law begs 
disaster. When Odysseus encounters the psych es populating Hades, one of them 
is his former companion, Elpenor. His body had been left behind in Circe's 
palace on the island of Aiaia, "unburied and unwept" because Odysseus had to 
leave quickly for his journey to Hades.412 Elpenor beseeches Odysseus to return 
to Aiaia when he leaves Hades so that Odysseus can burn his body and build a 
grave mound for him, warning that otherwise his unburied body might bring the 
gods' curse upon Odysseus. 413 
Like the visitation from the souls of the dead, the Calypso episode is 
central to the O dyss ey because it portrays both the vulnerability of human beings 
and the necessity of risking that vulnerability to live properly a life of human 
excellence. For Odysseus, this vulnerability is expressed in the movement of his 
life after the Trojan War. When the war ended, he was a great hero, courageous 
and highly regarded. During his ten-year journey his closeness to death and 
destruction causes him in various ways to make choices that lead to his losing his 
reputation for proper action. The failure to bury Elpenor is one of these. He 
encounters the souls of Elpenor and the other dead, not as a soul himself, but 
410. WD 161-73. 
411. WD 172-73. 
412. Odyssey 11.SOff. 
413. Odyssey 11.70-74. 
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fully human and alive, and so doubly violates usually forbidden limits. But his 
decision to forego an eternity of divine immortality to return to home, family, and 
obligations was the move that ensured the rekindling of his reputation. 
Ronald Hall argues that Odysseus's choice was a transcending moment 
for him.414 In a discussion comparing Odysseus to Abraham, Hall draws on 
Kierkegaard's account,415 of the story of the binding of Isaac416 to claim that 
compared to Abraham's choice, Odysseus acted admirably. Abraham chooses 
God over his son; Odysseus chooses human existence over immortality. Two 
dramatically different choices, one seeking what Nussbaum calls external 
transcendence,417 the other seeking the human heroism of internal 
transcendence. 
Implicit in Odysseus's choice, Hall says, is an indication of what we value 
about being human, and mortal: 
The human condition of contingency also calls for courage, for 
resourcefulness, for love, hope, and trust, the human virtues we admire, 
the virtues we reckon as human excellences. It is just these features of our 
existence that give it its intrinsic worth. Yet it is just these features that 
would be lost in the timeless, changeless, deathless eternity of divine 
transcendence. What we admire in Odysseus's choice of his own human 
finitude, a choice he makes at the price of his own mortality, are precisely 
those qualities of finite contingent existence that make human existence 
itself of intrinsic value. 418 
414. Hall 1994, 363ff. Hall's essay is a discussion of Nussbaum's Fragility (1990), Love's 
Knowledge (1990), and Therapy of Desire (1994). 
415. Fear and Trembling 1983. The story of the binding of lsaac is discussed throughout. 
416. Genesis 22. 
417. Nussbaum 1986, 200ff. 
418. Hall 1994, 364. Also see Ronald Hall, 2000. 
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Who is right here? Hall wonders. Abraham, who is willing to turn his back on the 
world and his only son? Or Odysseus, who will not turn his back on his earthly 
home, his aging wife, or his humanness? ""Must we resist the lure of 
transcendence for the sake of our humanity? . . .  how do we reckon with the 
human lure to divinity, with the human temptation to want to transcend itself, 
without destroying the human, without destroying ourselves?"419 
In a discussion of Euripides' Hecuba, Nussbaum says humans are the 
beings that can most easily cease to be human by transcending their nature, 
""either by moving (Platonically) upwards towards the self-sufficiency of the 
divine, or by slipping downward towards the self-sufficiency of doggishness." 
She says ""the difference between the two is not altogether obvious, since both 
involve the closing-off of important human things. "420 In Euripides, Hecuba alters 
from a woman with kindly intentions to become a vengeful, bloodthirsty dog 
with fiery eyes. She cuts herself off from her humanness, disregarding the usual 
parameters of trust and hospitality so that she can destroy to satisfy a revenge 
lust. In Genesis, Abraham renounces the bonds of familial obligation to reach 
upwards toward the divine. In the Odyssey, the hero consciously renounces both 
the move downward and the move upward. 
Transcendence of the sort Odysseus demonstrates seeks not to exceed or 
transcend his humanness, ""but instead to rise in moral and political excellence, 
the transcendence of practical wisdom. It aims to deepen our sense of 
419. Hall 1994, 364. 
420. Nussbaum 1986, 417. 
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humanness, makes us more aware of the riches of our human existence. "421 
Rather than closing off what is important about being human, Odysseus 
embraces it, escaping shipwreck and misery to continue his journey home, clear 
away those who have set it askew, and return it to the orderly ways of one who 
lives a proper human life. 
In this way, Plato's project is a counterpoint to Homer's O dyss ey. Plato 
seeks transcendence of humanness much in the way Abraham does. Plato in the 
early and middle dialogues seeks 
a techne, a science or art of control, that would guard against tuche, the 
human condition of being subject to ungoverned contingency, to luck, that 
which simply happens . . . . Such exposure makes us vulnerable to pain, 
uncertainty, vulnerable to chance, to loss, the ultimate such loss being 
death, and hence to grief. He wanted to find a way to make human 
existence safer, more predictable, more under control.422 
Plato's techne, then, is an attempt to gain control over luck, to manage a life so 
that it has predictive ability and control over future events. Plato is thus 
searching for a human goodness without fragility, without vulnerability to 
mortality, or to the lack of understanding that results from deceptive 
appearances. If Plato's project is an example of external transcendence, then 
Odysseus's courage in his choice is an example of internal transcendence. 
Plato's version of aspiring to live well is akin to living as a god. Hall says 
Plato seems to want to exist u aloof from the concerns of the earth, of bodily 
existence, from appearances, from passions, to live without need, without 
421. Nussbaum 1990, 379. 
422. Nussbaum 1986, 200ff. 
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dependency on others." 423 Alcibiades resists Plato on this, raging "against the 
lure of the inhuman," Hall says. "7o live as a stone, as a god, frees us from the 
conflicts of passion, from the vulnerability to loss, from dependence, but at what 
price? For Alcibiades, the price is too dear."424 We will see in the Bacchae425 the 
tragic result of joining with a god and having access to god-like powers when 
Agave slaughters her son and rips apart his body. The best human life, Euripides 
suggests in the ·tale, is the life lived within the confines of mortal power and 
experience. 
Alcibiades thus follows the Bacchae, Greek tragedy generally, and 
Odysseus in arguing against Plato's project. They have in common, at the least, 
as Hall puts it, ''ambivalent feelings toward godlike existence." Plato thinks the 
gods are better, superior, because-they lack human limitations. Homer's 
Odysseus and the tragedians argue that to want to live as gods would entail 
forfeiting human existence, which would be to lose what humans consider best 
about themselves. Hall explains this in terms of our ability to respond to 
suffering: 
If justice requires us to recognize the needs of others, to have compassion 
for them, to want to put a stop to suffering where we can, then humans 
are better off than the gods in terms of their capacity to understand, to 
pursue, and to achieve justice.426 
Nussbaum agrees, saying humans "know how to deal with suffering, and their 
morality is a response to the fact of suffering. The gods are better because they 
423. Hall 1994, 366. 
424. Hall 1994, 366. 
425. Below, section ID.i. 
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can simply overlook, look over, the sufferings of human beings, without 
involvement or response."427 
But in important ways, the gods seem worse off in comparison to humans, 
Nussbaum says. The gods seem to .... long . . . for that which displays effort and 
longing, need and striving, achievement against odds . . . . So the transcendent 
ones long, it seems for a certain sort of transcendence: for transcendence of their 
own limit, which is to lack limit and therefore to be incapable of virtue. "428 
It takes no courage to live as a god. It does take courage to live as 
Odysseus does. He needs both resourcefulness and courage to survive, which 
brings him a heroic standing that gods can never enjoy. Calypso is drawn to this 
about Odysseus and is reluctant to see him go. When Plato and others with 
projects similar to his succumb to the lure of what Nussbaum calls external 
transcendence, it .... is the lure to depart human life altogether . . . to leave behind 
altogether the constitutive conditions of our humanity and to seek for a life that is 
really the life of another sort of being."429 
On this account, Plato's project is a variety of hubris in its failure to 
comprehend the kind of life one should properly live, and to live within its limits: 
.. There is a kind of striving that is appropriate to a human life; and there is a kind 
of striving that consists in trying to depart from that life to another life." 
Correctly understood, Nussbaum asserts, .... the injunction to avoid hubris is not a 
426. Hall 1994, 368. 
427. Nussbaum 1990, 375. 
428. Nussbaum 1990, 377. 
429. Nussbaum 1990, 379. 
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penance or denial-it is an instruction as to where the valuable things for us are 
to be found."430 
The part of a good human life that is most difficult for human beings to 
encompass is the struggle to at the same time experience human love, human joy, 
human victories, as well as to understand its limits, including its mortality. 
Nussbaum expresses this by asking whether, given what is best about human life, 
one should not want the people one loves to live forever? "Yes and no," she 
concludes. This tension is what Hall argues is the best part of the best human 
life.431 
Hall criticizes Nussbaum for suggesting that the Greeks had the idea of 
transcendence and infinity, which he argues they didn't, largely on grounds that 
the Greeks lacked the conception of the universe as a creation. I doubt that this is 
quite accurate, but it is of little consequence because the upshot of where he goes 
with it is clearly misguided. He asserts that remarks Nussbaum makes about the 
"positive contribution" of Plato's aspiration to divinity-"a kind of striving to 
make things better, a striving to live a noble life devoted to truth, goodness, and 
beauty"-make it seem that "what she really admires in Plato is what could well 
fit into her notion 'internal transcendence,' that human form of transcendence 
that deepens our humanity, and keeps our ordinary lives from degenerating into 
banality. "432 
430. Nussbaum 1990, 381. 
431. Hall 1994, 368. 
432. Hall 1994, 370, note 9. 
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But Hall mistakes Nussbaum. She admires certain aspects of Plato's 
project-striving to live a noble life, for example-but the larger goal of what 
Plato seeks she finds too sterile, too impoverished: ""part of the peculiar beauty of 
human excellence just is its vulnerability . . . .  Human excellence is seen . . . 
pervasively in the Greek poetic tradition, as something whose very nature it is to 
be in need, a growing thing in the world that could not be made invulnerable and 
keep its own peculiar fineness."433 
Nussbaum does not imply here that a life is better the more fragile it is, the 
more risks it takes; rather, she explains in a later essay that for the Greeks ""any 
human life -that is going to be sufficiently rich in value must incur risks; that the 
attempt to minimize risk is bound to result in an impoverishment of life.434 
What Nussbaum rejects as ""incoherent" is the .,., aspiration to leave behind 
altogether the constitutive conditions of our humanity, and to seek for a life that 
is really the life of another sort of being-as if it were a higher and better life for 
us."435 So, what limits human life-that we are mortal, have bodies that fail, need 
things from nature and one another-is also what allows, perhaps creates, that 
which is truly, intrinsically good, and these are things ""different in kind from that 
which is good to and for a god."436 It is for these reasons that Odysseus acted 
rightly in refusing Calypso. 
433. Nussbaum 1986, 2. 
434. Nussbaum, 1993, 57. 
435. Nussbaum 1990, 379. 
436. Nussbaum, 1993, 58. 
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Bioethicist Leon Kass recently drew on the same understanding in 
portraying immortality as a state altogether alien from that of being human. 
Speaking at a conference to consider the implications of technological attempts 
to extend human life, Kass said that "to argue that human life is better without 
death is to argue human life would be better without being human." He recalled 
that Odysseus rejected Calypso's offer of being her immortal consort in favor of 
mortality and his human duty, that of continuing his hazardous voyage back to 
his home and his aged wife, Penelope. But Kass said he feared that public 
wisdom would not prevail against the temptation of immortality offered by the 
possibilities of cloning and other technologies: "While the head might counsel 
tinitude, the blood likes to live. "437 
Neither Kass not anyone else means by these concerns that they fear there 
is a likelihood that human beings can achieve immortality, or even a dramatic 
extension of reasonable human lifespans. Neither are they approaching the 
issues as Luddites, opposed to technology generally. Rather, their intention is to 
encourage attendance to those aspects of human life that we most value. They 
suggest that instead of concentrating our efforts and resources on endeavors 
that may lead us away from what we value, and toward what has been referred 
to as a commodifi.cation of the species, we should pursue those projects that will 
fortify human control of technology rather than assume all innovation is progress 
and will proceed necessarily. 
437. Wade 2001, 1. 
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d. Hesiod. Works and Days, Theogony 
Summazy 
The Theogo� y  and Works and Days are among the earliest of the works in 
the Western tradition to provide a glimpse of life as new political and economic 
structures developed in the archaic period, roughly between 75�. The only 
earlier material is the Homeric epics, which support much of what Hesiod says 
but Hesiod's Works an d Days describes a local region of the Greek world that 
has changed since the one told about in the epics. He writes in the early seventh 
century as farmer and social critic, discussing "the social and economic 
institutions within which and in response to which these daily activities were 
undertaken."438 Works and Days is written in the form of advice to his brother, 
Perses, giving him suggestions about farming and living a proper life. In his 
discussion he is thought to depend partly on the wisdom literature of the East439 
and to provide some insight into the rise of the individual in early Greece.440 
Except for some limited archaeological evidence, there is no way to verify 
Hesiod's accounts, but there is also no good reason to reject them. They are 
what we have, a story of what life was like in Ascra, a village just north of 
438. Tandy 1996, xiii. 
439. West. Martin, ed. and comm. 1966. Hesiod: ·Theogony. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. Also, West (1978) says Hesiod parallels literature from Hebrew, Sumerian, 
Akkadian, Egyptian, Persian, and Indian traditions as well as Medieval Irish, Middle 
English, Old French, Norse, Finnish, and others. 
440. Polanyi 1977. Bernard Knox argues for a similar position when he finds in Hesiod an 
insistence by the author that his name be identified with the poems and that he expresses 
his personal opinions on moral and social problems. Knox believes that Hesiod's •solid 
presence• in his work suggests that he, unlike earlier singers, wanted to be identified 
with his work. If this is the case, we can profitably look at Hesiod as an early example of 
the developing individualistic trend in Western thought This feature has implications for 
the issues of human/divine boundaries because as the individual becomes more 
dominant, communal norms relating to boundary issues are more likely to be challenged. 
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Athens in the early 700s. He writes just before the classical Greek civilization 
begins developing. 
Discussion 
Central to Hesiod's discussion is dike (pl. dikal), which refers to various 
forms of justice or, as in Homer, to the way things are, custom, or the way things 
go. Hugh Lloyd-Jones calls it the central concept of the early Greek religious 
outlook.441 In his examination of dike starting with the Homeric epics and going 
to the end of the fifth century, Lloyd-Jones says it can refer to some kinds of 
""justice," but can also mean the divinely appointed order of the universe.442 When 
Penelope in the Odyssey describes her husband Odysseus as onewho ""did no act 
and spoke no word in his own country that was unfair . . .  (nor was he) 
outrageous at all to any man, "443 she contrasts him with godlike (or divine) kings, 
whose dike (custom) it is to often do wrong, as when ""one will be hateful to a 
certain man, and favor another." This is just the way it is, she suggests, merely 
the custom of kings. In this sense, dike lacks the characteristic of moral praise 
culpability. The term occurs elsewhere as an idea that carries moral weight, and 
as the idea develops, dike takes on the connotation of the way things ought to be, 
or what is normal, expected, or right. 
John Kerrigan says dike does not accurately translate by using ""right" or 
any of the other terms in modern European vocabularies to define the sphere of 
441. Lloyd-Jones 1971, ix. 
442. Lloyd-Jones 1971, ix. 
443. Odyssey 4.690-1. 
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just-dealing.444 He says it has wide-ranging signifance in Athenian culture in 
reference to 11order" or "'vengeance" or 11coherence" or "'stability," in a variety of 
contexts from the political to the scientific. Where we might think of Orestes in 
The Oresteia as a "'revenger," ancient Greek has no equivalent phrase, instead 
speaking of "'the man who deals dike," or 11he who restores honor or status or 
respect," or «the person who exacts a price, reciprocates, enforces an 
exchange."445 Bernard Knox says the word can be understood in reference to its 
opposite, hybris, meaning, roughly, violence, but more commonly as 11an 
overweening pride and sense of superiority, of invulnerability, of contempt for 
the rights of others. "446 Tandy says that in Works and Days dike has the primary 
m�aning of «settlement, judgement," sometimes 11penalty" and by extension the 
system within which disputes were settled. He says it is in Homer, but not in 
Hesiod that dike has moral force and refers to proper or just behavior. But 
Hesiod uses derivatives of Dike, such as dikaios and adikos, to refer to a moral 
force that can be translated as "'just" and 11unjust." In any case, keeping in mind 
Tandy's warning about the «fuzziness of our understanding of the range of 
meanings," 447 various forms of the word seem to refer to what is rightly 
deserved, or what is to be honored. Others have said that in the context of Works 
and Days the word is related to the way of nature or way of life of each natural 
thing. 448 In the Odyssey, good rulers uphold good dike (eudilde). 449 Similarly, in 
444. Kerrigan 1996, 20-21. 
445. Kerrigan 1996, 21. 
446. Knox 1996, 14. 
447. Tandy 1996, 47. 
448. Harrison 1912, 517. 
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Works and Days, Hesiod says those who "give straight dikai to outsiders and 
insiders" assist the polis to thrive and people to bloom. 450 But dike is also "just 
punishment," as when Zeus assigns dike to those ""whose care is evil violence and 
cruel works" 451 as well as to an entire polis in which an evil man commits 
offenses: "On them the son of Cronus brings . . .  hunger and plague together. The 
people die; women do not give birth . . .  Cronus destroys their wide army, or 
their wall, or exacts atonement from their ships upon the open sea." 452 
The word is important to understanding issues of boundaries between the 
natural and supernatural and between what is properly within the human realm 
and what is rightly left to the divine. Dike is in this context understanding that 
there are boundaries related to acceptable, justifiable, right human action. 
Beginning with Homer, and continuing through Hesiod, the Greek tragedies, and 
into postmodern thought, dike is the delimiting concept that brings with it a 
sense of squeamishness, uncertainty, or even fear when we approach that 
boundary. It is what is meant when some say to science, 11You are playing God, 
and your arrogance may have consequences." It is what Antigone meant when 
she tells Creon he is violating divine laws by refusing to allow Polyneices' burial. 
And it is what Creon refers to when he chastises Antigone. 
The ancient corollary is in Hesiod when he compares those who act with 
proper dike to those who do not. He says in Works and Days that for those who 
give dike, who act with just action, ""the city flourishes and the people in it. They 
449. Odyssey 19.108-114. 
450. WD 225. 
451. WD 238. 
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enjoy the blessings of peace . . . escape famine and they do the work that they 
must do as if it were a holiday. The earth gives them great livelihood, their oaks 
give acorns and honey, their flocks are heavy with wool, their women bear 
children who resemble the fathers." For those who fail to act with good dike, 
Zeus gives them punishment, which is also dike, and the punishment comes often 
as the result of the bad actions of one person: .uFamine and plague, the deaths of 
the people, the barrenness of women, the destruction of the city's army, fleet and 
fortifications in war . . .  "453 
So here, as elsewhere, the boundary refers generally to transgressions 
against accepted morality or practice, as well as the just response to 
transgression. Adkins points out that some Greeks value justice "'because and 
only because (or if and only it) the gods reward it"454 and he points as an example 
to Hesiod: .uNow may neither I nor my son be dikaios any more among men; for it 
is a bad thing, kakon; to be just if the unjust man is to come off better. "455 He finds 
additional support in Aeschylus's Eumenides: .uWho that, in the "light' of his 
heart, trembles at nothing, would continue to reverence dike in like manner [as in 
the past]?"'456 Adkins finds here evidence that the Furies �elieve that men have in 
the past behaved justly out of fear, and that removal of the fear will remove 
reverence for justice." He says the position remains constant through the end of 
452. WD 243-247. 
453. Knox 1996, 15. 
454. Adkins 1975, 210. 
455. WD 270ff. This is Adkins's translation. Tandy has: 11Now indeed may I myself not be 
just among people, nor may my son, since it is an evil thing to be a just man, if the more 
unjust man will have greater dike." 
456. Eumenides 517ff (Adkins translation). 
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the play. There is no evidence that the "relation of divine punishment (or fear of 
it) to the choiceworthiness of justice has in any way changed."457 As always, there 
is dissent. Creed objects: 
It is no doubt true that a motive for the avoidance of injustice was often 
the fear of divine retribution, but to infer from this that it was the only 
reason why justice was valued begs the question. Rather an appreciation 
of the value of justice might lead to the view that the gods reward it."458 
The issue of whether dike is required because it brings reward from the gods or 
because that is what a person should do arises in Adkins's Merit and 
Responsibi1ity459 and again of course in Plato's Meno and Crito. 
Hesiod refers to Prometheus in Works and Days, but provides a richer 
description in Theogony. In modern interpretations, Prometheus's theft of fire 
from the gods is thought to be a metaphor for gaining forbidden knowledge. It is 
a story very much like the eating of forbidden fruit by Adam and Even in the 
Garden of Eden.460 Hesiod's account uses Prometheus to explain why the gods 
have hidden the good life from humans.461 In Hesiod's Works and Days, and 
Theogony, Prometheus462 sought to deceive Zeus by tricking him into choosing 
the inferior of two plates offered for dinner. In Theogony he says Prometheus 
457. Adkins 1975, 210. A more extensive discussion of this issue is in my discussion of the 
Iliad, below, m.b. 
458. Creed 1973, 217, note 4. 
459. Crito 45c5ff and elsewhere. Meno 77b4ff and elsewhere. 
460. Genesis 3. 
461. Again, whereas there are similarities to the eating of the forbidden fruit by Adam 
and Even, because as punishment, God condemned humanity to painstaking labor, 
misery in childbirth, and banished them to live in hardship outside the garden (Genesis 
3.17ft). 
462. WD 48ff. 
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divided a sacrificial animal's meat in a way that Zeus got only bones under a 
layer of fat and humans got the meat.463 Zeus in response ""contrived pernicious 
woes for people," including hiding fire from them. But Prometheus refused to 
honor Zeus's proscription and stole the fire, then hid it in a hollow fennel stalk, 
and gave it to human beings. 464 
Zeus was so enraged, he punished Prometheus for giving humans the 
""far-seen glory of fire" by driving : ""a stanchion through his middle. Also he let 
loose on him the wing-spread eagle, and it was feeding on his imperishable liver, 
which by night would grow back to size from what the spread-winged bird had 
eaten in the daytime."465 
The combination of Prometheus's two transgressions, deceit and theft, 
gave Zeus the excuse he had been looking for to punish the human race. The 
punishment was devastating and has since been the archetypal reward for 
crossing a line set by the gods. Hesiod relates that Pandora and her box were 
created by Zeus especially for the task.466 She was made so that she would tempt 
Prometheus's brother, Epimetheus. Charmed by her, Epimetheus allowed her to 
be let loose upon the world467 to scatter ""pernicious woes," filling the earth and 
the sea with evils of disease, mortality, and hard toil: ""There are diseases for 
463. Theogony 535-64. 
464. Theogony 565-69. 
465. Theogony 521ff. 
466. In Theogony, Hesiod does not give her a name, apparently thinking it suffices to call 
her "'an evil thing." At WD 80, he says she was Pandora. 
467. A similar rendition of the troubles besetting humanity having their source in woman 
is found in Christian interpretations of the story of Eve enticing Adam to eat from the 
forbidden fruit. For a discussion of this, see Knox 1996, 9ff. 
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people during the day, and others in the night that wander under their own 
power, bringing evils to mortals secretly because Zeus the Planner took out their 
voice."468 
Hesiod says the new creation was a ""beautiful evil thing" from which 
.,., originates the breed of female women" who live with mortal men, .,., and are a 
great sorrow to them" because ""hateful poverty they will not share, but only 
luxury." On Hesiod's account, Zeus created women solely to be a pernicious trial 
for men, .,.,accomplished in bringing hard labors . . .  (and) sorrowful things . . .  "469 
In WD, Hesiod fills out the story a bit. We learn more about the time when 
humanity lived a life of ease. Before Pandora and her box of woes, for example, 
men were .,.,free from all evils, free from laborious work, and free from all 
wearing sicknesses that bring their fates down on men. ""47° For men, there is to 
be no abatement from the evil of women and all the suffering they brought into 
the world. But Prometheus does gets relief. Zeus's son, Heracles, arrives and kills 
the eagle, partly because Zeus's anger has subsided and partly because he wants 
Heracles to achieve greater fame. Prometheus is left attached to the rock, but his 
liver is no longer being eaten anew each day. 
Prometheus learned the seriousness of the proscription against enabling 
human intrusion in divine territory by being chained to a rock and having his 
liver ripped out every day for giving humans fire. The fire was meant to stay in 
468. WD 80ff. Some of the variations on the Prometheus legend are discussed below in 
section ill.d on Aeschylus's Prometheus Bound. That section also includes discussion of 
differences between the accounts of Aeschylus and Hesiod. 
469. Theogony 585-604. 
470. WD 90-95. 
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the divine world, a secret only gods should share. 471 There are variations on the 
story of Prometheus-the nature of his transgression, the justification for his 
punishment, and exactly what that was-but they have in common that he 
violated the boundary between gods and humanity. Humanity must live with the 
punishment even though, at least on Hesiod's account, we did nothing to deserve 
it. The implication is that intentionally or not, when human beings violate limits, a 
bag of troubles await. 
e. Aeschylus. The Oresteia 
Summazy 
The Oresteia, comprised of Agamemnon, Libation Bearers, and Eumenides, 
is the only complete trilogy in Greek drama that we have. A story of struggle and 
regeneration, it is the record of a family and of the passage from the values of an 
ancient warrior aristocracy to communal institutions of justice. The entire story is 
set against the background of the founder of the House of Atreus, Tantalus, who 
violated the bounds of civility by serving his son's flesh to the gods. They 
responded by bringing the boy Pelops back to life and sending his father to 
Hades. Pelops had two sons, Atreus and Thyestes. Thyestes seduced his brother's 
wife and tried to ascend to Atreus's throne. To avenge the crimes, Atreus invited 
Thyestes to a banquet, kidnapped his children, killed them, and served their 
chopped-up bodies to their father as the main course. Thyestes wreaked his own 
471. Gantz 1993, 155 ff. 
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vengeance by invoking a curse on Atreus, his family, and all their descendents. 
He then entered a miserable exile with his one remaining son, Aegisthus. 
Atreus had two sons, Agamemnon, who married Clytaemnestra, and 
Menelaus, who married Helen. When Helen was seduced and carried away by 
Paris of Troy, Agamemnon led the Greek armada that laid siege to Troy. As 
Agamemnon's forces sailed toward Troy, their ships were stilled by winds 
quieted by the gods. Agamemnon learned from a god that winds would rise 
again only if Agamemnon sacrificed his daughter lphigeneia. The Greek 
commander agreed, the winds rose, and the ships sailed on to Troy. The Oresteia 
begins nine years later, after the Greeks sacked Troy and Agamemnon took as a 
spoil of war Cassandra, the daughter of Trojan king Priam and priestess of 
Apollo. 
In the Agamemnon, Clytaemnestra kills her husband when he returns 
home from the war, angrily accusing him of having acquiesced in the brutal 
sacrifice of their daughter lphigeneia and then improperly bringing Cassandra 
home to share their marriage bed. Clytaemnestra then rules over Argos with her 
lover Aegisthus, Thyestes' son. In Libation Bearers Orestes, the son of 
Agamemnon and Clytemnestra, is commanded by Apollo to avenge his father's 
death. Orestes dutifully slays his mother and her lover but is haunted by his 
pollution and by his mother's Furies, or Erinyes, who follow him everywhere, 
driving him mad. In Eumenides the Furies chase him to Apollo's shrine at Delphi. 
Orestes' bloodguilt is released by the god, but the Furies still plague him. Orestes 
is told that Athena might be able to help assuage his torment. In Athens, the 
goddess establishes the law court of the Areopagus, where Orestes is tried, 
acquitted, and told to return to Argos to rule. The story ends when Athena 
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negotiates the transformation of the Furies, who represent revenge, into the 
benevolent Eumenides, the kindly ones. They become a symbol that a new civic 
system of justice and order has begun. It marks a future in which there is the 
promise that rational discussion, not vengeful brutality, will determine 
appropriate punishment in Athens. 
Discussion 
Aeschylus wrote of suffering and its significance. He suggests that if the 
Areopagus can come from Orestes' killing his mother, if inherited curses can lead 
to transformation of the Furies, then pain can transcend its suffering, and the 
pathology of cyclical revenge can transform what E. R. Dodds said was a culture 
ridden by its guilt472 into the foundation for democratic community.473 The story 
expresses hope for moral progress. At the same time, it offers a thoroughgoing 
ambiguity about whether the human drive for progress and change has limits 
imposed by either nature or divinity. What limits it suggests seem established by 
humanity's fears. This is perhaps because Aeschylus writes at a time marked by 
enormous social and political turbulence as well as the tentative stirrings of an 
472. Dodds 1951, 28:ff. 
473. This is what Williams in Shame and Necessity (pages 5ft) describes as an element of the Mprogressivistw account of moral progress in the ancient world. Williams, without endorsing it, frames the account as: Greeks had primitive ideas of action, responsibility, ethical motivation, and justice, which in the course of history have been replaced by a more complex and refined set of conceptions that define a more mature form of ethical experience. Further, the world of Homer is thought to have embodied a shame culture (See Dodds 1951 for details), and that shame was later replaced, in its crucial ethical role, by guilt. Some think that this process had gone a long way by the time of Plato or even the tragedians. Others see all Greek culture as governed by notions that are nearer to shame than to a full notion of moral guilt, with its implications of freedom and autonomy; they believe that moral guilt was attained only by the modem consciousness. Dodds held the former view; the latter is dominant in Adkins. Lloyd-Jones (1971) warns that little can be educed about any of this. 
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individualism that could tend to believe boundaries were limited only by 
. imagination. 
On the face of it, The Oresteia seems to be an account of people who often 
and brutally overreach proper limits. Agamemnon kills his daughter to enable 
the Greek forces to attack Troy and revenge the seduction of his brother's wife. 
Clytaemnestra hacks her husband to death for killing their daughter. 
Agamemnon accedes to the sacrifice because, like Creon in the Anti. go ne, he 
believes his primary obligation is to the polis rather than to his family. Aegisthus 
takes up wrongful residence in the queen's bed while her husband is at war. The 
murderous rage that Clytemnestra exhibits has uncertain provenance: Is the 
presence of Cassandra and the death of her daughter a convenient excuse to 
replace Agamemnon with Aegisthus? Orestes exacts blood revenge that in other 
circumstances might seem appropriate payment for his father's murder. But 
here, with his sword ripping open his own mother's body, it seems to be a rude 
violation of laws more fundamental than the necessity of revenge. Orestes is 
haunted by the terror of his act because he believes it violates the rules of proper 
behavior as surely as did Agamemnon's sacrifice of Iphigeneia violate the rules 
of family bonds. 
When Orestes acts to avenge his father's death, the key concept in 
understanding his motivation in the context of ancient Greek culture is dike. But 
John Kerrigan points to the difficulty of the term when he says there is nothing in 
modern European vocabularies that encompass dike. The Greek had no term for 
a "revenger." Instead, they had the concept of "the man who deals dike," or "'he 
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who restores honor or status or respect," who N enforces an exchange. "474 The 
difficulty of exactly translating dike means that The Oresteia, like other tragedies 
that use the same term, means that the meaning and significance of the action 
and language of the story is always open to argument. Kerrigan says about this 
that when a work Nis written around complex keywords . . .  their semantic 
intricacy provides fuel for debate," which is the source of much of the power of 
The Oresteia to speak to modern concerns.475 
The tale's continuing power rests also in that Aeschylus does more, here 
and elsewhere, than point to the overreaching of humanity and the ensuing 
suffering. His stories are hymns to humanity's ability to endure suffering, to 
transcend the blood curse of hereditary guilt and ethical conflict. The, as Robert 
Fagles describes it, is humanity's #battle for freedom in the teeth of fate, and his 
collaboration with his gods to create a better world. "476 Zeus, as the old men of 
Argos explain, .ulays it down as law that we must suffer, suffer into truth." 
Aeschylus is clear that if suffering has meanings, its significance must lie in its 
capacity to transform. It is the transformation of suffering into truth. 
The Oresteia continues to speak to audiences today because it celebrates 
humanity's courage to explore new possibilities and create new versions of itself, 
and yet it warns that this courage carries with it the likelihood of misbehavior 
and anguish. The paradox suggests that a tension is necessary between progress 
and suffering and that people must accept both the danger and the exhilaration 
474. Kerrigan 1996, 20-21. 
475. Kerrigan 1996, 21. 
476. Fagles 1975, 6. 
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of the directions our nature leads. The house of Atreus is enveloped in fear, 
danger, guilt, misery, and memory. Like the House of Laius, the pollution forces 
each of its members to recreate the crimes and the guilt of their ancestors-a 
cycle of foreboding evil that Aeschylus argues can be broken. 
E. R. Dodds says the kind of mythology that creates the houses of Atreus, 
of Laius, and of kindred circles, reflects the pathology of a culture ridden by 
guilt.477 The guilt rises from a world where violence begets more violence, which 
in turn begets historical upheavals, economic crises, and class warfare.478 During 
the eighth, seventh, and sixth centuries, the upheavals affected social systems 
and familial bonds, and for explanation people attributed cause to an angry set of 
incomprehensible gods who established fate and issued tragic judgments. Dodds 
believes the Greeks sought escape, sometimes in the Apollonian demand for self 
restraint and sometimes in the ecstatic release of Dionysian frenzy.479 
Fagles says that Aeschylus's interest in Dionysus lies in the cult's 
development from one that included rites of ripping apart living beings and 
eating their flesh into an established religion with tamer ritual practices, thus 
suggesting the capacity of humanity for renewal and redirection.480 The story of 
the House of Atreus is the story of a rite of passage, of moving from suffering to 
regeneration, from unknowing to knowing, and the strides along the way that 
are necessary to the eventual result. In this way, Fagles sees each book in The 
477. Dodds 1951, chapter 2; also related discussion, 244ff. 
478. Discussion of class warfare and related issues is in Ste. Croix 1981. Also see Crook 
1983. Additional discussion of Ste. Croix's thesis and related issues is in T.D. Barnes 1982, 
K. R. Bradley 1982, Robert Browning 1983. 
479. Dodds 1951, 76ff 
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Oresteia as rites of passage along the way from savagery to civilization. He says 
the Agamemnon is the rite of separation as the king is cut off from his society. 
Libation Bearers is the rite of transition, depicting the son at the threshold of 
maturity. Eumenides is the rite of aggregation that ""celebrates Orestes' initiation 
into Argos and our initiation into Athens."481 
While The Oresteia seems to depict regeneration coming from suffering, it 
is also a dramatic account of efforts to resolve questions of justice and the 
appropriate bounds for human striving. It tells of the trials that result from 
human social missteps, and perhaps similar to the events of the Bacchae, the 
capacity to evolve higher states of consciousness. 
As the Greeks struggled with changes in their economic and civic systems 
during the late archaic period, we struggle in the postmodern era to emerge 
from the uncertainties of modernity. Our questioning of the gods, of natural 
orders, and of humanity's proper domain, contains differences in the details but 
our questioning is of like kind to those the Greeks asked: How do we see 
ourselves in relationship to each other and to the gods? Is it always true that, as 
the chorus says, the gods have ordered that we must suffer to find wisdom?482 
What does it mean to extend justice? What is the best kind of community? How 
do we want to be different than we are? What are the questions we should be 
asking? What is in our domain and what is not? 
480. Fagles 1975, 7-8. 
481. Fagles 1975, 9. 
482. Agamemnon 176: "'Zeus has led us on to know, the Helmsman lays it down as law 
that we must suffer, suffer into truth." 
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These questions are implicit in OT, and are spoken to directly when 
Oedipus explains that whereas Apollo made his pains much worse, ""the hand 
that struck my eyes was mine and mine alone." Fate and blood curses had a hand 
in his suffering, but Oedipus came to understand that he alone chose how he 
would respond to what was fated. Compare this to Agamemnon in the Iliad 
explaining what caused him to take Cassandra from Achilleus: "not I was the 
cause of this act, but Zeus and my portion and the Erinys who walks in darkness: 
they it was who in the assembly put wild ate483 in my understanding, on that day 
when I arbitrarily took Achilleus' prize from him. So what could I do? Deity will 
always have its way."484 
This may seem to be an evasion of responsibility and hence another failure 
to see that will lead to Agamemnon's punishment. But Dodds argues that 
Agamemnon is not trying to evade responsibility; instead he is expressing a form 
of early Greek justice, which cares not at all about intent, only about the act. Thus 
Agamemnon offers just compensation to Achilleus because the reason he took 
483. Lloyd-Jones in Justice (1971) defines ate as "a temporary insanity, causing disastrous 
error, often sent by Zeus to mortals. "  Dodds (1951), 3:ff, interprets the Greek ate as the 
experience of divine temptation or infatuation. He says it was a claim often made when 
one needs an explanation for doing something that causes the contempt or ridicule of his 
fellows. Loss of self-control, or disregard of proper behavior, or a failure to act rightly in 
various ways is thus explained as the result of ate. Dodds points out that if Agamemnon 
had acted of his own volition, he could not so easily admit himself in the wrong. Early 
Greek justice cared nothing for intent; it was solely the act that mattered. Dodds says it 
was after the Homeric age that ate was transformed into a punishment and the Erinyes 
became ministers of vengeance, and Zeus an embodiment of cosmic justice. Although ate 
occurs in the mad 9.505ff and 19.91:ff. in personal terms as punishment, Dodds says these 
are meant as allegory (Dodds1951, 18 and 37ff.) Generally, Dodds says, ate bears the 
connotation of a ruin that is supernaturally determined, but that in Homer it is often 
merely a state of mind, a temporary clouding or bewildering of the normal 
consciousness. On this, see Dodds 5 and 38ff. At 5, Dodds declares that the assertion of 
Liddell and Scott that ate is "mostly sent as the punishment of guilty rashness" is quite 
untrue of Homer. In Hesiod's WD, at 214ff, ate is the inescapable penalty for hubris, 
although ate is translated by Lattimore as "delusions" and by Tandy as "calamities." 
484. mad 19.86ff. 
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Cassandra is not important, only that he took her: "since I was blinded by ate 
and Zeus took away my understanding, I am willing to make my peace and give 
abundant compensation. "485 Achilleus shares this understanding of causation: 
"Father Zeus, great indeed are the atai thou givest to men. Else the son of Atreus 
would never have persisted in rousing the thumos in my chest, nor obstinately 
taken the girl against my will."486 The moral value of intention in assigning 
culpability would develop later. For Homer, perhaps on Dodds's account for 
Aeschylus too, it may not have been as significant. Instead, these passages and 
the action surrounding them point to the questions I suggested above about 
justice, community, our view of ourselves, and the limits of our domain. 
Dike, in OC and OT, as in Aeschylus's Prometheus and in Agamemnon's 
explanation for taking Cassandra, is the central issue. It is held out during the 
Homeric and Aeschylean periods as the promise of right behavior and orderly 
relations, but instead, following Fagles, dike "has remained a force of vengeance, 
cursing offenders and their heirs with endless acts of violence-the punishment 
of the Furies."487 In this way, ate is the explanation both for the causes of offense 
and pollution, as well as for the reaction to it.488 When Paris seduces Helen, he 
violates dike. But the Greeks' reaction is polluted from the beginning by 
Agamemnon's violation of familial dike in sacrificing his daughter. One 
impropriety leads to another, and so the lingering brutalities begin feeding on 
themselves. The battle in The Oresteia centers on whether the family can find 
485. mad 137ff 
486. mad 19.270ff. 
487. Fagles 1975, 11 .  
488. See discussion of ate in note 408 above. 
170 
resolution, can find new ways of honoring dike in a culture undergoing elemental 
changes. The cultural changes created new dilemmas in religious, social, and 
familial relationships that call for new ways of thinking, especially about the 
proper extending of dike. Aeschylus forces us to see that it is not just his 
generation that faces this question. Rather, each new generation faces both 
opportunity and danger and it is in the way it deals with dike in the changed 
culture of the new generation that determines whether we get mired in the same 
stupidities or we find new understandings that affo�d the possibility of moral 
progress. 
Fagles says The Oresteia presents a range of conflicts: theological conflict 
between will and necessity, or between Zeus and the Fates, or the gods of the sky 
and the powers of the earth; social conflict between patriarchy and matriarchy; 
psychological conflict between our intellect and ""our hunger for release, our 
darker, vengeful drives that can invigorate our dreams of ideality, equity and 
balance. "489 It is in the way the conflicts come to be seen as working together 
rather than in opposition that, for Aeschylus, resolution becomes possible. The 
boundaries between the two sides in the conflicts remain, but their relationship 
becomes synergistic, which allows dike as retribution to be transformed into dike 
as justice. This process is most apparent in the Furies, which transform from 
being the spirits of the avenging dead into the spirits of civic justice. 
As the force that impels the community toward its future, the Furies are 
Promethean, bringing to humanity the possibility of a new order of justice rising 
out of the old order of vengeance. The idea that conflicting positions like 
489. Fagles 1975, 12. 
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vengeance andjustice can work synergistically, transformatively, also may be 
seen in the conflict between will and necessity. Dodds asserts that for the Greeks, 
will and necessity do not refer to the same issues as they are framed in the 
modern debate between freedom and determinism: ''To ask whether Homer's 
people are determinists or libertarians is a fantastic anachronism: the question 
has never occurred to them, and if it were put to them it would be very difficult to 
make them understand what it meant."490 They differentiate between normal 
actions and actions done under the influence of ate or of fate. On this account, 
the immediate agent of Agamemnon's death is Clytemnestra, but it might also be 
indirectly attributed to the Erinys as the agents of ate and vengeance, or to fate 
as the overall context. Dodds says all three exist in Agamemnon's understanding 
of causation, and so culpability is held on several levels, all of which work 
together. 
Culpability is significant in Aeschylus because it demarcates the locations 
at which human responsibility begins and ends. If man is the measure of all 
things, then ate and fate and the will of the gods are all held within humanity's 
imagination and control. Dodds finds a deep sense of human insecurity and 
helplessness in the fragmentary literature of the Archaic Age, as well as in Pindar 
and Sophocles and, generally, in Herodotus, all of whom have a mostly archaic 
outlook. The insecurity accrues, on Dodds' account, partly from the sense of deity 
holding human beings down, being "jealous and interfering," as Herodotus puts 
it.491 We wonder how overmastering gods can be so jealous of an insignificant 
490. Dodds 1951, 7. 
491. Herodotus 1.32. 
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humanity, why they resent our successes and happiness. The explanation is 
usually that the immortals do not want humans to begin encroaching on their 
prerogatives, their domain.492 The gods alone get the contents of the jar that 
carries the unmixed good. Human beings get either unmixed evil or a mixed 
assortment of the contents. 493 In Agamemnon Aeschylus speaks about divine 
jealousy as .ua venerable doctrine uttered long ago."494 Too much success can 
bring on jealousy, and bragging about it is almost certain to. Prometheus learned 
this anew each time his liver was chewed out of his body. Insecurity and anxiety 
also resulted from the political and economic turmoil of the seventh and sixth 
centuries, which brought an upheaval in the social strata. The insecurities 
showed up in various ways, among them development of a belief in demons, 
''based on the sense of man's helpless dependence upon capricious Power."495 
A significant result of these changes was a shift in the stability of the 
family, and thus a shift in the proper boundaries of behavior within and in 
relationship to the family. The family was the keystone of the archaic social 
structure, Dodds says, "the first organised unit, the first domain of law" and the 
father was king of his household. 496 The father had authority to expose his 
children in infancy and to expel them from the community when they were older. 
A son had duties to his father, but no rights. And Greeks viewed offenses against 
the father as second only to impiety against the gods. As claims to individual 
492. Dodds 1951, 29. 
493. mad 24. This is also discussed above in section ill.b, the mad. 
494. Agamemnon 750. 
495. Dodds 1951, 45. 
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personal rights and responsibilities rose, family bonds relaxed. During the 
Classical period, the sophistic movement marked a further deterioration: .Uthe 
conflict became in many households a fully conscious one: young men began to 
claim that they had a "'natural right" to disobey their father. But it is a fair guess 
that such conflicts already existed at the unconscious level from a very much 
earlier date-that in fact they go back to the earliest unconfessed stirrings of 
individualism in a society where family solidarity was still universally taken for 
-granted. "497 
This account of a culture in change suggests that in Aeschylus, 
Agamemnon and the old order of dike had to die to allow the possibility of a new 
order. As in Prometheus, the bringer of fire had to be punished to satisfy the 
gods and allow humanity to progress. Agamemnon's guilt in violating familial 
dike is clear in the choice he made between war and daughter. It is less clear that 
Aeschylus wanted Agamemnon's sacrifice of Iphigeneia to justify Clytemnestra's 
murder of her husband. He is doing more than suggesting her revenge results 
from a curse operating on the house, from Agamemnon's paying for the sins of 
his fathers. Aeschylus .. s portrayal of a family dissolving so that it can regenerate 
becomes the claim that any system-social, political, familial, religious-must be 
able to rethink its most basic traditions, continue them when they allow the 
system to thrive, and remake them when they cause the system to wither. So 
Clytemnestra's killing of Agamemnon and Orestes' slaying of Clytemnestra is 
also comparable to the complete disintegration of the old order. In Hecuba, 
496. Dodds 1951, 45. Aristotle, too, describes the father's position as analogous to that of 
a king, Politics 1.2, 1252b 20 
497. Dodds 1951, 47. 
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Hecuba appeals to no mos, moral law, which she describes as superior even to the 
gods: " . . .  the gods are strong, and strong is the great Law that governs them. It 
is by Law that we believe the gods exist; By Law we live, by Law distinguish right 
and wrong."498 She draws on no mos to persuade Agamemnon to help her take 
vengeance on her son's murderers.499 Agamemnon refuses to help her, but does 
not deny that vengeance, as well as helping her as a friend, is what no mos 
prescribes. He says the issue is more complicated than the simple application of 
no mos, however, and, while he would like to help, he must step carefully where 
there is uncertainty.500 Nussbaum says the morality of helping friends that was 
pervasive in ancient Greece was under attack by the time of Sophocles and that 
even Aeschylus is critical of the morality of revenge. She, like Dodds, argues that 
The Oresteia depicts social morality arising out of the containment of revenge.501 
When Sophocles followed Aeschylus to the Athenian stage, he would be what 
Dodds says is the last great exponent of the archaic world view. Sophocles 
expressed the .ufull tragic significance of the old religious themes in their 
unsoftened, unmoralised forms-the overwhelming sense of human helplessness 
in face of the divine mystery, and of the ate502 that waits on all human 
achievement-and who made these thoughts part of the cultural inheritance of 
Western man."503 
498. Hecuba 797-800. 
499. Hecuba 734ft', 786ft'. 
500. Hecuba 85o-862. 
501. Nussbaum 1993, 67. Also see Blundell 1989, 6ff. 
502. For ate, see note 408 above. 
503. Dodds 1951, 49. 
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f. Aeschylus. Prometheus Bound and Prometheus Unbound 
Summaiy 
Prometheus Bound is thought to have been the first in an early 
fifth-century trilogy dramatizing the fiercely violent argument between Zeus and 
Prometheus. Another play in the Prometheus trilogy, Prometheus Unbound, 
survives only in fragments. A third Aeschylean play about Prometheus, 
Prometheus Firestarter, is also known only from fragmentary evidence. It is 
thought to have been a satyr play that apparently burlesqued Prometheus's 
giving tire to human beings and it may have accompanied a different trilogy. 504 
The tales are especially relevant to this dissertation because they contain clearly 
discussed boundaries set by divinities and because some of the themes parallel 
similar ideas related in the Genesis creation story. 
Together, the stories consider the nature of gods, their relationship with 
each other, and how some of this affects humanity. Prometheus, whose name 
means ""the forethinker," betrayed his fellow Titans by siding with Zeus and the 
Olympians in the war between the two groups of divinities-Olympians and 
Titans. His relationship with Zeus soured when Prometheus altered the status of 
humans by giving them tire, providing for them the ability to develop the arts 
and crafts-technology. 
The play begins with Prometheus as a prisoner of Zeus's representatives, 
Power and Force. At their instruction, Prometheus is staked to a rock by 
Hephaestus and left as punishment for violating Zeus's will in assisting humans. 
504. Gantz 1993, 158. 
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He asks that the elements witness his suffering and much of the rest of the play is 
Prometheus explaining to the chorus and a series of visitors-Ocean, Io, and 
Hermes-that he is being punished for giving humanity fire, along with the blind 
hopes that veil knowledge of death. 505 Prometheus also tells a secret, which turns 
out to be one of the central issues of the play: that Zeus, unless warned in time, 
will some day father a son fated to be greater than Zeus. This sets up a battle 
between Zeus, who has seemingly all power in the universe, and Prometheus, 
who has knowledge of an event that can end Zeus's rule. 
A second central element of the story is Io's visit to Prometheus. She tells 
him of the miseries she has suffered as a result of Zeus's lust unsatisfied lust for 
her. His wife Hera's jealous anger forced her to wander the earth, plagued by the 
droning and biting horsefly that accompanies her wherever she goes. Her story 
is an account of the gods' oppression of humanity. When Io's father sought her 
freedom from Zeus and his wife, his messengers were told by Apollo's oracle 
that she must wander the earth, untouchable, and if she is not driven out of her 
home Zeus would destroy humanity with a thunderbolt. In his meeting with Io, 
Prometheus tells her that for several generations she will continue to wander 
through the universe, facing various troubles, and that one of her descendants 
will eventually set Prometheus free. 
The bitter tale Io tells leads Prometheus to reveal to Io and the chorus the 
story of Zeus's future son, and this revalation in turn causes a furious 
confrontation between Prometheus and Zeus. When Prometheus challenges Zeus 
505. In Hesiod, the punishment is said to be punishment for Prometheus's tricking Zeus 
into taking a plate of bones and fat instead of a plate of meat. 
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for his stubborn arrogance, especially in his treament of humanity, Hermes is 
sent from the heavens to threaten Prometheus with more violence if he does not 
reveal the name of the woman fated to bear Zeus's son. Prometheus refuses, and 
the play ends when Zeus angrily raises a cosmic convulsion to hurl Prometheus 
into the abyss of Tartarus. 
Aeschylus does not mention Pandora, the misery brought by women, or 
Prometheus's deception of Zeus in tricking him out of getting the best portion of 
meat. Aeschylus also differs from Hesiod in saying that Prometheus provided 
humanity not just with tire but also with architecture, advanced methods of 
agriculture, domestication of animals, divination, and writing. Prometheus in the 
Aeschylean version is said to have prevented Zeus from entirely destroying 
humanity: 
. . .  to the unhappy 
breed of mankind he gave no heed, intending 
to blot the race out and create a new. 
Against these plans none stood save I: I dared. 
I rescued men from shattering destruction 
that would have carried them to Hades' house; 
and therefore I am tortured on this rock . . .  506 
In what is known from surviving fragments of Prometheus Unbound, 
Prometheus-after a time in Tartarus-is returned to earth, bound again, and, as 
in Hesiod, his liver repeatedly torn out by Zeus's eagle. The story ends when 
Heracles shoots the eagle and releases Prometheus. This differs from Hesiod's 
version that says nothing about Prometheus being released. 
506. Prometheus Bound 232-245. 
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Some answers to questions raised by the various stories are not included 
in the extant plays. It might be that it is in the missing parts we would learn why 
Zeus wanted to eliminate the human race and why Prometheus first turned 
against Zeus and tricked him with the ruse of meat and bones. We might also 
learn why Zeus eventually allowed Prometheus's release. Some readings of other 
fragmentary evidence argue that Zeus eventually learned from Prometheus that 
the son who could overthrow his rule was to be born to Thetis.507 But like all 
stories about Greek gods, the versions told vary considerably depending upon 
who was telling and when it was told. 
Discussion 
In Prometheus Bound, Zeus is depicted as cruel, tyrannical, ungrateful, 
and would destroy humanity if it were not for the intervention of Prometheus. 
Prometheus is defiantly determined to undermine Zeus's power, save humanity, 
and revenge Io's suffering. This is an unusual view of Zeus. Scholars commenting 
on the play routinely note that the Zeus of Prometheus Unbound is very different 
than the Zeus of Aeschylus's other plays. 508 In the Suppliants, for example, Zeus is 
humanity's protector, a wise judge of good and evil who rules justly.509 In Homer, 
Zeus generally possesses three of the functions later closely associated with that 
of protecting justice: he is protector of oaths, of strangers, of the law of host and 
507. See, for example, Hall 1997, 90. 
508. See, for example, Balot 2001, on Zeus in Homer and Hesiod as protector of fair­
minded men and of justice, 60-61, 73, 85-86, and Golden 1962, 100ff. 
509. Suppliants 437, 78, 343, 395, and elsewhere. 
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guests, and of suppliants. 510 Uoyd-J ones explains the differences among the 
various accounts by arguing that Zeus throughout Greek literature is arbitrary 
and inconsistent, that .uthe gods by their laws encourage righteousness among 
men. But they themselves are not obliged to obey those laws, nor should we be 
reasonable to expect it . . .  "511 
It may be that the Zeus of the Suppliants is the god who represents the 
controlled behavior of justice, while the Zeus of Prometheus Bound represents 
the uncontrolled, mysterious powers of the universe, and that the combination 
represents in Aeschylus, as in us, the tension of uncertainty regarding power and 
authority in the universe. 512 William Zak suggests this in arguing that this story, 
along with others such as Oedipus, demonstrates that nothing, including 
Prometheus, can mediate between humanity and the gods with much success. 513 
Whether they got fire on their own or as a gift from a god, humanity would still 
have to suffer for violating the divine boundary. 
Human beings, Zak says, thus must act even amidst the uncertainties of 
the terrors that exist in the universe. Prometheus and his brother, Epimetheus, 
might be divine benefactors to humanity, but they cannot-except in rare and 
unexplainable circumstances-protect against the mysterious and uncontrollable 
incertitude of chance, fate, and the gods. Bernard Williams speaks to this in 
asserting that humanity rightly employs a "Promethean fear" of taking too 
510. Lloyd-Jones 1971, 5. 
511. Lloyd-Jones 1956, 66. 
512. See Podlecki 1999 for a discussion of the Greek political background and the 
analogies of Zeus in Prometheus Bound to contemporary leaders. 
513. Zak 1995, 189. 
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ulightly or inconsiderately our relations with nature."514 This fear, he says, is 
something that is not simply an archaic remnant that we can ignore: 
. . .  Promethean fear is a good general warning device, reminding us still 
appropriately of what we may properly fear. But apart from that, if it is . 
something that many people deeply feel, then it is something that is likely 
to be pervasively connected to things that we value, to what gives life the 
kinds of significance that it has. We should not suppose that we know how 
this may be, or that we can be sure that we can do without those things. 515 
Williams says nature offers an example of how this fear provides guidance and 
caution in exercising the traditional doctrine of our utranscendence of nature, 
and with it our monarchy of the earth." In this way, nature provides a boundary 
to our activities, u defining certain interventions and certain uncontrolled effects 
as transgressive. "516 
For many, this conception of boundary and transgression, is a part of a 
religious sensibility. As such, human beings should understand that there are 
limits. In Prometheus Bound, Zeus and the uncontrollability of the gods represent 
a counterpoint to the outlook of some religions that claim human domination of 
the world. 
This uncontrollability often shows up in tragedy as the expression of pathos, 
the suffering that comes from seemingly undeserved punishment. 517 Thomas 
Gould says Prometheus Bound is the most sustained spectacle of pathos in 
514. Williams 1995, 239. 
515. Williams 1995, 239. 
516. Williams 1995, 237-38. 
517. See the discussion of pathos above, section 11.c. 
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surviving Greek drama.518 Its portrayal of Prometheus as a longsuffering 
benefactor of humanity, shackled to a bleak mountaintop, is the archetype of 
suffering that is not justified by the crime. And it does not end with the first play; 
it continues in Prometheus Unbound when in what may be the opening scene, his 
visitors say: 11we have come, Prometheus . . .  to gaze upon this pathos, your 
bondage. "519 It is in this second play that Prometheus is left staked to the wall 
accompanied by Zeus's eagle, who repeatedly eats Prometheus's perpetually 
regenerating liver. 520 
Gould says that in the third play of the trilogy, 521 for which only fragments 
survive, a cosmic equilibrium between Prometheus and Zeus is achieved. 
Nothing, throughout the available fragments suggests that Prometheus deserved 
his punishment, or, Gould says, that Zeus can be II exonerated of the charge of 
having persecuted the good. It is the gods, not their victims, who must be 
transformed. "522 
The story's themes are early examples of recurrent motifs in Western 
literature and thought: 
1. Intelligence against force: Prometheus stiffly refuses to reveal a secret to Zeus 
and Zeus tries to destroy Prometheus's will by nailing him to a fissure in the 
518. Gould 1990, 126-27. 
519. Gould 1990, 127. 
520. For a discussion about ways tragic authors such as Aeschylus use tragic elements, 
including pathos, to involve and instruct the audience, see P. ,E. Easterling 1996. 
521. There is enormous scholarly uncertainty over the ordering of the plays in the 
Prometheus trilogy, as well as what is contained in the two plays that survive only as 
fragments. Whether Aeschylus or someone else wrote Prometheus Bound is also 
questioned. For a discussion of the controversies, see D. J. Conacher 1980, 141-74. 
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mountains at the end of the world and then splitting the earth, leaving 
Prometheus buried beneath it for eons. 
2. Humanity against god: Zeus seeks to assert his authority by keeping humanity 
in a subservient position, powerless without fire and the arts, while a rebel 
divinity assists their independence. 
E.A. Havelock says P rom eth eus Bou nd reflects Na deep distrust of man's own 
powers of purpose and contrivance, and especially of his intelligence, which if 
exercised can collide with the mind of god and invite jealousy and so disaster. 
The fruit of the tree of knowledge must not be eaten."523 The tale is more than a 
caution against knowledge, however; it exhibits what Havelock says is the 
hallmark of Greek tragic humanism: 'There is the distrust of what man can do, 
and the reluctance to match him against his environment. Yet this is balanced by 
a feeling that man is heir of the gods, with whom he once kept company and 
against whom he once competed; that he has to fool them, and can fool 
them, . . .  "524 
This balance between the power of divinity and the nature of humanity 
plays out, in the way Aeschylus tells it in Pr om eth eus Unb ou nd, 525 when Zeus has 
the hero impaled on a pillar and tortured by an eagle, and then released by 
Heracles, an action suggesting Zeus's emasculation by humanity's reach for 
knowledge. The power of Zeus is diminished, but the Olympic pantheon is not 
522. Gould 1990, 127. 
523. Havelock 1950, 51. 
524. Havelock 1950, 51. 
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being overthrown. Zeus and the others remain, on Aeschylus's account, but 
humanity is raised up as an antagonist equal to the gods. They still have not 
tasted of immortality, which could make their knowledge more powerful and 
godlike. The battle depicts Zeus enraged, willing to destroy all so that he can 
punish Prometheus and retain supremacy. Havelock reads this as a radical · 
correction in Greek tradition: to convert Zeus from "the architect of an ordered 
cosmos into a chaotic and willful force which would pull the cosmos about 
Prometheus's ears. This cannot but be intended to strip Zeus of dignity. It 
reduces him to a status below that of the Forethinker."526 As the end of the play 
approaches, Prometheus proclaims proudly, 
Doom waits for Jove. His proud and violent heart shall verily stoop . . .  
Let him now in face of this sit cheerful in the sky trusting loud noise and 
waving thunderbolts . . .  These cannot fend away his coming fall and 
scanda dire and unendurable . . . .  Colliding with disaster, Jove shall see 
what bondage means for one who has been free . . . .  Let him play out his 
little act of power. His role in heaven lasts but for an hour. "52 
If, following Havelock, various aspects of humanity are represented in the 
characters of Prometheus, Zeus, and Zeus's representatives, then the myth told 
by Aeschylus expresses the conflict within humanity's consciousness between 
intellectual power and the distrust and fear of that power: 
. . .  the total mood of the Greeks about man was complex. Their 
conception of his science was so complete that they took in not only what 
it meant in itself, as a mental discipline and a technological force, but also 
what its moral consequences would be . . .  They were able to realize that it 
525. Prometheus Unbound survives only in fragments, but enough of it apparently is 
available to decode the ending. 
526. Havelock 1950, 57. 
527. Prometheus Bound 907-40, Havelock 1950. 
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I meant a revolution in age-long methods of feeling, and that thou�ht it would make us different, it would not necessarily make us happy. 28 
Havelock argues that the Greeks present huma_nity as the victor, who 
through intelligence has prevailed, and yet has been defeated because despite 
technological power, he has learned his own insignificance: " . . .  he lives 
ephemeral in a tiny space for a moment of time; he remains helpless before 
cosmic forces which exercise arbitrary control over his obscure destiny. This 
mood of fatalism persists from Homer to Thucydides and is not absent in 
Plato."529 It is a contradictory account, lacking the same clarity that humanity 
l�cks in its actions and its justifications. 
Here as well as in The Oresteia, Aeschylus writes about the time when 
ideas about the status and powers of both men and gods were being created. 530 
For example, in Pindar's Pythian 3, written around 474, Asclepius, the first mortal 
healer, can heal the sick and the dead, 531 suggesting that it was a later idea that 
the dead stay dead. By Aeschylus's Agamemnon, written around 458, the finality 
of death was fixed. The chorus says " . . .  a man's lifeblood is dark and mortal. 
Once it wets the earth what song can sing it back? Not even the master-healer 
who brought the dead to life-Zeus stopped the man before he did more 
528. Havelock 1950, 33. 
529. Havelock 1950, 34. 
530. Lattimore 1958, 47. D. J. Conacher (1980) discusses what he calls "The Zeus Problem"' 
in chapter 6. Lloyd-Jones 1971, 95-103, refutes the thesis that Zeus of the Prometheus is 
different than the Zeus that appears elsewhere in Aeschylus. He argues there is no 
change in Zeus, no evolution here or elsewhere in Greek literature, that Zeus is always a 
complicated, contradictory, and confounding character. 
531. Pythian 3.45-58. 
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harm."532 This does not mean, of course, that the dates of these ideas determine 
social beliefs generally for these periods, but they provide clues. 
In Genesis too, God forbids eating from the tree of the knowledge of 
"" good and evil, "533 and then sends Adam and Eve out of the garden so that they 
cannot also eat from the tree of life, of immortality. 
Here, the human has become like one of us, in knowing good and evil. So 
now, lest he send forth his hand and take also from the Tree of Life and eat 
and live throughout the ages . . .  ! So YHWH, God, sent him away from the 
garden of Eden . . .  534 
Like the Hebrew God, Zeus sees that, thanks to Prometheus, humans have 
gained previously forbidden knowledge and they must be prevented from further 
incursions into divine territory, stopped from further harm. Prometheus, perhaps 
like the seductions of the snake in Genesis, represents intellect and is, for 
Havelock, Nin competition with all the inherited terrors of traditional 
Mediterranean cult." When Havelock compares Greek thinking with Hebraic, he 
finds in the Greeks a tension dramatically pulling at their existence, with gods 
and limits on one side and on the other, intellect, imagination and curiosity. In 
the Hebrews, this tension is absent, he says, such that ""in the Old Testament, man 
is completely dwarfed by his environment." God is everything; humanity is 
nothing. ""All man's knowledge and judgment, left to its own devices, is vanity. To 
532. Agamemnon 1017-23. 
533. Genesis 2: 16ff. #Good and evil" is a Hebraic idiom referring to knowledge and 
understanding. 
534. Genesis 2: 22-24 
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realize any health in himself he must lean on, or identify with, a power without. 
He is sinful and blind."535 
If this were true, Havelock' s depiction of the Hebraic tradition would 
indeed provide a handy contrast to the Greek. His reading of the Pentateuch, 
however, is shallow. It misses the richness of intellectual courage and the sense 
of freedom that the Hebrew God grants humanity not only to explore the world, 
but, in the obligation of Tikkun Olam, to perfect it.536 Rather than being powerless 
and '' dwarfed by his environment," humanity is given the task to repair the 
world, which was left imperfect during the creation described by Genesis. On the 
Judaic account, human beings are given full intellectual power to complete the 
creation, but to do it within the context that the project is nevertheless within 
God's domain and that it is not the case that human power has dominion. 
The issue of who or what has ultimate authority arises in Prometheus 
Bound, when Prometheus says that "craft is far weaker than necessity," which 
can be translated as "Science is weaker than nature is." The chorus then asks 
who is the steersman of necessity, of nature-to which Prometheus answers, 
"The triple-formed Fates and the remembering Furies." 
This prompts the chorus to ask, "Is Zeus weaker than these?" Yes, 
Prometheus, asserts, for he, too, "cannot escape what is fated." What is fated, the 
chorus asks. At this, Prometheus declines to go further: "Inquire of this no 
535. Havelock 1950, 36. 
536. Tikkun Olam is discussed in Frank and Leaman 1997, volume 2, 478, 871. Also see 
Yehuda Liebes 1993, 100, 112, 115-117, 126-128, 130-137, 139, 14o-149, 194-200, 204-205, 
208, 210; David Blumenthal 1988/1994, xxvi-xxii, 22-27, 54-55, 66-68; Walter Wurzburger 
1954, 47ff. 
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further, do not entreat me . . . .  it must be hidden with all care; for it is only by 
keeping it that I will escape my despiteful bondage and my agony."537 
The question being asked is, what limitations form the parameters on 
Zeus's power and, perhaps, on the potential powers of humanity? The question 
seems to be left unanswered. We are not told with certainty whether the fates 
and furies rule Zeus or whether he equates the fates and furies with nature. He 
suggests but does not confirm that scientific inquiry will always fail in gaining 
full knowledge of nature. He seems to suggest that the power Zeus wields must 
operate within the limitations imposed by nature/fate/furies, but before he can be 
pressed for details he says "Press me no further" because he will not reveal the 
"terrible secret." Later, Prometheus refers to humanity as .uthese new gods of 
ours,"538 and says he showed them how to see, how to survive in the world, and 
how to understand. He proudly claims to have opened an entrance for humans 
into God's walled-off terrain so that the ""new gods" could learn to master the 
universe. But it seems clear from this that humanity, too, is subject to the same 
limitations. Thus, the concern about overstepping boundaries can extend not just 
to Zeus's realm but also to those proscriptions contained in nature itself, as well 
as those wielded by the fates and the furies. 
For an Athenian audience, Lattimore says, Aeschylus's story was the 
depiction of "an insurrection in the community where a new aspirant rises 
against the enthroned master." Humanity is now able to gain mastery of things 
537. Prometheus Bound 512-25. The issue of Prometheus's knowledge of a secret fate for 
Zeus is first raised at line 254 when a mysterious plan to endanger Zeus's throne is 
mentioned. By 1393, Prometheus predicts that Zeus will "'be humbled yet." And at 1410, 
..,Nothing will save Him from the sharp plunge into shame, excruciating ruin." 
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that in the past had been reserved to divinities. It is the story of a shift in 
boundaries, symbolized by Prometheus's secret, which may be that whatever 
power Zeus holds, it would one day give way to the new gods. But Prometheus's 
knowledge is faulty as well and has limitations. He misjudged Zeus's ability to 
punish: "I was trying to help mortals and I hurt myself. And yet I never thought I 
could be punished so, so hung to dry upon the skyward rocks."539 The audience 
would see this as a cautionary element in the tale, that human infringement on 
the old gods' territory and power can be tempting, perhaps even inevitable, but it 
comes tainted by Promethean hubris and so brings with it the constant 
possibility of misjudgment, failure, and punishment. 
For Havelock, the resolution arrives in Aeschylus's sequel, when 
Prometheus is released, Zeus's power curtailed, and humanity's intellect let loose 
to explore. But for both Havelock and Lattimore, the resolution is muddied by the 
entirety of the Prometheus story. 
Havelock says the story depicts humanity brought into collision with the 
universe. They pursue their interests enough to provoke the collision but they do 
not create it. If they did, disaster would be clearly traceable to humanity's faulty 
design and perhaps would be fixable. Instead, the genuine terror in Aeschylean 
tragedy "'lies in the fact that the ultimate sanctions employed against man are not 
proportional to his admitted errors. The dilemma without is mirrored in the 
competition within the soul, between wisdom and arrogance, skill and delusion, 
strong resolution and abject demoralization. Man's ambition is betrayed by the 
538. Prometheus Bound 436ft'. 
539. Prometheus Bound 269-71. 
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events which happen to him, whether they represent the will of the gods or the 
turn of accident . . . .  Is he bound to take risks to make himself vulnerable to 
fortune itself? Or should he accept the littleness and futility of his estate, and seek 
resignation and retreat before a universe with which he cannot compete, before 
which he is left naked and alone?"540 
The Prometheus stories leave the problem unresolved. We are left with a 
suggestion that human intellect is perhaps allied with the natural universe, which 
is sympathetic to humanity and to humanity's making a place for itself. But 
humanity is in a cautious tension in the universe with a power, perhaps of Zeus 
and perhaps of the fates and furies, that, following Havelock, can crucify us, yet 
does not have the power to defeat us entirely. For Aeschylus, Zeus is not the 
universe, he is a force or a power of the universe, and he is an adversary of 
humanity. In this sense, Havelock is justified in contrasting the Greek tragic 
vision with the Judaic vision; the Hebrew God is creator and guide, installing 
humanity in the world to complete his creation. But the stories in both traditions 
contain the cautionary elements of fates and furies, in one guise or another. 
Oedipus similarly shows the complexity of the interaction among humanity, gods, 
fates, and furies when Oedipus, after suffering in exile, seems to become semi­
divine. 
The stories nicely demonstrate, too, that there is a difference between, on 
the one hand, humanity's seeking understanding of the universe and then using 
that understanding to make a place for themselves, and on the other, seeking 
immortality. Various stories seem to equate the quest for knowledge with the 
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quest for immortality, both of which are said to be within the divine realm, so 
that when men seek understanding it seems that ultimate understanding perhaps 
is the ability to live forever, and that once begun, humanity will not stop until 
they have eaten of the ambrosia and nectar that provide immortality. This is why, 
in the Judaic tradition, Adam and Eve had to be banished; they had eaten of 
knowledge and had to be prevented from tasting immortality. 
In the Greek tradition, Zeus and his representatives also delimit 
knowledge by opposing excessive incursions. Prometheus might ultimately have 
to be released, but only after the limits are demonstrated. Both the complexity 
and the contradictions are developed in and through Prometheus, that arrogantly 
presumptuous being ("And now, my triumph intellectual! Next I invent the count 
numerical . . .  The inventor I, who many a shape did show of science to mankind 
• • •  "541) whose efforts to raise humanity to the level of gods symbolize those 
twinges of longing for immortality that we cannot seem to avoid because we are 
constantly reminded of our insignificance in the face of the gods and the 
. universe. Charles Segal says that one of the elements of Prometheus's 
endowment is that he keeps technological man away from knowing about his 
own death, "'and thus from contemplating the ultimate meaning of his life.542 To 
develop the arts and sciences necessary for the basic needs of society, 
introspective concerns with identity and ultimate meanings are an obstacle, Segal 
540. Havelock 1950, 40-41. 
541. Prometheus Bound 66:ff. 
542 Segal 2001, 5. 
191 
notes, and a "'certain degree of metaphysical blindness is an advantage. Hence 
Prometheus' gift that we not know the day of our death. "543 
Prometheus Bound and its sequel contain all the elements that complicate 
human striving. It seems at times to negate the usual Greek tragic formula that 
arrogance and chance lead to disaster. Prometheus defies the gods, perhaps all 
of the universe, and not only does he ultimately survive, the very fact of his 
survival causes a kind of defeat for Zeus: "'So, in his crashing fall shall Zeus 
discover how different are rule and slavery."544 Yet Prometheus understands that 
the resolution is more complex, that both he and Zeus will come to an 
understanding and that both will welcome it: 
. . .  that will of his shall melt to softness yet 
when he is broken in the way I know, 
and though his temper now is oaken hard 
it shall be softened: hastily he'll come 
to meet my haste, to join in amity 
and union with me-one day he shall come. 545 
These questions arise in similar form in the Jewish and Christian 
traditions, as we shall see in Genesis. In the eating from the tree of the 
knowledge of good and eveil, humans acquire knowledge over the objections of 
god. Later, humanity seeks to understand the universe and to master it with 
intellect and technology. The story told in Genesis explains how this began and 
how God responded so that the incursions on divine territory would be slowed if 
not stopped. When Adam and Eve are evicted from the Garden, god says he is 
keeping them away from the source of certain fundamental secrets, including 
543. Segal 2001, 5. 
544. Prometheus Bound 925. 
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immortality. The casting out and the cautionary edicts that go with it are 
intended to warn humanity that some things should remain unknown, especially 
about god-like traits: 
YHWH, God, said: Here, the human has become like one of us, in knowing 
good and evil. So now, lest he send forth his hand and take also from the 
Tree of Life and eat and live throughout the 
ages . . .  ! So YHWH, God, sent him away from the garden of 
Eden . . . .  and caused to dwell, eastward of the garden of Eden, 
the winged-sphinxes and the flashing, ever-turning sword to watch over 
the way to the Tree of Life. 546 
From Homer to Hesiod to Aeschylus, Sophocles, and the authors of Genesis, the 
fundamental warning is that while humanity's reach will always extend into 
previously forbidden places, the incursi�ns have consequences and 
transgressing certain boundaries should be feared. 
g. Sophocles. O edi p us 'Iyrann us and O edi p us at Colo nus 
Summa.ry 
O edi p us 1yrann us547 opens with reports of a devastating plague ravaging 
Thebes and it is this that will be the central event around which the play unfolds. 
We learn that King Laius of Thebes had been told by a seer that he would be 
killed by his own son and in an effort to cheat fate puts a spike (or ankle pin)548 
545. Prometheus Bound 190-94. 
546. Genesis 3.22-24. 
547. Hereafter, OT. 
548. The spike may have been intended to discourage passersby from rescuing the child, 
but Sophocles does not elaborate. This is a detail of the Oedipus myth that first appears 
in Sophocles, according to Segal, 29, who suggests that it points to how determined the 
parents were to ensure the boy did not live and thus escape fate. Another possibility 
could be that Sophocles was raising questions about the practice of infant exposure, and 
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through his child's feet and abandons him on Mt. Cithaeron. Oedipus was 
rescued by a shepherd, taken to Corinth, and raised there by the king and queen 
as their own son. 
Warned by the Delphic oracle that he would kill his father and marry his 
mother, Oedipus fled Corinth. At a crossroads on his way to self exile in Thebes, 
he encounters Laius, not knowing who he is, and kills him during an argument. 
He continues the journey to Thebes, and there finds the city being ravaged by the 
Sphinx. Oedipus answers the Sphinx's riddle, which causes the beast's death.549 
In reward, the city's regent, Creon, gives Oedipus the throne and the hand of 
Laius's widow, Jocasta. Years later, the plague strikes and the Delphic oracle 
advises Creon to banish from Thebes the killer of King Laius. The seer Teiresias 
provides clues that Oedipus was the killer, but Oedipus does not understand until 
Jocasta reveals that Laius had been killed at a crossroads. Oedipus then sees, 
recalls the event, and tells Jocasta what had happened. She hangs herself, and 
Oedipus blinds both his eyes with the sharp pin of her brooch. Creon becomes 
king. Oedipus's fate is unresolved at the end of OT, 550 but we know from the 
cycle's subsequent stories that he leaves Thebes to wander as a beggar, blind and 
suffering. 
the spike serves to suggest an added emotionally charged insult. Gantz elaborates 
mightily on all other aspects of the Oedipus legends but does not discuss this. Infant 
exposure is dealt with again about 15 years after Oedipus in Euripides' Ion, where the 
mother's remorse plagues her life, Ion 954--63, 1369-79. For more on this, see Herodotus 
1.112 and 5.92 
549. By contrast, Hesiod's Theogony, at 326-32, refers to the Sphinx as a monster killed 
by Heracles because it had been ravaging Thebes, but no riddle is mentioned. 
550. Hereafter, OT. 
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At the end of his suffering, which is told in the third of the cycle, OC, 
Oedipus travels to the grove of the Eumenides, the forest where oracles have said 
he will finish his life. He disappears there, and because his body is thought to 
remain among the trees, the place becomes blessed, providing protection for 
Athens. This depiction of Oedipus's suffering leading to blessedness is not the 
same idea that Aeschylus offers in The Oresteia, which is that suffering leads to 
wisdom. In Oedipus, the idea is that a person can be purified by suffering, which 
might have been the source for the Christian doctrine that a person can be 
redeemed by suffering. In OC and OT, the tragic hero violates two of the most 
basic rules of human community and is thus cursed, but he also is blessed by 
attributes of intelligence, leadership, and by his eventual ability to both suffer and 
seek understanding. It is the story of resolving, or at least accepting, the 
combination of opposites that exist in a human life: blessing and curse, suffering 
and understanding. 
This is a story, like Sophocles' others, of the mystery that is at the center of 
what the gods want and what they do. In OC and OT, the gods' motivations are a 
curiosity, a puzzle, but they are not malevolent. Instead, as Bernard Knox 
describes it, the way of gods ,u • • •  is, in some strange way that is beyond 
explanation, just. "551 Sophocles does not defend the morality of gods; he seems to 
accept them as incomprehensible beings who exist and act beyond human 
understanding. Instead of trying to make them comprehensible, he focuses on 
the heroic behavior and the greatness and dignity of human beings living with 
the consequences of their lives. Oedipus is not a villain suffering for his 
551. Knox 1993, 35. 
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stupidities. If Sophocles finds villains anywhere, it is in Creon, who is willing to 
sacrifice the individual to the community, or Menelaus in Ajax, who does the 
same. Sophocles celebrates the dignity of the individual and finds in the 
complexity of individual choice the uncertainty of fate and the courage of action. 
Discussion 
OT is not the straightforward story of a hero punished for overreaching 
pride and abhorrent crimes. 552 It is the working out of the implications of a life 
that juxtaposes curse and blessings. The deeds for which he would suffer were 
preordained before his birth, so if there is culpability it does not seem that 
Oedipus carries a large measure of it. He does have traits, however, that enable 
the living out of his circumscribed fate: an impulsive intellect, quickness to anger, 
strength, integrity, and pride. 
The story asks whether our lives are controlled by the external design of 
gods who are cruel or unjust. And if not controlled by design, then do the events 
of a life unfold by accident, which would be merely absurd? Sophocles suggests 
it is a fitful combination of the two, but a combination made more disorderly by 
the intrusion of luck and human willfulness. This reading has humanity living in 
what Charles Segal describes as "a tragic universe that does not correspond to a 
pattern of order or justice satisfactory to the human mind."553 This univers� 
skews human understanding by adding radical uncertainty to the mixture that 
includes the elusiveness of final truth and the remoteness of gods. 
552. Although Bowra 1944 does make that argument. 
553. Segal 2001, 5. 
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Sophocles offers this at a time in Western history that was marked by the shift 
from mythical thinking to conceptual and abstract thought. The presocratics, 
then Plato and Aristotle, began presenting a world regularized by nonpersonal 
processes and predictable, scientific laws; a world that is measurable, analyzable, 
understandable. Plato argued that proper analysis of the good will yield 
understanding of how to act, and when this analysis is done properly, a right­
thinking man will not be subject to the whims of unforeseeable fortune. This 
argument fit nicely with other developments of the time, including the 
Hippocratic claim that the cause of diseases is not divine, that u each of them has 
a nature of its own, and none arises without its natural cause."554 
These efforts to understand the world and gain control of human lives are 
expressed in Anti.gone when in the first stasimon the chorus celebrates 
humanity's domination of the earth. Humanity seems unlimited, our reach and 
our control extending potentially in every direction. But OT and OC question all 
of this. They question the new skepticism about oracles and fate and the power of 
gods; and they question claims about humanity's ability to make sense of our 
lives. Whereas in Euripides' Trojan Women uncertainty is expressed about 
whether Zeus even exists, whether he is a ""necessity of nature or the mind of 
mortals,"555 in OC and OT, the gods are always a force capable of confounding 
human control; the mind and reach of mortals is limited by mysterious, 
uncontrollable forces that exist in the world. Even so, these forces exist in 
relationship to a humanity that is changing, and its relationship to the gods is 
554. Airs, Waters, Places 22.1.c, 127. Similar sentiments are expressed in On the Sacred 
Disease, and elsewhere in the Hippocratic corpus. 
555. Trojan Women 884-85. 
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also changing. Sophocles' world is no longer the archaic world of Homer and 
Hesiod; it is a world of swirling uncertainty. Oedipus's mistake, if one was made, 
was to believe he had outrun the archaic world that divined his fate. That world 
could not be outrun, or outthought, because it would be with him wherever he 
went. Segal says Sophocles presents in the Oedipus cycle a view of the world that 
is a combination of the world as it was becoming, in which humanity would seek 
rational understanding and attempt to keep gods at a distance, and the world still 
linked to the archaic mind. In this world that combines the past with the present, 
Oedipus finds that there are 
forces less amenable to human understanding and control. . .  nature is not 
merely an inert, passive object for human domination but an organically 
connected network of animate beings that stand in delicately balanced, 
mutually responsive relations to one another. Imbalance or violation in 
one area will produce some kind of disturbance in another . . .  556 
When Oedipus sought to escape the oracle's knowledge, and when later 
he fails to see what Tieresias has tried to show him, he is unaware of the balance 
that is to be maintained. The disaster that results, and all that follows, may be 
much more damaging than the original crime. Victor Ehrengerg believes OC and 
OT are Sophocles' warning that rationalism can be taken too far if it leads to 
discounting the effects of fate and the gods. 557 Friedrich Nietzsche saw Oedipus 
as the paradigm of human guilt about his power to dominate nature. He says 
incest and parricide are "unnatural acts" that can be analogized to the 
domination and violence done to nature. 558 For Hegel, QC was more hopeful, 
showing human consciousness awakening to a moral and intellectual awareness. 
556. Segal 2001, 11. 
557. Ehrengerg 1954, 67-69. 
558. Birth of Tragedy, section 9. 
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He says Oedipus is the story of an ethical sense developing in humanity, as well 
as acknowledgement of guilt for crimes committed. 559 
OC was probably written in response to the difficulties of the 
Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta, especially the plague that swept 
through Athens in 431. By 429, it had killed a fourth of Athens' population, 
including Pericles, and made Athenians wonder whether the gods had 
abandoned them, sending disease as punishment for some cataclysmic 
transgression. Thucydides reports that the plague brought with it a moral and 
psychological disintegration among the citizens, 560 including irreverence for the 
gods who had in the past protected them. 561 When in OC the plague cripples 
Thebes, it seems divinely created, as though in response to the enormity of incest 
and parricide as violations of absolute boundaries. The parallel of Oedipus's 
pollution and Athenian guilt, both of which bring plague, suggests the mystery of 
a world where our authority and intellect can easily be swept aside when we 
miscalculate the extent of their proper reach. This understanding becomes for 
Oedipus an unfolding of personal discovery. Oedipus relaxed in the comfort of 
his reign in Thebes, believing that the demonstration of his wisdom in leaving 
Corinth and then in answering the Sphinx's riddle would allow him to create a 
life of contentment and accomplishment. 
Much of the power in Oedipus comes from what Sophocles does not spell 
out, thus leaving to imagination the working out of intentions, motivations, and 
559. Paolucci 1962, 279-80, 325-26. 
560. Thucydides 2.53. 
561. Thucydides 883-910. 
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resolution. Oedipus does not, for example, speak to the effect on Jocasta of her 
decision to expose her child. It does not discuss the emotional consequences or 
the pain of the original act of the decision itself. Euripides later deals with some 
of these issues in his Ion, 562 but Sophocles does not. The story does, however, 
describe several boundaries by which proper human action is demarcated from 
either improper action or from what is reserved to the gods. The most apparent 
is the proscription on incest and parricide. In Hesiod's Theogony, incestuous 
unions are said to be common during the evolution of the world order, often 
producing strange, sometimes monstrous beings, like the Sphinx. But because 
these occur during the still evolving beginning of the world and because it 
involves gods, no moral culpability seems to accrue; this is, as Penelope reminds 
us, just the way gods are.563 For humans, however, incest is said to lead to 
disaster because it crosses a human boundary of proper a�on. 564 
Similarly, both Oedipus and Jocasta try to set aside the authority of 
oracles and seers, seeking either to cheat their predictions or diminish their 
power. Jocasta tries to show that the oracle is unreliable565 even though two 
times she reminds us that Apollo by way of the oracle had said Laius would be 
killed by his son.566 Oedipus rejects Teiresias's prophecy of disaster for the slayer 
562. Note 4 73, above, discusses the spiking of Oedipus's feet. 
563. Odyssey 4.692 
564. Phoenix, the mad, 9.448-77, fights with his father because at his mother's request he 
slept with his father's concubine. Similarly, in Genesis and elsewhere, incest is reported 
in such a way that it is uncertain whether moral disapproval is suggested. Hellenistic 
writers also wrote much about incest, but generally to condemn it as the behavior of non­
Greeks or of tyrants. 
565. OT 711-12. 
566. OT 713-14, 854. 
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of Laius when he declares, 11But if I saved this city I do not care."567 This hubristic 
response does not bring on the predicted doom. Neither does Oedipus's haste 
and quickness to anger cause the inevitable suffering. Causation in Oedipus is 
not as direct as Sophocles makes it in Ajax when he says 
Look well at this, and speak no towering word Yourself against the gods, nor walk too grandly Because your hand is weightier than anothers, Or your great wealth deeper founded. One short day Inclines the balance of all human things To sink or rise again. Know that the gods Love men of steady sense and hate the proud. 568 
Instead, Oedipus points to the complexity of assigning provenance to the way 
this or any other life plays out, because it is unclear whether or to what degree 
Oedipus accrues guilt from his actions, and if he does, whether sense can be 
made of this in relationship to his preordained fate. The efforts by Oedipus and 
Jocasta to set aside fate and prophecy are portrayed as examples of the mistake 
humanity makes when it comes to believe it can control events. But the trilogy is 
not about whether human lives are determined.569 Neither does it point with 
certainty to the causes of suffering. Destiny and causation are raised as 
problems, but Sophocles provides neither answers nor resolution. Philip 
Vellacott says the play portrays issues of destiny and choice as 11 a box of mirrors 
to bewilder each new generation; the whole tangle is here in this story . . . .  The 
play offers to each spectator as much as he is capable of seeing."570 
567. OT 443. 
568. Ajax 126-33 (John Moore, tr. In Grene and Lattimore). 
569. Karl Reinhardt 1979, 98, argues that for Sophocles, as for the Greeks generally, fate 
is not the same as predetermiation, "'but is a spontaneous unfolding of daimonic power, 
even when the fate has been foretold." 
570. Vellacott 1971, 108. 
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Elise Garrison says issues related to oracles in Greek tragedy often exist 
to show that there is a curtain, or distance, between human knowledge and 
divine will. 571 Sophoclean irony is employed to show the absurdity of human 
attempts to overcome their limitations. When Oedipus or Jocasta defy or resist 
oracles, the chorus is usually nearby, ready to point out the likelihood of disaster 
that will result. Garrison argues that OT may be seen as an examination of 
impiety, especially in Jocasta's and Oedipus's skepticism about oracular 
statements.572 After Teiresias's revelations, Jocasta tries to allay Oedipus's fears 
by saying human beings are not skilled at prophecy.573 Oedipus, hopeful but 
growing more skeptical, agrees. 574 Even the chorus seems skeptical of the 
oracle575 and Jocasta claims that it is not the gods and oracles that control events, 
but instead, random chance. 576 When Oedipus finally understands what he has 
done, his attitude alters and he believes fully in the powers of fate, chance, and 
gods. So, presumably, does Jocasta.577 But her response is very different; she 
commits suicide, and the chorus says it was an appropriate end. 578 She had been 
the one who most directly questioned traditional beliefs about human limitations 
and divine control. Garrison says the story is about human illusions of control: 
571. Garrison 1995, 51. 
572. Garrison 1995, 103. 
573. OT 707-10, 723-24. 
574. OT 859. 
575. OT 897-902, 906-10. 
576. OT 977. 
577. OT 1071ff., 1445, 1458. 
578. OT 1367-68. 
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The heavy tragic irony of Oedipus' inability to see while sighted has been 
pointed out relentlessly, but his continued existence shows exactly how 
ephemeral is the illusion of control grounded in human knowledge, and 
how futile. One must live in full awareness of one's humanness and 
therefore of one's limited knowledge. 579 
Various interpretations of Oedipus have emphasized either Oedipus as a 
hero asserting his courage, energy, and grandeur, or as the polluted would-be 
hero who failed to listen to the gods. The former includes Cedric Whitman, who 
sees Oedipus as representing in humanity that determination to learn the truth 
and the strength to live with whatever has been dealt. 580 Whitman denies that a 
tragic flaw caused the suffering. Bernard Knox views Oedipus as more 
troublesome, finding excessive stubbornness and a view of himself and his 
capacities that overreach what is proper. Knox argues that Oedipus comprises 
greatness of spirit with egotism and narrowness of vision.581 In the former, 
Oedipus becomes symbolic of doubt and anguish, of mistake and tragedy, even 
an assertiOon that his life suggests the lack of meaning and justice in the 
universe. The latter interpreters include C. M. Bowra, who argues that Oed ip us is 
a straightforward morality tale in which the gods topple Oedipus, who is guilty of 
crimes that are abhorrent to humanity and gods. Bowra says the lesson is that 
life is precarious and so care must be taken to honor moral laws. 582 Decades later, 
E. R. Dodds and R. P. Winnington-lngram583 agree with Bowra that Oedipus 
transgressed the laws of heaven and earth, but they say he is morally and legally 
579. Garrison 1995, 112. 
580. Whitman 1951, 30ft'. 
581. Knox 1964, 140. 
582. Bowra 1944, 220. 
583. Dodds 1966, 37-49. Winnington-lngram 1980, 211. 
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innocent, that his punishment violates human understanding of justice. Tragedy 
thus results from the difference between the way the universe often works and 
the way we think it should. The gods on this account are mysterious and their 
ways unknowable. That, combined with the way human nature works, is the 
source of suffering. 
As the Oedipus cycle proceeds, it more clearly becomes the story of the 
hero gradually coming to understand limitation, to see the vagaries of human life, 
and to accept uncertainty and the consequences of pollution (deserved or not) in 
the suffering of his misery-laden exile. OT depicts a hero plagued by misfortune 
and unpredictability. OC balances this with showing the futility of seeking 
complete understanding and the necessity of redress for pollution. 584 
Some things must properly lie outside our understanding, and Teiresias's 
foreknowledge points to the existence of things in our lives that are not capable 
of ordinary human knowledge, the acceptance of which may lead to tragic 
wisdom. Teiresias' s knowledge points to the existence of an order operating in 
the world. This order is dike, and in Oedipus, dike is what Segal refers to when he 
explains the cause of the disorder in Oedipus's life: ""the crimes of Oedipus, 
regardless of his moral guilt, are a source of this kind of disorder, and the 
violence that he has released will return to his world and his life."585 This may be· 
what is described at the beginning of the third choral ode when the chorus says a 
584. In OC, Oedipus's new knowledge seems to be an almost supernatural 
understanding. He has knowledge of his final resting place (44-46, 72-74, 287-90) and he 
understands what the oracles are saying to him (391-420, 45Q-60). The ending is marked 
by divine signs, including a voice from the heavens, thunder from Zeus Chthonios, 
Oedipus's new ability to see although blind, and the intense light that causes Theseus to 
hide his eyes (1604-55). 
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moral order emanates from the gods, that it is timeless, ageless, and is not born 
from mortal nature.586 This order, or set of laws, is presented as determined by 
and perhaps enforced by some force that is not only beyond human control but is 
outside the realm of humanity, perhaps outside time. To understand the nature 
and source of this ordering system would require to be like gods, free of the 
tragic intrusions of change, mistakes, and punishment. Human beings are not 
like gods, the chorus reminds us, and so must accept the way things are. 
Dike acting in Oedipus restores balance that has been knocked askew by 
behavior that is outside human limits. Oedipus prefigures the needed restoration 
of order when he criticizes the Thebans for failing to find Laius's killer: ""For even 
if the matter had not been urged on by a god, it was not fitting for you to leave it 
so uncleansed."587 That order is restored by punishment far out of proportion to 
the degree of guilt, forces us to raise questions about the nature of dike. This may 
be why the chorus in OC asserts: "'Not to be born wins every accounting; and by 
far second best is when born to return there whence one has come as quickly as 
possible."588 At the same time, uncertainty about the composition of dike allows us 
to see Oedipus as being like Adam and other heroes: he shows us glimpses of 
what is properly in our domain, but at the same time confounds our efforts to 
understand with anything like certainty the location of the boundary. Oedipus is 
an inquiry into the composition of the universe and how it may affect human 
well-being. 
585. Segal 1991, 58. 
586. OT 866-72. 
587. OT 255-56. 
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h. Sophocles. Antigone 
Summary 
Antigone is the third part in the temporal sequence of the Oedipus trilogy. 
Its action unfolds after Oedipus disappears into the grove of the Eumenides at 
the end of OC. In OT, just before Oedipus went into exile as a blind, wandering 
beggar, he cursed his two sons for consenting to his banishment. The sons, 
Eteocles and Polyneices, agreed to occupy the throne on alternator years, but 
Eteocles banished his brother. This led to a war between the brothers and their 
armies, and eventually to a fight between the two brothers that ended in their 
killing each other. Creon succeeded to the throne and decreed that because 
Polyneices rebelled against the throne when his brother held it, he had violated 
the city's laws and as punishment his body could not be buried. Antigone, one of 
Oedipus's daughters, complains that the decree violates divine laws requiring 
that the dead be honored by burial. 
When she violates Creon's order and buries Polyneices, Creon has her 
arrested589 and condemns her to be buried alive. Creon's son, Haemon, who is 
betrothed to Antigone, fails to get his father to stay the decision. 590 Tieresias 
warns Creon591 that he is going too far, that he is offending the gods by leaving 
588. OC 1224-28. This follows Plutarch in Consolation to Apollonius, 115d: "For mortals, 
best of all is not to be born."' 
589. Antigone 404:ff. 
590. Antigone 635:ff. 
591. Antigone 988:ff. 
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dead bodies unburied, 592 and convinces the king to change his mind. Creon sets 
out to bury Polyneices and rescue Antigone, but he is too late; Antigone and 
Haemon kill themselves, and Creon's wife Eurydice stabs herself to death when 
she learns that Haemon is dead. 593 
Discussion 
The Anti.gone is a direct inquiry into the proper limits of human laws and 
human action. There are other themes, and as we shall see, David Grene suggests 
an entirely different theme as Sophocles' primary concern. The most common 
interpretation, however, is that Anti.gone is a statement about the struggle 
between individual conscience, or perhaps god's law, and the authority of the 
state. It is a complex interweaving that asks about our place in the universe; it 
asks whether man is the measure of all things, or merely an overreaching part of 
a larger concern framed by the danger and incomprehensibility of out-of-reach 
gods. In the latter sense, and on Antigone's account of it, Creon's order to leave 
Polyneices' body unburied for carrion eaters to gnaw at assumes authority that 
rightly rests in a divine realm. 
This delimitation of borders occurs directly and indirectly throughout 
Antigone, as it does elsewhere in Sophocles. Sometimes, as in OT, it is spoken of 
as a geographical limit, but with metaphysical implications: the Olympians exist 
592. A similar argument is made at the Odyssey 11.50ff, when Odysseus encounters his 
former companion, Elpenor, whose body had been left behind in Circe's palace, 
"unburied and unwept" because Odysseus had to leave quickly for his journey to Hades. 
At 11.70-74, Elpenor beseeches Odysseus when he leaves Hades to return to Aiaia, burn 
his body and build a grave mound for him, warning that otherwise his unburied body 
might bring the gods' curse upon Odysseus. 
593. Antigone 1183ff. 
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mostly in another realm, on high mountains inaccessible to humans. Similarly, 
in the Trachiniae, two inaccessible geographical realms are mentioned: the rivers 
of Aetolia where the lustful monsters of Deianeira' s past live, and on the peak of 
Oeta, where Zeus rules. In Antigone, the cave where she is sent to die is said to 
be the realm of Hades. Earlier in the story, this world and the heavens, 
momentarily come together when a dust storm rages as .,., a grief of the heavens;" 
the storm blowing across the plain where Polyneices' body lies unburied is a 
coming together of the human and divine worlds because, as Teiresias sees, the 
world order has been disturbed. Similarly, while Creon pronounces confidence 
in the steadiness and control of his ship of state594 (along with the control over 
the sea celebrated in the Ode on Man595), the second stasimon opens with the 
turbulence of dark seas and the violence of nature to provide a counterpoint to 
Creon, as if to point out that his control may become subject to the irrationality 
and violence of the curse that Antigone bears and which Creon will share. 596 
A boundary is also demarcated between the proper place for female 
lament and funerary rituals. Segal argues that a significant tension in the play is 
between the primacy of the city and its male rulers in matters dealing with death, 
and Antigone's ,f,f desperate female mourning" that challenges the claims of the 
city.597 When Eurydice exits after hearing of her son's death, the messenger 
hopes she will observe the city's traditions in her mourning by not lamenting in 
594. Antigone 162ft', 178, 189-90. 
595. Antigone 332ft'. 
596. Antigone 599-603. 
597. Segal 1995, 120-21. 
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public, 598 but instead staying inside her house. 599 This tension between private 
and public is echoed, of course, in the dispute between Creon and Antigone, and 
between Haemon and Creon. The delimiting lines between each raises questions 
about whether the gods establish boundaries or are they human constructs. This 
is clearly drawn by the depiction of Creon trying to separate out the city as a 
realm governed by the rationality of men, ·not subject to the uncertainties of 
mysterious divinities. When his claim of authority in the polis is belied by 
Teiresias' s telling what will result from failing to bury the dead, Creon 
understands that he has reached too far. 600 
Another boundary exists in the play itself, perhaps exists in all Greek 
tragedy. This is the boundary between the audience wanting to find explanations 
and solutions for the suffering it sees and the tragedy resisting the question, 
declining to offer an orderly finish to the struggle; the audience wants to know 
both why things happened as they did and how to prevent it in their own lives. 
Whereas Bowra saw tragic drama demonstrating how the gods tidily punishing 
transgressors, 601 Sophocles in A nti gone suggests, with Aristotle, 602 that justice as 
humans construct it is not necessarily a concern of the gods. 
Perhaps, but the warnings of Teiresias may argue that when they choose, 
the gods will respond clearly when boundaries are defiantly violated. Men may 
598. Funerary motifs in Antigone are discussed in Tyrrell and Bennett 1998. 
599. Antigone 1244-50. 
600. Antigone 998--1032. 
601. Bowra 1944, 220. 
602. Poetics 13 and 14. 
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not be allowed to cross into divine realms, but the divine has no such 
proscription. Creon's defiance brings this prophecy: 
Know well, the sun will not have rolled its course many more days, before you come to give corpse for these corpses, child of your own loins. For you've confused the upper and lower worlds. You sent a life to settle in a tomb; you keep up here that which belongs below the corpse unburied, robbed of its release. Not you, nor any god that rules on high can claim him now. You rob the nether gods of what is theirs. So the pursuing horrors lie in wait to track you down. The Furies sent by Hades and by all gods will even you with your victims.603 
Teiresias's warning blurs the boundaries between the heavens and the earth, 
between Hades and this world, and thus belies Creon's claim for autonomous 
authority in the city. The various themes contained in Antigone exist in complex 
layers, often overlapping one another. The play at once seeks to find the proper 
place for the public, male authority of the polis, and then upsets that place when 
the chorus offers its support to Antigone. At one turning point in the play when 
Creon confesses that he erred604 and the chorus points out that he sees the way of 
justice too late, 605 Sophocles seems to be preparing a conclusion. But in the next 
moment he deflects responsibility: "Yes, I have learned in sorrow. It was a god 
who struck, who has weighted my head with disaster; he drove me to wild 
strange ways, . . .  "606 And so, unlike Antigone and Oedipus, Creon seems to get 
exactly what he deserves from fate; he valued civic power and loyalty over 
603. Antigone 1064-77. 
604. Antigone 1261-69. 
605. Antigone 1270. 
606. Antigone 1271-73. Also see above, note 408, on ate as a source of causation. 
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personal and family ties, which he had claimed as within the jurisdiction of the 
polis rather than in the privacy of friendship and family: H • • •  he who counts 
another greater friend than his own fatherland, I put him nowhere. ,,fj/J7 
Pointing to the similarity between the dilemma of Creon in Anti.gone and 
of Oedipus in OT, David Grene argues that the Sophoclean focus in both is the 
contrast between the two heads of state: In both a king has made a decision 
which is disobeyed or questioned by his subjects. In both, the ruler misconstrues 
the role of the rebel and his own as a sovereign. In both, he has a crucial 
encounter with the priest Teiresias, who warns him that the forces of religion are 
against him. In both, he charges that the priest has been suborned. 
The two plays diverge at that point, however. Creon crumbles, fearful 
about his position and tries to correct his mistake. Oedipus refused to listen to 
anyone until self knowledge begins simmering in him and he sees what has 
happened, but even then he remains stronger and more defiant than Creon. 
Grene says that even with the divergences, Sophocles' intention in the trilogy as 
a whole seems to be the theme developed in Creon's actions, rather than the 
pitting of individual against society. 608 
In Antigone, following Grene, the ruler makes a wrongful decision, though 
in good faith, and then is opposed in a way he misunderstands and this induces 
him to persist in the mistake. In OT, the ruler unintentionally violates divine law, 
and then is destroyed by the workings of divine law in society. Grene says the 
theme is thus about Hhow the ruler who breaks the divine law may, for all he can 
607. Antigone 182-91. 
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see and understand, be entirely innocent, but nonetheless his guilt is an 
objective fact. "609 There are boundaries, and our lacking the senses to know them 
does not mean we will not suffer when we violate them. 
By the end of the trilogy this is clear. Sophocles declares in OC that Oedipus's sin 
is real even if he did not know he was sinning. Further, his 
punishment-knowledge of his crimes and the loneliness and misery of his 
exile-may well be undeserved. But Grene argues ��that the will and the 
consciousness are also some measure of man's sin-and when the sinner sinned 
necessarily and unwittingly, his suffering can be compensation enough for his 
guilt. He may at the end be blessed and a blessing."61° For Grene, Sophocles was 
interested in the person who is both blessed and cursed. He points to a similar 
concern in Sophocles' Philoctetes, the story of a lame castaway, plagued by his 
condition, who would rise from his suffering to be the conqueror of Troy. In this 
light, the concern is not what Philoctetes did wrong, or whether Oedipus chose 
the actions that caused his fall; the concern is, "how does it feel to be an object 
both of disgust and of fear to your fellows, while you yourself are simultaneously 
aware of the injustice."611 
Grene's rendering of Sophoclean theme suggests the possible importance 
of the difference between Creon's response to disaster at the end of Anti.gone 
and Oedipus's response at the end of OT: Creon is broken, Oedipus is not. Both 
608. Grene 1960, 2:ff. 
609. Grene 1960, 2:ff. 
610. Grene 1960, 5. 
611. Grene 1960, 7. 
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suffer, but only one is destroyed. In Antigone, Creon wants only to die after the 
deaths of his son and wife. 612 Oedipus, despite the misery of seeing the course of 
his life and the pain it has caused, is still defiantly strong. Creon complains about 
Oedipus' stubbornness: ''Do not seek to have mastery in everything, for those 
things in which you had mastery did not follow along with you in your life. 11613 
Similarly, in OT, Oedipus recalls that the oracle had said, "I would show 
forth to humankind a race unendurable to look upon,"614 and indeed Oedipus 
cites as one of the reasons for blinding himself, the sight of his children, "born as 
they were born."615 But by the end of the play-however he feels about his 
sons-Oedipus does not see his daughters as an accursed race; he seeks their 
presence, and Antigone accompanies him both in the misery of his wanderings 
and in his end at the grove of the Eumenides. Again, the heroic Oedipus is 
himself accursed, and knows his family shares in it, but the company of his 
daughters and the near divinity of his ending is the counterpoint to his suffering. 
While Sophocles may have developed this conclusion while writing the 
QC, it is not apparent in the Antigone. By the end of the OC Oedipus transcends 
the violence and misery of his house and of Thebes; in Antigone his daughters 
have transcended nothing. Antigone and her sister Ismene are heiresses of the 
blood curse that flows down through the house, inheriting self destruction and 
doom from Laius and their father. OC ends with the polluted, suffering beggar 
612. Antigone 1321-25, 1339-46. Also see the discussion of Creon at the end of Antigone 
in Charles Segal 1995, especially 128-32. 
613. OT 1522-23. 
614. OT 791-2. 
615. OT 1375-77. 
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transformed into a hero who would protect Athens by the proximity of his 
resting place.61� Antigone ends by proving merely that Oedipus was right when 
he laments her unmarriageability, predicting that his daughters will H die as 
barren fields and unmarried."617 Antigone's intended bridegroom, instead of 
joining her in marriage, goes to her Hhouse of Hades" for a union in death.618 
Oedipus may have learned from catastrophic experience, but neither he nor his 
family can ever escape what they are. They still contain the passions, the 
willfulness that circumscribe their lives and the future of their house. The myth of 
Oedipus, which encompasses everything from Cadmus to Laius and Antigone, is 
a tale of curses and the human inability to see either the gods' justice or the 
comprehensibility of their laws. 
Lloyd-Jones argues that in Antigone, the importance of the family curse is 
"considerable."619 When Antigone and her intended husband are destroyed, their 
fate is the result of Ate, a kind of foolishness, perhaps an insanity that blinds 
them to where their actions are leading.620 Their recklessness, however, comes 
from the gods, 621 at least partly because Antigone has "run against the high 
616. This conclusion is comparable to Orestes' acquittal of matricide in The Oresteia. 
There, acquittal suggests that a polluted past is purified when the system that allowed 
family vengeance to satisfy justice is replaced by a court of law and establishment of civic 
cult. But the comparison then fades because the Eumenides ends with a certain 
satisfaction in the transformation of the Furies. OC, however, ends with the promise of 
the curse on the House of Laius continuing with the deaths of Oedipus's sons, and then 
the avoidable death of Antigone after she returns to the slaughtering ground of Thebes. 
An interesting treatment of this is in Segal 2001, 137; Also Segal 1981, 401-405. 
617. OT 1502. 
618. Antigone 1234-41. 
619. Lloyd-Jones 1971, 111. 
620. Antigone 603. 
621. Antigone 205ff, 604ff 
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pedestal of Justice with your foot (and is) making atonement, I think, with an 
ordeal come to you by inheritance. "622 
Anti.gone has none of the OC's mitigation of blessing mixed with curse, or 
at least it does not render Antigone redeemed by suffering, understanding, or 
apotheosis. Like, OC, however, Antigone does portray its heroine as a mixture of 
reckless disregard accompanied by her attempt to thwart Creon's disrespect for 
divine law. In this respect, following her father, Antigone suffers miserably but 
remains assured that whatever recklessness she displayed, her intentions and her 
position were pious. Unlike Creon, she believes she does not deserve her fate. 
When her sister Ismene tells her she was "'wrong from the start, to chase what 
cannot be," Antigone replies, anticipating with self-righteous fury the glory of 
martyrdom, "'If that's your saying, I shall hate you first, and next the dead will 
hate you in all justice. But let me and my own ill-counseling suffer this terror. I 
shall suffer nothing as great as dying with a lack of grace."623 Antigone suffered 
the same predicament as Archbishop Thomas of Becket, but he at least 
understood that he risked ''doing the right deed for the wrong reason"; he saw 
the seduction of martyrdom in his resisting King Henry II' s demands to acquiesce 
and support his petition for divorce. The chorus later tells Antigone she was 
ruined by self-willed passion-"' self-sufficiency has brought you down" -but they 
concede that because she showed respect for the dead, ,Uwe are for you"624 and, 
as Lloyd-Jones says, her death indeed will be "glorious."625 
622. Antigone 852ff. 
623. Antigone 92ff. 
624. Antigone 872-75. 
625. Lloyd-Jones 1971, 117. 
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This is a vision of the world always on the verge of chaos and sometimes 
tilting entirely into unpredictability. The human search for meaning and order is 
thus kept off balance. The Sophoclean message is not reassuring: however good 
the intention, recklessness in the end will allow fate and the unknowable 
workings of the gods to have your head. The third stasimon, which discusses 
love, defines human life primarily in terms of what cannot be controlled: who has 
love within him is mad, the chorus says, UV ou twist the minds of the just. Wrong 
they pursue and are ruined. You made this quarrel of kindred before us now."626 
To Creon's regret, he scorned the authority of eros and so called down upon 
himself the elemental and divine forces . .uNever will I trembling with fear of a 
pollution allow him to be buried,"627 Creon tells Tieresias. But Eros and divinity 
together shatter rational humanity's claim of dominion over nature and fate. 
Creon learns by the pollution that follows his crimes that he cannot "battle 
necessity. "628 His inversion of upper and lower realms, life and death, causes an 
imbalance in the world; his punishment is certa�n: "'The late-destroying avengers 
of Hades and the gods, the Furies, lie in wait for you," warns Teiresias.629 
Early in the story's development, the "Ode on Man" praises humanity for 
being the world's civilizer, for bringing language, law, medicine, agriculture, the 
ability always to help himself with never a need to face the future helpless.630 It 
seems to support Creon's position when he claims that his state is governed by 
626. Antigone 781-93. 
627. Antigone 1042. 
628. Antigone 1105. 
629. Antigone 1075. 
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enlightened secular rationalism. But the ·entire tragedy is built around the 
negation of humanity's claimed control. Its violence belies civilization; its series 
of disasters uproot city and family. Sophocles draws a portrait of humanity _as not 
merely unable to control its excesses, it is helpless before the gods. Humanity's 
inability to control its savagery and to learn leaves them as creatures subject to 
the vagaries of chance, to the powers of fate. 631 
The final demonstration of humanity's vulnerability comes in Antigone's fifth 
stasimon, the ode to Dionysus. It marks a change in Thebes from its reliance on 
rationalism to a marked uncertainty. Segal finds in the ode the city's movement 
to Nthe god in whom the usual barriers erected between civilization and the wild 
break down. His very being, as Euripides illustrates in the Bacchae, calls 
civilization into question . . . .  Dionysus is to the limits of reason what Antigone's 
deeply feminine loyalties to the ties created by the womb are to the masculine 
loyalties toward the polis."632 The entry of Dionysus into Thebes, then, is the city's 
attempt to reconcile its contradictory elements, to transform its savage fury into 
Dionysiac ecstasy, to assuage its curses and hatreds by reveling in the mystery of 
the gods. 
i. Euripides. The Bacchae 
Summa.ry 
The Bacchae was presented posthumously in 405 BCE and is said to speak 
more significantly to modern audiences than any other Greek tragedy. The story 
630. Antigone 332-375. 
631. Antigone 951.  
632. Segal 1981, 202. 
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is about the Theban king, Pentheus, who seeks to govern himself and his city 
entirely by reason and Dionysus, the half-human god, sometimes called Bacchus, 
who represents emotion, enthusiasm, and ecstatic rituals unbounded by normal 
conventions. Dionysus arrives in Thebes after establishing his religion in Asia. 
He appears as a human participant in his cult and is accompanied by a chorus of 
women devotees. His intention is to establish Bacchic worship in Thebes and 
then spread it throughout Greece. Dionysus is the son of Zeus and a mortal 
mother, Semele, Pentheus's aunt. Thebes at first rejects him, scorns his claim to 
divinity, and ignores his religion. The story is about the madness and slaughter 
he invokes to punish Thebes. At the end of the story Dionysus is clearly 
established as a god. 
Pentheus resists introduction of Dionysian rites to his city and in reprisal, 
Dionysus inflicts all Theban women with madness, including Pentheus's mother, 
Agave. They become maenads, "mad women," who leave the city to conduct 
orgiastic rituals in the forests outside the city. The Theban prophet Teiresias and 
Cadmus, Agave's and Semele's father, have also joined the Dionysian religion 
and they tell the king that Dionysus exists as a force of nature, born of a mortal 
and a god, and is the proper object of worship. Pentheus resists and begins to 
hunt down the god and his followers. Before he can start, Dionysus is brought 
before the king as a captive in human form. The king derides Dionysus, and 
imprisons him, but the prison is destroyed in an earthquake, freeing the god. 
Pentheus and Dionysus meet again and this time, sensing Pentheus' s 
curiosity about the women's rituals, Dionysus leads the king into the forest to spy 
on the maenads. To keep from being noticed, Pentheus dresses as a woman while 
Dionysus tells the chorus he has sent Pentheus into a trap. The chorus speaks 
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happily about the joy of Bacchic worship and about triumphing over their 
enemy, which they say is a show of power of the gods to rebuke human stupidity. 
They call on the Bacchantes and Dionysus to kill the offenders. A messenger 
arrives reporting that his mother and aunts have torn Pentheus to pieces. Agave 
enters, carrying her son's head and asking the chorus to join in her victory. The 
chorus accepts the victory of the god but not the madness of Agave. Cadmus 
arrives carrying the rest of Pentheus' s body and brings Agave back from her 
madness to realize what she has done. Dionysus returns as a god to tell Cadmus 
and Agave that they are exiled and that Cadmus and his wife will be turned into 
serpents, all as punishment for having questioned his divinity. 
Discussion 
The Bacchae is among other things a cautionary tale warning that humans 
should honor what rightfully belongs to the gods, but that human beings perhaps 
should not expect too much from them except mystery and disorder. Revere the 
gods, accept that they have their own ways, but be wary. When the messenger 
describes Pentheus' s brutal death, he says, ""To have good sense and revere what 
belongs to the gods is the noblest thing. I think this the wisest possession too for 
the mortals who enjoy it. "633 And Cadmus adds, "'If there is anyone who �corns 
the gods, let him believe in gods when he looks at this man's death."634 
Like the story of Gilgamesh, The Bacchae is about the difference between 
mortal and immortal, between what humanity seeks and what the gods, or the 
universe, limit. By way of Agave, Cadmus, and Pentheus, the city comes 
633. Bacchae 1150-52. 
634. Bacchae 1325-26. 
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tragically to understand that humanity does not triumph over the gods and the 
laws of dike; at best, humanity exists in a tension between its mortality and its 
quest for immortality or other god-like powers, between what is properly within 
human domain and what is the domain of divinity, between order and chaos. But 
it also depicts dramatically the fundamental changes in the way people thought 
about gods and their relationship with them at a time when the culture and many 
civic understandings were in chaos. The paradoxes of Dionysian religion and of 
the god himself reflect paradoxes that were becoming increasingly evident 
during the Peloponnesian War. A pervasive uncertainty perplexed the region and 
its relationship with the gods was a central part of that. Martin Buber would say 
many centuries later that human representations of the relation with God 
change, ""but the truth of the relation is unchangeable because it stands in eternal 
mutuality; it is not man who defines his approach to it but the creator who in the 
unambiguity of man's creation has instituted the approach."635 When the Bacchae 
was presented on the Athenian stage, it offered no such consolation; it suggested 
instead that the gods themselves spread disorder and if it is order that is needed, 
it might be necessary to look elsewhere, or coming to whatever understanding 
with gods is possible. 
When Agave and the maenads join in the Dionysiac revelries, they seek 
wisdom, which is held out as a tantalizing reward throughout the play. They 
think wisdom will come by joining with the god, but they learn that wisdom 
comes in recognizing their separateness from divinity. For example, when Agave 
slaughters her son .,., she was mad, stark mad, possessed by Bacchus" and ignored 
635. Buber 1948, 75. 
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Pentheus's cries of pity. 636 The god .uhad put inhuman power in her hands"637 and 
once shed of the possession she learns that joining with the gods is not the 
proper place for human beings. The messenger who brings news that she has 
ripped apart her son's body while joined in ecstatic revelry with Bacchus 
reminds the community that they must learn the wisdom of revering what 
belongs to the gods and not to human beings.638 
When Franz Kafka wrote about Prometheus and the attempt by men to be 
like gods, he says �e legend tries to explain the inexplicable, but, since it comes 
from a ground of truth, it must end once more in the inexplicable."639 Even the 
god's birth is entirely out of the ordinary, an entirely supernatural event: After 
being born to Semele of a union with Zeus, Dionysus was sewn up in his father's 
thigh, creating an artificial womb to hide him from Hera, who was angry at 
Zeus's adultery.640 
Euripides ends The Bacchae with a similar lack of explanation, but he 
differs from Homer, Hesiod, and Aeschylus in that for him the gods are a source 
of disorder rather than of order. In the Bacchae this turns up in the denouement 
as a balance between the irrational forces that plague human experience and 
possibility of a new order to replace the uncertainties of Greek life during this 
period. Charles Segal says the Bacchae can best be understood in the historical 
context of the scale and violent atrocities of the Peloponnesian War. He says this 
636. Bacchae 1124. 
637. Bacchae 1128. 
638. Bacchae 1150-52. 
639. Kafka 1958, 82. 
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.umade men more keenly aware of how precarious are the ordered forms of 
civilized life. "641 
Euripides depicted the breakdown and disintegration of civilization not 
just in the Bacchae, but also in the Medea, Hecuba, Trojan Women, and 
Phoenissae. The Medea, produced in 431, the year the war began, shows what 
happens when the passions of love turn into hatred and ferocity. Segal says its 
heroine depicts the traditional passivity of woman changed to a murderous 
revenge that destroys maternal love and leaves the male antagonist .uimpotent 
and shattered." 
In the Bacchae, like the Hippolytus, the potential destructiveness of the 
·emotional life centers on woman as the ""symbol and the focal point for the 
irrationality that the polis must suppress." The Bacchae shows how the 
destructive power of the irrational annihilates the city itself. The hierarchical 
separation of god, man, and beast, Segal asserts, ""breaks down as the god 
appears in the form of bull, snake, or lion and is present to his worshipers in the 
holy thiasos, the ecstatic band of maenads." The king's death is a symbolic 
rending of the city itself, .uno longer able to integrate emotionality and religious 
ecstasy into the order of civic institution and law. "642 Order collapses entirely 
with the bestial metamorphosis of the old king, Cadmus, who had founded 
Thebes, and with the exile of the queen mother Agave after she kills her son. 
640. Bacchae 88-98. 
641. Segal 1986, 33-34. 
642. Segal 1986, 34. 
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The Bacc hae is among the most direct of Greek stories in depicting the complex 
relationships between mortal and divine: the differences between them, the 
limitations of human life, and the striving of human beings to experience and 
often be a part of, even like the sacred. Segal sees depicted in tragedy a series of 
linked polarities-mortal and divine, male· and female, man and beast, city and 
wild-that N encompass not just the emotional, interior world of the individual 
character or spectator but the whole of society in its multiple relationships to the 
natural and supernatural order."643 
Dionysus on this account is the inbetween and often uncertain place 
humans being often find themselves in, somewhere between respecting and 
transgressing boundaries, between the old and the new, between the ecstatic and 
the ordered. As such, Simon Price asserts that Dionysus played a critical role 
both within and outside the conventional religious choices. The god's ambivalent 
status and purpose was partly the result of his alleged origin on the margins of 
the Greek world, in Thrace or Phrygia, and so he could have dual purposes: He 
was the center of civic cults, as at Athens; he played an important role at Delphi; 
and some of his rites involved ubizarre and abnormal behavior." On Mount 
Parnassos above Delphi, for example, women acted as maenads in the nocturnal 
festival of Dionysus and uwere believed to tear wild animals apart in a shocking 
version of animal sacrifice. "644 Initiations into the rites of Dionysus involved the 
temporary abandonment of reason, a kind of divine possession that Plato would 
specifically ban for the ideal city of the L aws. He found it unfitting for citizens 
and so prohibited �� all Bacchic dances and those of a similar nature in which the 
643. Segal 1986, 34. 
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dancers, calling themselves Nymphs, Pans, Sileni and Satyrs, imitate drunken 
people, while celebrating certain rites of expiation and initiation. "645 
The ambivalent and inbetween status in Greek life of Dionysiac worship 
becomes apparent as centuries later Greek Christian writers seek to distance 
themselves from this sort of inbetween place in their effort to transcend the 
uncertainties of human existence to exist in a more Platonic, godlike state of 
certainty and perfection. Writing in the 150s CE, Justin attacked Greek religious 
cults and Dionysus specifically when he said that Hwe" (i.e. Greek Christians) 
used to worship Dionysus, but now "although we are threatened with death, 
through Jesus Christ we have come to despise these immoral deities, and have 
given ourselves to the unbegotten and impassive god who can not be driven wild 
by sexual passion, would not need to be rescued, nor would he plan the death of 
many Greeks for the sake of a concubine. We pity those who believe such stories 
and we recognize that demons are responsible for them."646 
Perhaps, but it may be more helpful here to think about the Bacchae, as 
Segal suggests above, in relationship to the fears, disorder, and uncertainty of 
the historical context of the Peloponnesian War. The importance of this is that 
human behavior and the linked polarities that he discusses were profoundly 
altered during this period by a rejection of traditional conceptions of the gods 
644. Price 1999, 115-16, 115 note 19. 
645. Laws 815c. 
646. Justin, First Apology 25, tr. Beard, North and Price 1998: 2.12.7a0). Cf. Chadwick 
1996: 9-23; Pagels 1988: 32-56, both from Price 1999, 160. Price also discusses the general 
incorporation of Dionysiac and Orphic religious motifs into Christian and Jewish 
theologies. 
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and thereby of traditional relationships with gods. The view of human limits 
changed too, as did the understanding of human/divine boundaries. 
The alterations are reflected in Herodotus, who wrote about the period 
before the Peloponnesian War, and Thucydides, who wrote about the war, but 
afterward. Herodotus, for example, accepted divine interventions in battles and 
believed truth is learned from oracles. 647 He also implies that Poseidon probably 
causes earthquakes.648 Thucydides, however, says he directly tries to reject 
.umythical" stories.649 Gods do not intervene in the battles as Thucydides describes 
them and Price650 points out that he .uputs appeals in the names of gods in the 
mouths of the losing side in conflicts. "651 He also denies that oracles should be 
relied on, 652 and describes storms, eclipses, and diseases as having natural 
causes. When Thucydides describes the disastrous plague that swept through 
Athens in 430, he says that in the beginning people continued their religious 
observances, used oracles, and made sacrifices. When the plague continued and 
the siege was unabated, people in the city stopped their worship, presuming the 
gods had abandoned them. 
647. Herodotus 8.77. Although the differences between Herodotus and Thucydides are 
not entirely clear. For example, the Hippocratic claim that even madness has natural 
causes is echoed in nonmedical literature in, e.g., Xenophon Memorabilia 3.12.6, and in 
Herodotus, who at 3.33 suggests that Cambyses became insane either because he 
offended Apis or suffered from the sacred disease (epilepsy), which Herodotus says is 
primarily a bodily condition. Similar suggestions in Herodotus put Cleomenes' mental 
affliction in the realm of natural cause, 6.75ff. and 84. Also see G.E.R. Lloyd 1979, 29ff., 
and 1987, 23ff. 
648. Herodotus 7.129. 
649. Thucydides 1.22. 
650. Price 1999, 131. 
651. Thucydides 3.58, 5.104-5, 7. 77 .3-4. 
652. Thucydides 2.54. 
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Thucydides' doubts653 were paralleled later in Plato when in the Euthyphro 
Socrates asks whether the gods really need gifts. Euthyphro answers by saying 
they do, as an issue of honor, recognition, and charis, 654 but the implication is that 
Socrates is doubtful. This doesn't mean Plato urged abandoning conventional 
religious practices because in the Laws he includes ritual practices in the ideal 
state.655 But all of this was an indication of changes in religious belief and a sense 
of uncertainty spreading across the region, and the Bacchae speaks to that. 
Timothy Reiss asserts convincingly that Greek tragedy generally, 
including the Bacchae, arose at a point of crisis in the political, moral, and social 
discourse about social order: 
In Western history tragedy seems to have appeared at moments that, 
retrospectively, are marked by a kind of 'hole' in the passage from one 
dominant discourse to another . . . .  Tragedy brings about rationality by 
showing what can be termed the irrational within that rationality. That is 
no doubt why all tragedy is thoroughly embroiled in the political, and why 
to grasp and enclose the tragic, the inexpressible of the discourse being 
created, is at once an ideological and an anti-ideological activity: the first 
to the degree that it hides what is unspoken in the law that is the order of 
discourse, the second, to the extent that it shows it. "656 
Reiss' s description has commonalties with the action in the Bacchae: The 
irrational within the rational, an ideological and anti-ideological activity, the 
passage from one dominant discourse to another, irrational forces that both 
plague human experience and promise renewal, Segal' s city and wild, man and 
653. Thucydides 3.82. 
654. Euthyphro 12e-15b. 
655. Lloyd-Jones 1971, 141, finds these readings of Thucydides unconvincing, noting that 
"If Thucydides dispenses with the divine motivation of events, that in itself does not show 
him to have been an unbeliever," nor does it show most people of the period to be 
unbelievers. 
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beast, Dionysus as both the respectable god of Athenian civic life and the god of 
women in a ritualistic frenzy. Where Odysseus in the Odyssey seemed to begin 
clarifying the relationship between humanity and the divine, seemed to show 
where the boundaries are drawn, Euripides' Bacchae sheds claims for clarity and 
offers paradox in its stead. 
j. Genesis 
Summary 
The first book of the Torah is an account of primeval history extending from the 
creation of the world and humanity through its near destruction and 
preservation in the flood to the spread of humanity over the earth. Genesis 
describes the history of the Judaic lineage of the human family beginning with 
Abraham, through Isaac, Jacob, and Joseph.657 
656. Reiss 1980, 284. See especially chapter 12. 
657. Except for Orthodox groups, Judaism has generally accepted that much of Torah is a 
metaphorical rendering. The United Synagogue of Conservative Judaism, for example, 
which represents the 1.5 million Conservative Jews in the United States, issued a new 
Torah and commentary in late 2001, called Etz Hayim (Tree of Life in Hebrew), David 
Lleber, ed., that spells out the unlikeliness of historical accuracy in Torah. One of the 
essays, by Robert Wexler, president of the University of Judaism in Los Angeles, states 
that on the basis of modern scholarship, it seems unlikely that the story of Genesis 
originated in Palestine. More likely, it arose in Mesopotamia, the influence of which is 
most apparent in the story of the Flood, which probably grew out of the periodic 
overflowing of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. Wexler says the story of Noah was 
probably borrowed from the Mesopotamian epic Gilgamesh. Other essays say 
archaeological evidence indicates that the Abraham of Genesis may never have existed 
and that the exodus recounted in the book of Exodus probably did not occur. Reform 
Judaism issued a Torah in 1981 (Joseph Plaut, ed.) that relates the same doubts about 
historical accuracy as a result of archaeological evidence. Among Orthodox Jews, 
however, Torah is regarded as the divine and immutable word of God. Their most widely 
used Torah commentary, known as the Stone Edition (1993), declares in its introduction 
"that every letter and word of the Torah was given to Moses by God. " 
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The creation of the world is described as occurring in seven days, perhaps 
using as material some preexisting undifferentiated chaos. The entrance of evil 
and suffering into the world is described in the story of Adam and Eve in the 
Garden of Eden. The first signs of cultural development and the scattering of 
tribes and languages is recounted. 
This is a story of divinely established boundaries. The ambiguities inherent to 
interpretation of the story allow very different understandings. One of the key 
differences is in whether it is an account of a world under curse that looks 
forward to Israel as a source of blessing among nations or of a world that is 
essentially good, guided by God's good providence, or even some combination of 
the two. It is primarily a theological statement that the world and Israel belong to 
God, exist because of God's intention, and are called to live under God's 
guidance. Ultimately, it is the account of a single God, creator of all things, 
portrayed as juggling the fortunes of people and intending to right the balance of 
moral justice. 
Genesis comprises four movements: the primordial history, the Abraham cycle, 
the Jacob cycle, and the saga of Joseph and his brothers. Each segment tells the 
story of how events led to the founding of the people Israel. 
The second book of Torah, Exodus, will be mentioned below. The first central 
element of the story combines an account of the presence of Israel in Egypt, and 
their liberation from Egyptian bondage. A second central element of the book is 
an account of Mount Sinai, where God issues his laws. Together, the two 
elements lead to the binding of Israel and God in a covenant relationship. 
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Discussion 
This, the first book of Torah, is an attempt to provide guidance about 
human action and the limits intrinsic to the universe. But it does so with the full 
ambiguity of all human endeavor. It both prohibits and allows, both clarifies and 
clouds. When seen in the confluence of Greek and Hebraic, Genesis gives us an 
explanation of how we got here, possible causes for suffering, and why there is a 
need to die. But like the Greek stories, what answers are here lie deeply 
embedded in layers of complexity that are disguised in the simplicity of the tale. 
By the time Aeschylus wrote The Oresteia in the early fifth century, the 
patriarch Abraham is said to have been dead for twelve hundred years, the 
Exodus was almost eight hundred years in the past, and Solomon's reign had 
ended more than four hundred years earlier. The earliest form of Genesis is 
thought to have been composed nearly three thousand years ago by someone 
scholars call J.658 Fragments of the unknown author's text include parts of 
Exodus and Numbers as well as Genesis. 
The God of Genesis is the penultimate version of Zeus on Olympus. His 
authority is absolute. He is the evolutionary endpoint of the developing version of 
a single God, sharing nothing at all with other deities and demanding that others 
be shunned. In the niad Zeus is supreme among the gods,659 and Lloyd-Jones says 
that his thought is identical with future happenings, that one's Nportion" is 
658. There is no agreement about dating for J's text, or even that it ever had independent 
existence at all. For discussion about the problems of assigning authorship and dating, 
see Harold Bloom, 1990, The Book of J. David Rosenberg, tr. New York: Grove 
Weidenfeld; Barry Bandstra, 1999, Reading the Old Testament: An Introduction to the 
Hebrew Bible, second edition, Belmont, Calif. :  Wadsworth Publishing; Karen Armstrong, 
1996, In the Beginning: A new interpretation of Genesis, New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 
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identical with the will of Zeus." But in Zeus's universe, others also share in the 
action. Aphrodite is a powerful entity in the Danaid trilogy, Apollo in the Theban 
trilogy, Athene in the Eumenides. God in Genesis clears away both pretenders 
and lesser deities. This God faces difficulties with humanity, however, in much 
the same way Zeus was challenged by human testing of limits. There is no 
Prometheus vowing to topple this god, but there would be questions about his 
authority and the boundaries of his dominion. 
The initial difficulty in Genesis arises over the serpent's contradicting 
Eve's understanding of God's instructions, under penalty of death, not to eat the 
fruit of the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil. Seductively, the snake says, 
NDie, you will not die! Rather, God knows that on the day that you eat from it, 
your eyes will be opened and you will become like gods, knowing good and 
evil."660 
When Adam and Eve succumb to the snake's subversion of God's edict 
and eat from the tree, God notices: 
Here, the human has become like one of us, in knowing good and evil. So 
now, lest he send forth his hand and take also from the Tree of Life and eat 
and live throughout the ages . . .  ! So YHWH, God, sent him away from the 
garden of Eden, to work the soil from which he had been taken. He drove 
the human out . . .  661 
In a Greek reading, the pair are polluted; in the Judaic, they have sinned; in the 
Christian, they have fallen. In all three understandings, the story is an account of 
659. Iliad 8, 18ff. 
660. Genesis 3: 4-5. 
661. Genesis 3: 22-24. 
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how evil and suffering came into the world and suggests the cause was a 
combination of some mysterious underlying force in the universe, symbolized by 
the snake, and the willful disobedience by human beings of divine proscription. 
The tale has been with us for a very long time and is as fully a part of our 
moral and metaphysical understanding as anything in the Greek corpus. But it 
angers some for its implications. Christian philosopher Paul Ricoeur662 chafes at 
describing the Eden story as the ""keystone of the Judeo-Christian edifice." The 
doctrine of original sin, he argues, is a ""rationalization of the second degree" and 
a "''false column" of Christianity: 
The harm that has been done to souls, during the centuries of Christianity, 
first by the literal interpretation of the story of Adam, and then by the 
confusion of this myth, treated as history, with later speculations, 
principally Augustinian, about original sin, will never be adequately told. 
In asking the faithful to confess belief in this mythicospeculative mass and 
to accept it as a self-sufficient explanation, the theologians have unduly 
required a sacrificium intellectus where what was needed was to awaken 
believers to a symbolic super-intelligence of their actual condition.663 
Milton expressed a very different understanding of the story when he wrote 
Paradise �ost. A part of his motivation can be understood by his living in the 
midst of changes being forced by Bacon, Montaigne, Descartes, and their 
declarations about the importance of understanding God's creation. They argued 
that the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge was now permissibly humanity's to eat. 
Milton urges caution. His epic presents Adam and Eve as the victims of the envy 
of Satan, who sees the first humans "Imparadised in one another's arms."664 
662. Ricoeur 1967, 239. 
663. Ricoeur 1967, 239. 
664. Paradise Lost IV: 506. 
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It is Satan, in Milton's account, who whispers in Eve's ear that the 
proscription on eating from the tree is nonsense, merely the foolish counsel of a 
limited God who is fearful-like the claimed weakness of Zeus in Aeschylus's 
Prometheus Bound-of humanity's threat to His power. Knowing this, and 
thinking that the pair may succumb, God sends the Archangel Raphael to remind 
Adam and Eve that they can freely choose obedience or obedience. 665 During the 
conversation Adam asks about celestial motion-the Copernican debate-and 
Raphael says, no, he and Eve are not to know about .uthings too high. "666 
Milton draws the elements of the dilemma as a grand battle with the epic 
proportions of the Iliad. When Adam and Eve eat the fruit, God as the Son 
descends to earth to tell them that sin and death will hencefo�h be a part of life 
on earth. This then, is the story 
Of Man's first disobedience, and the fruit 
Of that forbidden tree, whose mortal taste 
Brought death into the world, and all our woe . . .  667 
Adam, like Oedipus in OC, protests that the penalty and resultant suffering are 
unjust, that he was fated by his nature to choose as he did. Again like Oedipus, 
Adam comes to accept a degree of culpability and enters his exile of suffering 
and guilt for having violated divine instructions-for having followed Satan in 
rebellion. Once done, however, Milton suggests that humanity cannot recover 
from Adam and Eve's choice. It can, however, guard against future 
transgressions and so Milton's epic takes on the coloration of cautionary tale. 
665. Paradise Lost VII. 
666. Paradise Lost VII: 121. 
667. Paradise Lost I: 1-3. 
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When Adam asks for more information, for ''secrets," from Raphael because to 
know more is "'the more to magnify his works,"668 the Angel says some 
knowledge is "within bounds," but about other knowledge Adam should ""abstain 
to ask, nor let thine own inventions hope things not revealed . . .  "669 Later, 
Raphael makes it irreducibly clear: 
Heaven is for thee too high 
To know what passes there; be lowly wise: 
Think only what concerns thee and thy being; 
Dream not of other worlds, what creatures there 
Live, in what state, condition, or degree, 
Contented that thus far hath been revealed 
Not of Earth only but of highest Heaven.670 
Milton suggests, here and elsewhere, that the sin of pride and the lust for 
knowledge lead to transgressions that will be punished. But he provides for the 
possibility that humanity's traits of seeking understanding and experience exist 
for good reason. He seems to admit an ambiguity in the Eden story when 
Raphael in Book VIII cautions wisdom in the way humanity should proceed with 
understanding God's creation. Seek understanding of creation, Raphael says, but 
be cautious of overreaching: '"Be lowly wise."671 
God directly warned Adam and Eve against eating the fruit of the tree of 
knowledge, but in Babel or Babylon the proscriptions on investigating the world 
had not been apparent. Babylonians used the new technology of masonry to 
build a tall tower, which to God represented their arrogance, their wanting 
668. Paradise Lost VII: 94-97. 
669. Paradise Lost Vll: 11�22. 
670. Paradise Lost VIII: 172-78. 
671. Paradise Lost VIII: 173. 
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personal aggrandizement: "'Come-now! Let us build ourselves a city and a 
tower, its top in the heavens, and let us make ourselves a name . . . "672 they said. 
God came, and saw, and said: 
Here, {they are) one people with one language for them all, and this is 
merely the first of their doings-now there will be no barrier for them in 
all that they scheme to do!673 
Instead of destroying them for their defiance, God divides them, creating many 
peoples with different customs and languages in His effort to curb their 
ambitions, their 'schemes.' "Schemes" here is often interpreted as 
"imagination"674 and is cited as the dangerous human quality that can cause us to 
reach too high. With new technologies and united by imagination and a universal 
language, humanity might be capable of too much, and so they must be 
restrained. The concern is similar to the one that led God to unleash the great 
flood: humanity's imagination-'heart' s planning' -lured human beings toward 
overreaching their limits. "'Now YHWH saw that great was humankind's 
evildoing on earth and every form of their heart's planning was only evil all the 
day."s1s 
672. Genesis 11: 4 
673. Genesis 11: 6. 
674. The King James translation of Genesis has it: "' And now nothing will be restrained 
from them which they have imagined to do" (11: 6). Also, at 6: 5, just before the flood: 
"'
And God saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth and that every 
imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually." 
675. Genesis 6: 5. See above, note 594, on "'their heart's planning" translated as their 
"'imagination." 
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After the flood, Noah persuades God not to destroy humanity a second 
time, but there follows the same concern about humanity's capacity.676 Yet here it 
is ambiguous, with a suggestion that God may be accepting that an intrinsic part 
of being human is to exercise imagination and seek understanding: u • • •  and 
YHWH said in his heart: I will never curse the soil again on humankind's account, 
since what the human heart forms is evil from its youth . . .  n677 It seems to me 
here that if, as has been suggested, ""what the human heart ·forms" refers to those 
qualities of imagination and curiosity and perhaps others, then God gives up the 
effort to keep these qualities at bay; it is there from youth, Genesis says, from the 
beginning, perhaps inescapably. 
Increasingly, as the story proceeds, the cause of humanity's Hfall," of its 
""wickedness,"678 seems to be portrayed as imagination, vision, seeing 
possibilities, and seeking understanding, all of which threaten to exceed 
limitations imposed by a transcendent authority. The Tower of Babel episode is 
an expression of human curiosity bringing punishment, and then as the Genesis 
story continues, it becomes clear that another aspect of humanity's limits is the 
prohibition upon looking at God, seeing God, understanding God: ""And Jacob 
called the name of the place Peniel: for I have seen God face to face, and my life is 
676. This story of Noah persuading God not to destroy huinanity is paralleled in 
Prometheus's convincing Zeus not to destroy the race. See above, m.f. 
677. Genesis 8: 21. The King James version uses "'imagination"' in place of "'what the 
human heart forms."' See above, notes 594 and 595. 
678. The idea of a fall and of wickedness are common understandings of the story, which 
is why I refer to them, but there is enormous scholarly disagreement about whether 
humanity in this story moves from a higher to a lower level of being. Many argue that 
these are Pauline and Augustinian Christian interpretations that ascribe a degradation to 
the process. An alternative reading is that the Eden story is merely the myth of 
explanation for why and how humanity is different from God, and that we sometimes 
suffer because we are not like God. 
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preserved. "679 Many generations later, during the Exodus, Moses/Moshe twice 
sees God:680 N And YHWH would speak to Moshe face to face, as a man speaks to 
his neighbor. "681 But God makes clear that this is to be an exception: 
He said, I myself will cause all my Goodliness to pass in front of your face, 
I will call out the name of YHWH before your face: that I show-favor to 
whom I show-favor, that I show-mercy to whom I show-mercy. But he 
said: You cannot see my face, for no human can see me and live!682 
God emphasizes this again a few verses later: 
And it shall be: when my Glory passes by, I will place you in the cleft of the 
rock and screen you with my hand until I have passed by. Then I will 
remove my hand; you shall see my back, but my face shall not be seen. 683 
One of the ways to look at these verses is Dante's suggestion in the Purgatorio, 
that the apple did not give Adam and Eve knowledge of all things, and especially 
did not reveal knowledge of God. That knowledge, on Dante's account, would be 
glimpsed later, with Mary's immaculate conception: 
Content you with quia sons of Eve; 
For had you power to see the whole truth plain 
No need had been for Mary to conceive.684 
Among the reasons we find the stories in Genesis so compelling is that the 
characters in them are all flawed. They generally have good intentions, but they 
make mistakes. And, like the Greek gods, the God of Genesis makes mistakes too, 
especially in His initial expectations of humanity. Genesis is largely an account of 
679. Genesis 32: 30. 
680. Exodus 24: 10 and 33: 11. 
681. Exodus 33: 11. 
682. Exodus 33: 19-20. 
683. Exodus 33: 22-23. 
684. Purgatorio m.37-39. 
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justice and injustice and the ambiguities that lie in their midst. Why would God 
punish Adam and Eve for disobeying if they lacked knowledge of good and evil 
before eating from the tree? Why does God destroy the innocent along with the 
guilty in the flood and then at Sodom and Gomorrah? Should Abraham be 
praised for being willing to kill his son? If Abraham could argue with God about 
what to do in Sodom and Gomorrah, should he not have argued about killing his 
son? Jacob seems to have been rewarded after cheating his twin brother out of 
his father's blessing. How can that be? If Cain killed Abel because of petty 
jealousy over God's preference for Abel's offering, why is Cain's punishment 
merely to wander about, exiled like Oedipus? Lot offers his daughters to a crowd 
for their sexual pleasure and then gets an opportunity to escape the destruction 
of Sodom. Is this justice? Agamemnon received no such mercy from 
Clytemnestra when he sacrificed their daughter. 
When Cain/Kayin is born to Eve/Hawa, his mother remarks, pleased, "!­
have-gotten a man, as has YHWH!"685 Eve's prideful claim to creation seems to 
validate the serpent's seductive promise of God-like powers and sets the stage 
for what follows. Cain becomes a farmer who becomes jealous of his shepherd 
brother, Abel/Hevel, when God rejects his sacrifice and accepts Abel's. Cain kills 
Abel and is condemned by God to wander the earth, but with a protected status 
from God, who orders that he shall not be harmed. It is a remarkably puzzling 
tale that includes sibling rivalry, the attraction of sin, the danger of ungoverned 
passion, the pride of claiming to be like God, crime met with punishment that 
seems too lenient, God's mercy as well as God's authority and mystery, the 
685. Genesis 4: 1. The translation often is "I have created." 
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futility of pretense, the discontinuity of familial generations, the origins of crafts 
and of worship, and the moral distinction between civilization and barbarism. 
All of these are contained in 16 short, perfectly drawn verses. Their 
unraveling suggests possible meanings, but like the rest of Genesis it is the 
process of seeking meaning that may have more value than the claimed solutions. 
If there is explanation for Cain's punishment, it may be that his uncontrolled 
anger means he must be separated-morally, economically, and 
geographically-from the proper realm of civilized life. Cain is exiled from the 
community to live what is a life of small worth away from other human beings 
and where he is "concealed"686 from God's face.687 
Cain becomes like Oedipus, wandering in exile and suffering for the 
violent passions and inability to see that again leads to misery and a family 
cursed. The first child in Genesis repeats the fate of Milton's Lucifer,688 who is 
exiled, hidden from God. The Islamic rendering of the Satan story is that the 
angel so loved God he became jealous of humanity's favor in God's eyes and 
rebelled. His exile meant perpetual suffering because he would be away from his 
beloved. Over and over, stories are told of how angelic powers or other 
important figures get swollen with lust or with arrogance, and must be exiled 
either from heaven or from God's presence or from the civilization that 
symbolizes whatever is thought to be the best and most appropriate place for 
686. Genesis 4: 14. 
687. This interpretation is Ronald Hendel's in Metzger and Coogan 1993, 97. 
688. Milton's use of the Latin name "'Lucifer," which means "'light-bearer," according to 
Pagels 1995 (48), suggests parallel connections to Promethean rebellion. 
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human life.689 When Cain became jealous of Abel, the story parallels an 
apocryphal version of angelic rebellion in which Satan refuses God's order that 
the angels bow down to Adam and is banished for his jealousy and 
disobedience. 690 
A traditional Jewish truism is that there are seventy faces to the Torah, 
and so no single interpretation is objectively correct.691 In the Cain story, like the 
story of the binding of Isaac, 692 like Oedipus, we mine the words for knowledge of 
God and of ourselves and we find no certainty. The value of Genesis is its 
continuing relevance in_ seeking understanding about the provenance of justice 
and the meaning of suffering. The answers we find are ambiguous, but they 
allow us at least to see that it might be in the existence of universal questions, 
rather than in the clarity of the answers, that the commonality of experience most 
clearly appears. 
689. For the various renderings of Satan or Lucifer, see Pagels 1995, especially 39-55. 
690. Pagels 1995, 49. 
691. Leibowitz 1999, xxxii. 
692. Genesis 22. 
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Chapter IV: The changing moral image 
a. Ancient and modern images 
As I write this, the corpses of the butchered and the brutalized lie 
scattered across the landscapes of Israel, Kosovo, and Bosnia. The dead and the 
soon-to-be dead are hiding in caves and behind the walls of misbegotten shelter 
in Afghan villages. Neither they nor the charred, fragmented souls that haunt 
New York are afforded protection from the fear and hatred and stupidities of 
each new Creon who wanders unknowingly into power. In 1984 George Steiner 
composed a lyrical study of the Antigone that foreshadowed subsequent decades 
of grinding, tedious of savagery. 
He said Teiresias' s vision of the inversion of the worlds of the living and of 
the dead has taken on for us, today, an overwhelming actuality: 0It is the lucid 
delineation of a planet on which massacres . . .  have left the numberless unburied 
dead, and in whose subterranean shelters, caves, or conscripted catacombs the 
living wait in blackness for their end. "693 
What Teiresias points to, Steiner said, is the prospect for humanity of the 
''murder of life itself by the politics of the living, politics which, like Creon's, have 
their undoubted claims to dignity and to rationality." Steiner's words describe 
the puzzlement of a world in which each new Creon seems able to assure us that 
the vulgarity of human slaughter is necessary and sensible. He argues that 
ancient Athenians who listened to Sophocles' words had questions about their 
government and their gods not dissimilar from those we have. The relevance of 
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Teiresias's words ""negates all cautionary distance between us and the ancient 
text," he says, and in our recognition of Creon's pollution, the words scream to 
us across more than two thousand years, bringing an image of darkness.694 
Less than a decade after Steiner wrote, Newsweek magazine reported that 
Serbia's genocide of Muslims in Bosnia had included systematic slaughter of 
civilians and a policy of psychological terrorism that included mass rape: ""Rape is 
an integral part of ethnic cleansing, of eradicating entire areas of their historic 
Muslim populations through brutal intimidation, expulsion and outright 
murder."695 Newsweek reported that the corpses lay scattered along roadsides 
and in charred remains of burned-out homes. 
Steiner says that in the ancient stories are ""the raw material and substance 
of the continuities of the human psyche"' and that this is the reason, ""More and 
more, we can come to understand in the modernist movements in the West a 
hunger for 'beginnings', for a return to archaic, essentially Greek, sources."' This 
""will to homecoming,"' to the fusion of past and present, is vividly represented in 
the tragic politics of our age: ""The burning of cities in 1939-45 was seen, almost 
at once, as cognate with the destruction of Troy." Later, for Sartre and the Living 
Theatre, during the wars in Algeria and Vietnam, such figures as Andromache, 
Hecuba, and the Trojan women provided, Steiner asserts, ""a code of universal 
693. Steiner 1984, 288. 
694. Steiner 1984, 288. 
695. Newsweek, January 4, 1994, 32-37. 
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presentness" because they foreshadow, they symbolize, they speak nakedly to 
our present condition. 696 
The stories I have discussed have long been a source of understanding, 
solace, mystery, and anxiety in what they say about the playing out of human 
lives in relationship with each other and with the divine. When Teiresias tells 
Creon that the Erinyes, the Furies, are "lying in ambush for you,"697 implicit in 
this and in the context of what he says are questions about whether the gods are 
the source of destiny, whether they are at work in human action, and whether 
human beings in some way have effect on Olympus. These and other questions 
resonate in us because the stories, as Steiner explains, have an "unbroken 
authority . . .  over the imagination of the West" so that there seems to be an 
unending obsession with Oedipus, Prometheus, Orestes, Narcissus.698 Our 
identification with these myths is so immediate and fertile that they are the 
constant "pivot of reference for all subsequent poetic invention and philosophic 
allegory." 
If Steiner has got it right, and I think he has, then embedded in these 
stories we should be able to find the elements of our deepest concerns, our most 
important values, and our understanding of meaning in human life. We should 
be able to find these because over the period of 2800 or so years Western 
consciousness developed always with that "'pivot of reference" to the Greek, and 
so the seeds of our values today should still be recognizable in Sophocles, 
696. Steiner 1984, 284-85. 
697. Antigone 1075. 
698. Steiner 1984, 300. 
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Aeschylus, and the other dramatists. The existence of Steiner's llcontinuities of 
the human psyche" argues strongly for a reading of the continuum that says that 
when we find elements that are constant, or nearly so, there we will find a picture 
of what we value about being human. 
The picture should show what helps us thrive rather than suffer and 
wither. With that knowledge, we can more fruitfully think about how we want 
our lives to proceed and the kind of human community we want to create. In the 
unfolding of the cultural continuum, we can also identify directions we may wish 
to avoid. I have cautioned before that the stories do not provide clear answers to 
current dilemmas. But if we look carefully and consider well, I believe they can 
show us the most elemental of the values we cherish. If we find the elemental 
values in these ancient stories, and can recognize them in modern counterparts, 
we can presume from this that their persistence is something we ought attend. 
Among the difficulties, of course, is in the interpretation of myths and 
stories. Certainty in interpretation is elusive, and it might be argued that one 
reading is as good as another. Bowra finds in Oedipus a straightforward 
cautionary tale showing that Oedipus is guilty of crimes abhorrent to humanity 
and gods. On his account, the lesson is that life is precarious and so care must be 
taken to honor moral laws.699 Others argue that, no, Oedipus is an account of luck 
entering into human life, skewing the outcome of men's action so that destiny is 
not just unpredictable, it is sometimes comic.700 Dodds and Winnington-lngram701 
699. Bowra 1944, 22�21. 
700. Nussbaum 1986, 283, 334, 380, 383. 
701. Dodds 1966, 37-49; Winnington-lngram 1980, 211. 
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disagree with Bowra, arguing that Oedipus is morally and legally innocent, and 
his punishment violates human understanding of justice. Quine argues against all 
of them that sentences and texts lack determinate meaning, and looking for such 
is pointless. He claims there is no ·"fact of the matter" as to which meaning is the 
right one. 702 
But while I might agree that texts such as the stories I discuss lack 
absoluteness in their meaning, I do not agree that there are not better and worse 
interpretations. Putnam argues against Chomsky's contention about total 
subjectivism and that all interests must be taken to be on a par.703 No, "There are 
silly interests, deluded interests, irrational interests, and so on, as well as 
reasonable and relevant ones (even if there is no general rule for determining 
which are which)."704 
Putnam similarly argues against Quine and Chomsky that a ""sane 
relativism" recognizes that there is a ""fact of the matter in interpretation without 
making that fact of the matter unique or context-independent.*705 In literature, 
whether it is King Lear or Aristotle's Metaphysics, interpretations vary, as do 
assumptions and styles of criticism in different periods. But while an absolutely 
correct interpretation is a troublesome notion, it is just as troublesome to make 
the radical claim that interpretation is simply invented anew by each interpreter. 
702. Quine 1960, 11ff. Also see Quine and Ullian 1978. 
703. Chomsky 1980 (from Putnam 1990, 211). 
704. Putnam 1990, 211. 
705. Putnam 1990, 211. 
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Putnam argues, correctly I think, that this latter possibility falls in the same 
category as other self-refuting relativisms. 
Keeping in mind the difficulties of commensurability, it is still possible on 
Putnam's account to follow Quine's suggestion to think of interpretation as 
correlation, which means, for example, that we can correlate Aristotle's words 
and sentences with words and sentences in our present-day language and in so 
doing we can begin to find connections, though not sameness. #Sameness" is not 
possible because Aristotle's words depended on contexts-institutions, 
assumptions, and so forth-that no longer exist. 
Each period requires new interpretations, Putnam says, and we thus give 
up the idea of Platonic Mmeaning."706 Instead, we can think of interpretation as 
human interaction seeking to find what Putnam calls the Himplications" of what 
Aristotle wrote. Because what is written is often, perhaps always, ambiguous, we 
try, in translating to our age, to find out what it might imply about our problems. 
Against Posner,707 I think writers are trying to tell us something, and what that 
might be can and should be much more than the truth conditions of the words 
and sentences. Putnam says there can be no Hfinal commentary, one that is 
perfect from the standpoint of every cultural position, every set of interests and 
assumptions."708 But to say there is no one unalterably true interpretation is not 
to find that contemporary understandings do not take account of commonalities 
in human experience that extend over time. ""Perhaps," Putnam says, ""we can 
706. Putnam 1990, 211. 
707. See above, section 2. 
708. Putnam 1990, 212. 
245 
come to see criticism as a conversation with many voices rather than as a 
contest with winners and losers. "709 
Better and worse interpretations might be claimed on the basis of 
Putnam's Nmoral image." This Nmoral image" presumes that it is not the case that 
all there is is language, that what we perceive in the moral realm exists only in 
whatever way we describe it at any point in time. It is possible on this account to 
renounce notions of ''things in themselves" -although not as, with Kant, because 
we cannot know the things in themselves-and yet still speak of conceptual 
schemes in which our descriptions, following Putnam, Nreflect our interests and 
choices. "710 
Putnam explains the way a moral image tits into his scheme of internal 
realism in moral philosophy by asserting that finding a moral image is what Kant 
is doing in his project of arguing for the third formulation of the Categorical 
Imperative-that is, for the proper ordering of the formal and material principles 
of morality, and so on. Putnam says Kant is 
. . .  most importantly, providing a moral image of the world which inspires 
these, and without which they don't make sense. A moral image, in the 
sense in which I am using the term, is not a declaration that this or that is 
a virtue, or that this or that is what one ought to do; it is rather a picture of 
how our virtues and ideals hang together with one another and of what 
they have to do with the position we are in. 711 
An example of aspects of moral image might be as vague as Nsisterhood and 
brotherhood." Millions of human beings find in these metaphors moral images 
709. Putnam 1990, 213. 
710. Putnam 1987, 37. 
711. Putnam 1987, 51. 
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that can organize their moral lives, Putnam says, "and this notwithstanding the 
enormous problem of interpreting them and of deciding what it could possibly 
mean to make them effective. 712 
Where most moral philosophers talk about duties, rights, virtues, and the 
rest, Putnam says Kant was right to think about moral images, and Kant's most 
important contribution was to see that we cannot separate our conceptual 
contribution from what might on the account of a medievalist metaphysics be 
described as what is "objectively there." This inability is a good thing, Putnam 
says. Kant's project in this is, following Putnam, in accord with Jurgen Habermas 
and Karl-Otto Apel, who claim that the #notion of a warranted or justified 
statement involves an implicit reference to a community."713 Putnam says one 
way to see the importance of moral image is to see what happens when we try to 
justify a fundamental social institution such as democracy without appealing to 
an image of human nature. 
Kant presents one facet of moral image for the West, which stresses the 
liberal values of free and critical thinking, but it is not the only facet. Judaism and 
Christianity offer others, stressing equality, among other things. Because there 
are a variety of facets that must go into moral image, many of which shade into 
and out of each other in seen and unseen ways, Kant's moral philosophy is 
712. Putnam 1987, 51. 
713. Putnam 1987, 53. Habermas expresses this position in Knowledge and Human 
Interests, 1971, translated by Jeremy Shapiro. Boston: Beacon Press. Apel's position is in 
Charles S. Peirce, From Pragmatism to Pragmaticism, 1981, translated by John Michael 
Krois. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press. 
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defective, Putnam argues, because Kant does not want to supplement the moral 
image, he wants to replace it completely, with a .umonistic moral standpoint."714 
Putnam at times argues for the existence of many moral images, saying 
that rather than being different facets of one image, the West is comprised of 
various images: "We have many different moral images in our tradition, and 
there are moral images which we need to pay attention to in other traditions as 
well."715 But he usually refers to needing "'a  more multi-faceted moral image," and 
he seems to have the same idea in mind with both descriptions. When Putnam 
refers to moral image or facet, he does not mean some one trait or "some one 
mode of behavior as virtuous." In describing the Kantian moral image, for 
example, he includes thinking for oneself about how to live and say, " it includes 
the claim that a human being who has chosen not to think for himself about how 
to live, or has been coerced or 'conditioned' into being unable to think for himself 
about how to live, has failed to live a fully human life." The moral image also 
contains the idea of a community of individuals who respect each other for that 
capacity, as well as ideas about how a community should be organized, and so 
forth. It includes a complex system of values that serve to support the 
community. 
Steiner speaks to certain of these values when he discusses the role of 
Antigone in our imaginations; he says it is "a defining trait" of the Western moral 
image: 
714. Putnam 1987, 61. 
715. Putnam 1987, 61 . 
248 
. . .  pervasive, and altogether impossible to index has been the role of the 
matter of Antigone in the actual lives of individuals and communities. It is 
a defining trait of western culture after Jerusalem and after Athens that in 
it men and women re-enact, more or less consciously, the maj or gestures, 
the exemplary symbolic motions, set before them by antique imaginings 
and formulations. Our realities, as it were, mime the canonic possibilities 
· first expressed in classical art and feeling. In his diary for 17 September 
1941 , the German novelist and publicist Martin Raschke recounts an 
episode in Nazi-occupied Riga. Caught trying to sprinkle earth on the 
publicly exposed body of her executed brother, a young girl, entirely 
unpolitical in her sentiments, is asked why. She answers: 'He was my 
brother. For me that is sufficient. ' In December 1943, the Germans 
descended on the village of Kalavrita in the Peloponnesus. They rounded 
up all the males and did them to death. Against explicit orders, in peril of 
their own lives the women of the village broke out of the school in which 
they had been imprisoned and went en massse to lament and to bury the 
slain . . . .  716 
The girl who tried to sprinkle earth on the exposed body of her brother may or 
may not have known the story of Antigone. But the story is in the culture's blood 
in a thousand different ways and so she acts from cultural knowledge even if she 
does not know Antigone. The trait also shows up in humbler circumstances, 
Steiner asserts-"in the spasms of the young when faced with the unctuous 
imperative of the old, in the daily rub of Utopian or anarchic impulse against the 
mildewed surface of 'realism' and expedient routine . . .  " Since the fifth century, 
he says, the West has experienced "decisive moments of its identity and history 
in reference to the Antigone legend and to the life in art and in argument of this 
legend. Overwhelmingly, it has felt women in the face of arbitrary power and of 
death to be, as Romain Rolland called them in his desperate plea for an armistice 
and a burial of the dead during the hecatombs of 1914-18, 'the Antigones of the 
earth. '717 
716. Steiner 1984, 108--09 
717. Steiner 1984, 109 
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What Steiner means by claiming that our realities mime the possibilities 
expressed in classical art is related to what C. S. Lewis argued when he said 
traditional wisdom is passed on in religion and literature by manifesting abiding 
moral truths.718 Lewis, however, asserts that religion and literature are the means 
by which moral insights are transmitted, which goes beyond the mere "miming' 
of truths. In the context, I think this is what Steiner i:neant as well, because he 
argues in very clear terms in this essay and elsewhere that classical literature 
strongly and directly influences our moral, philosophical, and aesthetic 
sensibilities. Greek mythology, for example, is the ""constant centre or pivot of 
reference for all subsequent poetic invention and philosophic allegory."719 He 
says we ""come home" to the stories as ""our psychic roots."720 As an example, he 
recalls a teacher of Green from high school who during the Second World War 
would ""knit Sophocles' text to the news of war and of occupation, of hostages 
and the unburied dead . . .  "721 Similarly, Sidney Callahan asserts that the truths 
found in religion and literature are .,.,foundational moral axioms, which recur and 
persist in human thinking because they correspond to universally objective moral 
reality . . . .  Those societies that stray from the traditional wisdom will pay a heavy 
price." It would seem an act of hubris, she adds, ""not to appreciate the guidance 
and authoritative voice inherent in the common moral traditions of the past."722 
718. Lewis 194 7 /1978, 39--53. 
719. Steiner 1984, 301. 
720. Steiner 1984, 301. 
721. Steiner 1984, 292-93. 
722. Callahan 1991, 6 
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Yet, each new generation unavoidably seeks to both honor the wisdom of 
the past and still find its own way in some of these matters. They strike out in 
what they believe are new directions, claiming new conclusions, reinterpreting 
key points, and often asserting that their findings negate the claims of the 
previous generation. We sometimes seem to find this in Plato. In the Apology, 723 
for example, he has Socrates deny the authority of fate when they argue that the 
gods guarantee that nothing can destroy the happiness of a truly good person. 
Socrates either sets aside previous understandings or seeks to correct errors in 
moral thinking when he asserts that the best course is to "refuse to accept 
Homer's or any other poet's mistake concerning the gods when they err without 
understanding and say that 'two urns stand on Zeus's threshold / filled with 
fates, one with good, the other miserable.'"724 The reference to the mad725 is to the 
claim that mortals who receive allotments from both urns are sometimes happy, 
sometimes not; those who receive solely from the urn of unhappiness live in 
misery. 
For the Socratics, this left too much to chance, too much out of the control 
of the man who properly employed philosophical study. Bernard Williams 
suggests that Plato might have overstated the case in the Apology and that it was 
not so much that he did not see the power of fortune to "wreck what looked like 
the best-shaped life." Rather, he "sought a rational design of life which would 
723. Apology 41 c-d. 
724. Republic II. 
725. filad 24.527-33. 
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reduce the power of fortune and would be to the greatest possible extent luck­
free."12s 
Williams is one of this generation's philosophers who employ ancient 
understandings to guide their own search. While he too finds in the past much to 
set aside about the application of fundamental principles, partly because Mwe 
exist now and not in Socrates' condition, "727 he nevertheless argues that Mlt would 
be silly to forget that many acute and reflective people have already labored at 
formulating and discussing these questions ."728 Williams asserts here not that the 
fundamentals have significantly altered, but that their application to particular 
circumstances may need to be changed, partly because circumstances have 
changed. 
He takes as the starting point, Socrates' question, ""How should one 
live?"729 and employs the ancient dramas, Plato, Aristotle, arid others in looking 
for ways to think about this. He begins by inquiring-following the model of 
Hesiod, Aeschylus, Sophocles, Plato, and the rest-into the nature ofjustice.730 
When Plato considered justice, Williams says, he saw that the common view was 
that it is merely Man instrument for the satisfaction of selfish desires that exist 
naturally,· independent of any ethical outlook." Justice in this sense is something 
one would not want to follow if one did not need to and, for Plato, this was a 
726. Williams 1985, 5. 
727. Williams 1985, 2. 
728. Williams 1985, 2. 
729. Republic 352d. 
730. See especially in relationship to Aristotle's Book 5, Nicomachean Ethics; also in 
Williams 1981, 83-93. 
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basic weakness. 731 He thought an account of the ethical life could combat 
skepticism uonly if it showed that it was rational for people to be just, whoever 
they were and whatever their circumstances. "732 
From this Socratic beginning, Williams' s project encompassed a series of 
studies in which he sought, among other things, places of commonality in human 
experience through time that provide glimpses into the nature of justice and 
moral obligation. 733 He found a tension existing between ancient and modern 
inquiries in how they frame their questions and interests. But in some basic 
respects, he says, uthe philosophical thought of the ancient world was better off, 
and asked more fruitful questions . . .  (because) it was typically less obsessional 
than modern philosophy, less determined to impose rationality through reductive 
theory."734 Still, he admits that the world is irreversibly different, and so rather 
than limit our inquiry to the way interests take shape only in ancient 
philosophers, it is more productive to begin with them, and then employ their 
reflections along with those of medieval, modern, and postmodern thought to 
find places where human experience has commonality-thicknesses of 
experience, as he puts it. 
In assertions similar to Putnam's, Williams says this does not mean that 
moral philosophy need seek Hto join the natural sciences in providing an absolute 
conception of the world, but we need to have some reflective social knowledge, 
731. Williams 1985, 31. 
732. Williams 1985, 31. 
733. In addition to the discussion of this project in Williams 1985, he discusses this in 
Williams 1981, 1993, and 1995. 
734. Williams 1985, 197. 
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including history, that can command unprejudiced assent if the better hopes for 
our self-understanding are to be realized. "735 
The reflective knowledge he desires is not a claim to foundations in 
determinate conceptions of well-being, nor to showing the .... truth" of ethical 
statements. Neither does he reject Isaiah Berlin's insistence that there is a 
plurality of values which can conflict with one another, and which are not 
reducible to one another.736 Rather, he seeks some way to justify a .... disposition to 
accept certain ethical statements"737 and it is in the commonality of experience he 
believes we can find clues to this. In this project, .... It is no paradox," he asserts, 
.... that in these very new circumstances very old philosophies may have more to 
offer than moderately new ones" in efforts to justify, for example, a ...,respect for 
freedom and social justice and a critique of oppressive and deceitful institutions. 
,,73a 
In those efforts, what will make a difference ., ..is the extent to which ethical 
life can still rely on what I have called thick ethical concepts," such as .... treachery 
and promise and brutality and courage, . . . "739 While these are open to .. .,being 
unseated by reflection, . . .  to the extent that they survive it, a practice that uses 
them is more stable in face of the general, structural reflections about the truth of 
ethical judgments than a practice that does not use them." He claims for these 
judgments that when they employ thick ethical concepts they are 
735. Williams 1985, 199. 
736. Williams 1981, 71. 
737. Williams 1985, 199. 
738. Williams 1985, 198. 
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''straightforwardly true" and "for the people who have these concepts, the claim 
involved in assenting to them can correspondingly be honored." 
By "the people who have these concepts," he means those are in the 
Western lineage beginning with the Greeks, finding confluence with the Judaic, 
and ending with us, today. Williams' s substantive or thick ethical concepts, 
which he says include "coward, lie, brutality, gratitude, and so forth," are 
characteristically related to reasons for action. 740 Being action-guiding, the 
concepts are applied in the context of a world and by people who may agree or 
not that it applies to some situation. 
In Shame and Necessity, Williams stresses some "unacknowledged 
similarities" between Greek conceptions and our own,741 especially concepts used 
in interpreting our own and other people's feelings and actions: ideas of 
responsible action, justice, and the motivations that lead people to do things that 
are admired and respected. The problem on Williams's account is that we do not 
understand the parts of our conceptions that originate in the Greek. We have 
some clues about it, but mostly we merely frame them in what he describes as the 
"progressivist" account of moral progress in th� ancient world. 
Without endorsing it, Williams frames the progressivist account in this 
way:742 Greeks had primitive ideas of action, responsibility, ethical motivation, 
and justice, which in the course of history have been replaced by a more complex 
739. Williams 1985, 129. 
740. Williams 1985, 140. 
741. Williams 1993, 2. 
742. Williams 1993, 5. 
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and refined set of conceptions that define a more mature form of ethical 
experience. Further, the world of Homer is thought to have embodied a shame 
culture743 and tliat shame was later replaced, in its crucial ethical role, by guilt. 
Some think that this process had gone a long way by the time of Plato or even the 
tragedians. Others see all Greek culture as governed by notions that are nearer 
to shame than to a full notion of moral guilt, with its implications of freedom and 
autonomy;. they believe that moral guilt was attained only by the modern 
consciousness. Dodds held the former view; the latter is dominant in Adkins.744 
Lloyd-Jones745 warns that little can be educed about any of this. 
Williams argues against all of them that there has not "been as big a shift 
in underlying conceptions as the progressivists suppose. "746 How much of a shift 
there has or has not been is, he admits, an elusive question that cannot be fully 
answered because to do so would be to be able clearly to distinguish between 
what we think and what we merely think that we think. Instead, Williams argues 
that if we can come to understand the ethical concepts of the Greeks, *we shall 
recognise them in ourselves" and that the recognition will occur partly, but not 
entirely, at the level of basic human motives. 
Most importantly, if I understand him, Williams suggests that what we 
might be able to get from understanding the Greeks is a coherent set of opinions 
0 about the ways in which power should be exercised in modern societies, with 
743. See Dodds 1951. 
744. Adkins 1960. 
745. Lloyd-Jones 1971. 
746. Williams 1993, 7. 
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what limitations and to what ends. "747 If this is possible, it would help immensely 
in the project not just of devising a proper civic system, but also in making 
decisions that lead to that kind of system. This would include decisions about 
health care and about the appropriate uses of medical technologies. 
Further, where Williams claims that our ideas of action and responsibility 
and other of our ethical concepts are closer to those of the ancient Greeks than 
we usually suppose, he seems to make much easier my project of arguing that 
Greek epics and tragedies provide the Western paradigm for thinking about 
conduct and obligation. But he also says there are problems, partly in that his 
thesis makes claims that sometimes seem contradictory. For example, he wants 
to say, in addition to the claim that ethical concepts are closer to those of the 
Greeks than we suppose, that (1 ) the significance of those Greek ideas is 
expressed in ancient tragedy and is central to its effect; (2 ) tragedy must be 
understood as a particular historical development, coming about at a particular 
time; (3 ) tragedy tells us something about our ideas of human agency, 
responsibility, regret, and necessity, among others; and (4 ), this historical 
development involved beliefs about the supernatural, the human, and the 
daimonic, which we could not possibly accept, which are no part of our world.748 
NHow can we respond to (the tragedies )," Williams asks, Nif their effect is 
grounded essentially in supernatural conceptions that lie over two thousand 
years behind us?" He answers : 1'he fact that we can honestly and not just as 
tourists respond to the tragedies is almost enough in itself to show that ethically 
747. Williams 1993, 11. 
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we have more in common with the audience of the tragedies than the 
progressivist story allows."749 But Nalmost enough" is not necessarily sufficie·nt, 
and the largest hurdle is that in areas of causation and necessity, the tragedies 
involve supernatural conceptions that are conceptually very far away from 
modern or postmodern understandings. The solution may be in looking for 
analogies in our experience and the way we see the world 
Williams says that his project is in a sense based upon the necessary truth 
of "'the primacy of the individual and of personal dispositions"' but that this 
necessity may end with '' drastic technological changes such as cloning, pooling 
of brainstores, and so on. "750 Despite the difficulties these may bring to our 
common concepts, Williams says he has an optimistic belief in the continuing 
possibility of a Nmeaningful individual life, one that does not reject society, and 
indeed shares its perceptions with other people to a considerable depth, but it is 
enough unlike others, in its opacities and disorder as well as in its reasoned 
intentions, to make it somebody's."751 
Putnam and Williams acknowledge the difficulty of finding understanding, 
but as I suggested earlier, if we look carefully and consider well, we will find in 
the unfolding of the cultural continuum the most elemental of the values we 
cherish. Their persistence is something we ought attend. 
748. Williams 1993, 16-17. 
749. Williams 1993, 18. 
750. Williams 1985, 201. 
751. Williams 1985, 201--02. 
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b. Seeing 
The values that recur in these stories have to do with family, limits of 
human reach, the prohibited realm of divinity, appropriate action, human 
motivation, and divine intention. They make claims about our obligations to the 
dead and to the living, and about the value of each. They warn about honoring 
limitations on knowledge and the hubris of our pursuits. Warnings in the stories 
are paralleled in philosophical and theological understandings. Maimonides and 
Aquinas,752 for example, both warn against the same dangers: the hubris that 
exists in our inquiries and in our dogmas. They say we must understand the 
limits of reason so that we can get knowledge of God's providence. The story of 
Job is cited by both as a study of human freedom as well as the story of a man 
who experiences the failure of natural reason to recognize its limits.753 
Several questions reside in the space between Oppenheimer's seeing the 
potential for disaster in the product of his work and Walter Gilbert's 1986 claim 
that the Human Genome Project754 ''is the grail of human genetics . . .  the ultimate 
answer to the commandment, 'Know thyself.'"755 One of them has to do with 
whether ultimate answers are possible and whether we will ever reach the 
conclusion of Percival in Thomas Malory's Le Morte d'Arthur that the grail will be 
found only with the application of enough humility. 
752. Maimonides 1963, Aquinas 1969. 
753. Dobbs-Weinstein 1995 examines these issues in Maimonides and Aquinas. 
754. Hereafter, HGP. 
755. Walter Gilbert, in a speech delivered in 1986 at a U.S. Department of Energy meeting 
in Santa Fe; N.M., organized to consider whether to extend sequencing to all of our 3 
million base pairs. Cited in Shattuck 1996, 237. 
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Other questions have to do with how we will think about and what we 
will do with the new technologies, abilities, and knowledge coming from the 
genome project and other inquiries. We are not sure yet the extent of their 
possibilities, but the questions are building. We do not know how individuals will 
benefit from promised therapies, including gene replacement. Prenatal and 
carrier testing is raising a variety of ethical and social questions. The implications 
for increased numbers of abortions has raised alarms. Knowledge arising from 
the HGP has the possibility already of being compromised because many of the 
scientists involved are involved in commercial projects to turn their findings into 
cash. A corpus of theoretical law is being developed having to do with the new 
question of wrongful life and birth. Will this mean that prenatal tests that can 
distinguish single-gene inherited and incurable conditions should be used to 
screen the entire population? If so, what will we do with the results? Is there 
reason to be concerned about unpredictable and irreparable damage to the 
evolutionary process? A New York Times editorial twenty years ago, on July 22, 
1982, asked whether we should think about making *perfect humans," and 
recommended that there be no interference with germ-cell alterations, saying 
"There is no discernible line to be drawn between making inheritable repairs and 
improving the species."756 
The concerns are mitigated by the promise of therapies for cruel diseases 
and an unfairly early death. The assumption is that common sense will keep the 
possibilities from leading us in the direction of science fiction horrors, or toward 
the narrator's fear in Dostoyevsky's Notes from Underground about humanity 
756. "Making Perfect Humans," New York Times July 22, 1982. 
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becoming a mechanistic cog in the utopian Crystal Palace of scientific 
determinism. But we are unsure; we fret. If cats and sheep can be cloned, surely 
we will clone human beings, and what will that mean? •What will we do with the 
ability? Is the entire endeavor merely another reaching toward the grail of 
immortality? 
I have claimed that we can find in the stories I have discussed the seeds of 
values we employ in considering issues that arise today. I further claimed that 
where we find a continuity of values, we can profitably use them in discussions of 
issues related to emerging technologies such as cloning and genetic therapies or 
manipulations. 
The values I claim together form some of the elements of Putnam's moral 
image of ourselves, and as such tell us a good bit about what we value in 
ourselves, what we would like to be different, and what we are unsure about. In 
the stories generally is the implicit value that we are a part of a larger whole of 
some constitution-either communally in a civic system or divinely in a perhaps 
providential system, 757 or some variation on these. In this larger whole, we have 
certain obligations of behavior. Many of the following observations fall within 
the provenance of this sense of being a part of something. 
757. The prospect of a benevolent and purposeful ordering not always perceptible to 
humanity recurs in ancient writers beginning with Plato (Timaeus 30b, 44c) and 
Xenophon (Memorabilia 1.4.6, 4.3.6), and then Diogenes Laertius (3.24k) and Plutarch 
(Moralia 425f, 436d). The thesis appears in Genesis when Abraham is told "'I will make a 
great nation of you and will give-you-blessing and will make your name great . . . .  All the 
clans of the soil will find blessing through you!"' (Genesis 12.2-3). It became, of course, a 
foundational concern beginning with first-century writers such as Philo, who wrote in 
Pronoia that a person should be able to ascertain God's plan. Christian writers developed 
a clear articulation of the idea in claims such as that in a speech attributed to Peter, 
asserting that Jesus came "'by the predestined plan and foreknowledge of God"' (Acts 
2.23). All of this may or may not involve fatalism or determinism, depending on the way 
the argument is drawn. 
261 
• Adam and Eve along with Prometheus and related symbols point to a 
nearly unquenchable desire to learn about the universe and whether there are 
external limits to proper inquiry. 
• Two possibilities emerge about limits: that they are self-imposed or that 
they are imposed by some underlying universal force or law, or some 
combination of these. 
• That we value knowledge and experience does not mean we would value 
eternal life. When Odysseus declined Calypso's offer of immortality, he made the 
argument that other qualitative values override the quantitative value of more 
life. 
• The lack of interest in immortality is related to a trepidation at what 
Mary Douglas describes as crossing categories. We are averse to making such 
significant changes in the nature of being human that it would lead us to become 
something else. The experience of procreation, for example, could lead to 
significant changes if the process becomes a manufacturing rather than a 
begetting experience. 
• Similarly, there are limitations to what alterations could be made in the 
structure of the human body before the alterations create a different kind of 
being. Epictetus suggests these limitations in the story of the athlete. The 
Bacchae and the Medea raise questions about human beings taking on bestial 
characteristics and thereby altering their essential humanity. 
• Prometheus, Dionysus, the serpent in Genesis, and other elements 
remind us that there are competing values, including that there are no limits to 
what we are able to do, that human beings have radical freedom in the way they 
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construct themselves and their experience of the world. A tension exists between 
the Promethean and the contrary values that express limits. 
• Despite curiosity, the experiences of Oedipus and others suggest an 
acceptance that whatever values and intentions the gods have, humanity may not 
have access to understanding them. 
• Pity should be shown to those who suffer. Achilleus' s pity for Troy's king 
Priam keeps his anger in check. The Greek choruses say pity should be felt for 
Antigone, Oedipus, and others who suffer, especially if they suffer beyond their 
fair allotment. 
• Friendship, relationship, and communal experience is necessary to 
human well-being. The exiles of Cain and Oedipus were severe punishments 
because they were deprived of human company. Cain had the added misery of 
being apart from God. Betrayal is thus a severe violation of a value because it 
destroys relationship. 
• Social customs should be honored unless the honoring of them violates 
some larger value. When Agamemnon refused Chryses' offer to pay the 
appropriate ransom for his daughter's freedom, the Greek commander behaved 
improperly and endangered the community. 
• Pride is dangerous. Agamemnon's taking Briseis from Achilleus to show 
""how much greater I am than you" was a link in the chain of disaster 
Agamemnon brought on himself. 
• Some things bring both value and disvalue, the proportions depending 
upon seeing limits. In Genesis, the limits were transgressed when new 
technologies were misused in Babylon. 758 
758. Genesis 11: 4-6. 
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• Some inquiries into the workings of the natural world may transgress 
divine providence, threatening to alter God's intention. Milton warned about this. 
Mary Shelley's Frankenstein also warns about overreaching in scientific inquiry. 
• Human beings' lives may be affected by a variety of forces, including 
gods, fate, luck, insanity, and our own actions and intentions. Achilleus in the 
lliad points to these issues. Acting with moderation is the value that can allay 
some of the effects of these forces. 
• We value being well-regarded by others. It appears as a continuing value 
in Homer and every other story. 
• Justice occurs on two levels. Human justice should be fair, and equitably 
distributed. Odysseus's killing his wife's suitors was a necessary part of bringing 
order, or justice. Ultimate justice is often unfathomable. The Oresteia, Hesiod's 
poems, Oedipus, Antigone, and the Homeric epics all speak to this. The tension 
between the two is especially evident in Plato's assertion that the good is 
independent of what humans think, want, or do. In the Phaedo (73-7), Phaedrus 
(249), Republic (7: 514-18), and elsewhere, Plato claims that the Good is what 
human beings seek, but that it eludes our grasp because we see only an imperfect 
conception of the Good that exists in its perfected form only in in the realm of 
Forms. On his account the Good in our experience always imitates and thus falls 
short of the Form of Goodness. Justice may or may not have a moral component, 
such that in Hesiod and Homer there is disagreement about whether dike, 
(roughly, justice) had a moral component, though it certainly did in most of the 
poetry of the fifth century and later .. 
• Citizenship as a value is related to justice, in that it is giving what is 
owed. It is also valued for its role in the well-being of the community. Odysseus 
demonstrates this, as does Hesiod's poems and The Oresteia. 
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• Suffering and disaster often result from overreaching boundaries. Our 
inability to see those boundaries will not necessarily mitigate the suffering, which 
Oedipus learned, as did Creon, and Job. 
• Suffering may or may not be commensurate with the violation. Antigone 
suffered for demanding that Creon honor divine laws. Oedipus merely failed to 
see properly, and suffered enormously. 
• The obligations that accrue from familial connecti<?n generally prevail 
over other obligations. When Agamemnon sacrificed his daughter, he believed it 
was necessary for the good of the city. Aeschylus suggests he did not think 
clearly, then and elsewhere. The Bacch ae depicts family disconnection as parallel 
to a city's disintegration. Odysseus's determination to return to his wife is 
depicted as an admirable characteristic. 
• There are customs and perhaps divine laws that stipulate the proper 
treatment of the dead. In the m ad, A nti go ne, and the Bacch ae, violations of these 
create feelings of repugnance. Violence to corpses is forbidden at all levels, 
human and divine. 
• The experience of Eve's sons, Cain and Abel, suggest that her claiming 
god-like powers of creation began a cautionary tale. The juxtaposition in Genesis 
of being banished for transgressing god's proscription, then claiming god-like 
powers of creation, followed by the fruits of that power being killed and exiled, 
suggests that the tellers of the story were suggesting a connection. Prometheus 
offers a similar lesson in his violation of divine boundaries and his subsequent 
punishment. Both Prometheus and Cain challenge god's dominion-Cain by 
being angry that god favored his brother's sacrifice; Prometheus by arguing that 
Zeus is subject to another, stronger power. 
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• Identity is an inextricable combination of body, mind, custom, 
experience, and a variety of relationships-with family, community, gods, and so 
forth. When the political and economic relationships began altering in Hesiod's 
time, beliefs about value altered. 
• Human beings have intrinsic value. This shows up over and over, 
especially in those places where killing of a human being, intentional or not, 
brings pollution and the expectation of punishment. Oedipus, The Oresteia, and 
Genesis contain examples. 759 
In each of these values is embedded the essential struggle of learning, 
understanding, seeing. Being able to contain the possibilities of imagination and 
desire is spoken of in the stories as having the ability to "see.' In Oedipus, the 
Sophoclean hero seems to be punished at least partly for seeing what is 
forbidden, or perhaps for not seeing what he should have seen. But Oedipus 
could have seen only if his character, his nature, had been different. It is for this 
reason that after the flood, God seems to resign himself to knowing that our 
nature precludes us from honoring some limits. 
Similarly, seeing and imagination are often intertwined in stories about 
limitations and punishment for transgressing limits. When Lot's wife is fleeing 
the destruction of Sodom she is told ""Escape for your life, do not gaze behind 
you, do not stand still anywhere in the plain: to the hill-country escape, lest you 
be swept away!" When she defies the injunction and turns to look, .,., she became a 
759. On this, see especially, Kerrigan 1996, 34ff., where he says that those who died 
violently were thought likely to be a uniquely dangerous class of spirits. Also, in Laws, 
865d--e, Plato says a murdered man "is wroth with his slayer when newly slain, and being 
. . .  disquieted himself . . .  with all his might disquiets his slayer." 
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pillar of salt."760 Similar instructions are ignored when Orpheus leads Eurydice 
out of Hades and he is told not to look to see whether Eurydice is behind him. 
The punishment is that he loses her for good. 761 In another story, when Psyche is 
told not to look into the box containing a token of Proserpina's beauty, she is 
overwhelmed by her curiosity and vanity, looks inside and is cursed with Stygian 
sleep. Cupid rescues her eventually and she is made a goddess, but the point of 
the story was clear. 762 On the other hand, when we do see properly, the result is 
good. When Perseus is told not to look at the Gorgon's head of Medusa, he 
obeys, escaping petrification by looking instead at Medusa's reflection on his 
shield.763 
In Dante's Divine Comedy, the hero, Dante/Pilgrim, survives a long 
odyssey through the landscapes ordinarily forbidden to all mortals. Because he 
'' sees" correctly with the aid of Virgil and Beatrice, because he holds to his faith, 
he survives. But he is also tested, and dramatically informed that while he has 
enjoyed the privileges of his journey, there are limits to what he should know. 
The lesson comes in the Paradiso when Peter Damian descends a golden ladder 
to receive Dante. Instead of being shown what is within his proper limits, Dante 
boldly asks questions about how it came to be that Damian was chosen for his 
task. Dante is allowed to proceed despite the presumptuousness of the question, 
but a message about forbidden knowledge is made clear: 
760. Genesis 19: 17, 19: 26. 
761. Gantz 1993, 722-25. 
762. Gantz 1993, 3-4. Gantz only touches on this story; most of it comes from the second 
century writer Apuleius in his The Golden Ass. 
763. Gantz 1993, 304-07. 
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The truth you seek to fathom lies so deep in the abyss of the eternal law, it 
is cut off from every creature's sight. And tell the mortal world when you 
return what I told you, so that no man presume to try to reach a goal as 
high as this.764 
The rebuke is intended for the presumptuous questions being asked by 
Renaissance thinkers and scientists in their quest for knowledge: humanity might 
properly see what God allows, but beware of exceeding what is beyond 
propriety. The entirety of Dante's one hundred cantos, however, makes clear that 
he is uncertain where this boundary lies. When he encounters Ulysses (Odysseus) 
in the eighth circle of the Inferno, Dante suggests, through Ulysses, that curiosity 
about "'that which lies beyond"765 is natural to humanity, but the result of its 
exploration will be both the gaining of understanding and the punishment that 
follows exceeding limits. 
Unlike Lot's wife, Perseus, Orpheus, and Psyche, we think of Oedipus 
being so bound by the oracles' reports about fate and blood curses that, despite 
the pride for which the chorus condemns him, 766 he may have been unable to do 
otherwise, trapped by his nature. We continue to be uncertain about Oedipus 
and about us: how much of his story, and our, is contingent and how much fated. 
We remain fascinated by the promise of what Prometheus brings and at 
the same time wonder how much of his gift comes hand-in-hand with Pandora 
and her box. In the sixteenth century, Michel de Montaigne warns that 
"'Presumption is our natural and original malady . . . . it is by the vanity of this 
764. Paradiso 21: 94-102. In Musa 1981. 
765. Infemo, 26: 114-17. 
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very imagination that man sets himself up as the equal of God."767 He has a 
similar warning in his Apology when he says ''Christians have a special 
knowledge of the degree to which curiosity is a natural and original evil," which 
is "why ignorance is so strongly recommended to us by our religion as the 
appropriate path to belief and obedience." Still, he says, "A man can be only what 
he is and can imagine only according to his reach. "768 Like trying to step farther 
than the length of our legs, which would be "impossible and monstrous," 
Montaigne warns, "The same goes for man's attempt to rise above himself and 
humanity ."769 
Montaigne, of course, did not accept the restrictions, though he, like 
Pascal, knew there were consequences for transgression. Pascal too 
recommends, "Let us then know our reach. We are something, and not 
everything . . . .  Our intelligence occupies in the order of intelligible things the 
same place as our body in the extent of nature. "770 Montaigne and Pascal wrote 
during a time marked by the beginning of dramatic explorations in science and 
when the culture had begun wondering about its previous suspicions of 
exploring nature. Whereas the search for understanding had been thought to be 
akin to repeating the sin of Adam and Eve-of seeking god-like 
knowledge-some found ways to throw off much of the restriction. Petrarch in 
1336 enjoyed "admiring earthly things." Three hundred years later Galileo threw 
766. OT 963. 
767. Montaigne, Apology for Raymond Sebond, 501. 
768. Montaigne, Apology for Raymond Sebond, 501. 
769. Montaigne, Apology for Raymond Sebond, 588. 
770. Pascal 1965, Pensees, 199. 
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open the door to allow imagination and curiosity space to expand. Francis 
Bacon, with his The Advancement of Learning in the seventeenth century, 
provided the justification: 
God has framed the mind like a glass, capable of the image of the 
universe . . . .  Let no one weakly imagine that man can search too far, or be 
too well studied in the book of God's word, and works, divinity, and 
philosophy.m 
We should limit ourselves, Bacon said, only in that the 11proud" knowledge of 
good and evil seeks to· go places God would rather we didn't. The 11pure" 
knowledge of nature is a justified contemplation of and glorification of God's 
work. 
Bacon answers Augustine's assertion in his Confessions that, of the three 
temptations, desire for knowledge may be the most dangerous: 
There is also present in the soul, by means of these bodily senses, a kind of 
empty longing and curiosity, which aims not at taking pleasure in the flesh 
but at acquiring experience through the flesh, and this empty curiosity is 
·dignified by the names of learning and science. Since this is in the appetite 
for knowing, and since the eyes are the chief of our senses for acmuring 
knowledge, it is called in the divine language the lust of the eyes. 2 
Again here-following Oedipus, Lot's wife, Dante, and others-it is the 
eyes-those instruments of seeing-that represent acquisition of knowledge and 
that bring the danger of transgressing limits, of crossing into territory reserved 
for the divine. 
771. Bacon, The Advancement of Learning, book I. 
772. Confessions X.35. 
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c. Changing medical constructs 
Nicholas Rescher argues that "'some information is simply not safe for us." 
This is not because there is "'something wrong with its possession in the abstract, 
but because it is the sort of thing we humans are not well suited to cope with. "773 
He raises the question: 
Are there also moral limits to the possession of information per se-are there things we ought not to know on moral grounds? . . . .  Here, inappropriateness lies only in the mode of acquisition or in the prospect of misuse. With information, possession in and of itself-independently of the matter of its acquisition and utilization-cannot involve moral impropriety. 774 
Robert Oppenheimer, who had said during the first test of the atomic bomb, 
"'Now I am become death, the destroyer of worlds,"775 warned later in a 1947 
speech at MIT: 
Despite the vision and the far-seeing wisdom of our war-time heads of state, the physicists felt a peculiarly intimate responsibility for suggesting, for supporting, and in the end, in large measure, for achieving the realization of atomic weapons. Nor can we forget that these weapons, as they were in fact used, dramatized so mercilessly the inhumanity and evil of modern war. In some sort of crude sense which no vulgarity, no humor, no overstatement can quite extinguish, the �hysicists have known sin; and this is a knowledge which they cannot lose. 76 
The National Bioethics Advisory Commission 1997 report on cloning speaks to 
the problem Oppenheimer raised when it said humanity has displayed a 
""propensity to use their divinely authorized dominion for unauthorized 
773. Rescher 1984, 9. 
774. Rescher 1984, 9. 
775. Oppenheimer drew the quotation from the Bhagavad-Gita. 
776. Oppenheimer 1947, 193. 
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domination" and a lltendency to transgress limits. "777 The commission implies 
that despite Rescher' s assertion that mere possession of information cannot 
involve moral impropriety, human propensities have shown that once acquired, 
information has a tendency to be used. The issue then becomes the likelihood of 
the prospect for misuse. The difficulties become especially troublesome when we 
seem to move into in-between places-liminal periods of entering territory not 
just unfamiliar, but profoundly different in kind. The in-between stages may last 
for many centuries, but they clearly mark times when we cross thresholds into 
new ways of thought and practice. 
One way to understand the process we are experiencing in deciding how 
to respond to new information about the human genome and related 
technological processes is to see how roughly analogous dilemmas were resolved 
in the past. 
For example, the ancient world experienced similar changes in crossing a 
threshold when it moved from the llmagico-religious" healing of seer-physician­
philosophers such as Empedocles778 in the sixth and fifth centuries to the 
"empirico-rational"779 methods of the Hippocratic physicians. Difficulties arose 
during that period about what to do with the new "scientific" information. How 
did it compare to what had been done in the past? What needs to be set aside 
777. Cloning Human Beings. Report and recommendations of the National Bioethics 
Advisory Commission, 1997, chapter 3, 47. 
778. On Empedocles, see Kirk, Raven, and Schofield 1983, 280-321. Also see Kingsley 
1995. 
779. These categories are used by Sigerist 1951, v.1. The distinction between the 
Hippocratics and other healers is made by Robert Bartz in Kuczewski & Polansky 2000, 
3ff. 
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from past understandings? And how might the past and the present meld into 
something more helpful than dangerous? 
A second threshold was the gradual process of coming to accept the use 
of dissection and autopsy of human bodies, along with the eventual rejection of 
vivisection. When dissection was viewed as crossing a proscribed boundary 
against cutting into body, arguments were employed that sound very similar to 
those surrounding genetic interference today. We hear that unzipping the human 
gene and then altering it to suit our interests is going too far, crossing the line, 
inappropriately doing God's work. Similarly, unzipping the human body for 
autopsies, dissections, and vivisections caused expressions of moral repugnance 
that claimed the same violations. 
If we could chart the way it became permissible to penetrate the skin to 
understand and manipulate the interior of the body, we might have a view of 
how in the future it will become permissible to penetrate and alter the interior of 
genes. Similarly, a description of the shift from "magico-religious" to ''empirico­
rational" healing may tell us something about the way we incorporate new 
information into our cultural moral image. These, together with the enduring 
values I suggested earlier in reference to their appearance in ancient stories, may 
provide some of the background understanding to help us in how we proceed 
along the threshhold of the developing genetic age. 
1. Empirico-rational healing 
The presocratic sixth century Ionian nature philosophers began the 
transformation toward empirico-rational healing by providing, however 
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speculatively, the theoretical underpinning for "scientific" medicine. Most of 
these early thinkers had little direct influence on theories of disease because their 
interest was primarily the working of the universe, not specifically the physiology 
of man. But the methods they developed would be used in the fifth and later 
centuries to formulate medical theories. They began with the assumption that 
everything has a cause and so the world must have a cause too, one that does not 
necessarily require a supernatural or transcendental source. 
It is tempting to think that magic and mysticism, as irrational elements of 
religion and medicine, were displaced by rationalism and scientific notions. But 
for the Greeks as well as others, the natural and supernatural serve different 
purposes. Magical beliefs and practices of a wide variety of kinds can be 
documented from Homer to the end of antiquity and onward. 780 The prevalence 
of Asclepian temple medicine, for example, continued well into the Christian 
era. 781 Relying on incubation-divinely inspired dream therapy-and dietetics, it 
existed side-by-side with rational medicine, sometimes as an alternative, 
sometimes as an additional source of healing, and perhaps  incorporating the 
developing scientific method into its regimen. Lloyd says people resisted the 
takeover of scientific thought: 
It was mainly through myth, in belief, and through ritual, in practice, that 
the Greeks, like others, responded to the facts of death and disease, for 
example - and it remained so, even after the inquiry concerning nature 
was some kind of going concern. Yet to say the Greeks "responded to" 
natural facts through myth is not quite accurate. For myth is not, and does 
not aim to be, explicitly systematic and coherent. 782 
780. Bartz 2000, 4-5. Also see Dodds 1951, ch. 6. 
781. Edelstein 1945, 1:179ff.; 2:139ff.; Walton 1894, 36ff. 
782. Lloyd 1985, 4-5. 
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When the Hippocratics began writing during the late fifth, through the 
fourth, and perhaps into the third centuries, their efforts marked one of the 
phases in our communal effort to determine whether there is a realm for the 
divine and a realm for humanity, and whether the veil between the two acts as a 
shield behind which is an inviolable realm. For the Hippocratics, if there was a 
veil, it mostly had to do with things other than their practice of healing. For 
them, the body was to be adjusted rather than the heavens consulted. 
As Lloyd asserts, this was not the case for everyone, and it was only partly 
true for the Hippocratics and other healers who came after them. While the 
movement during the fifth century and later was toward a more rational 
medicine, throughout antiquity in every part of the ancient world the prevalent 
mode of healing was based upon magic, folk beliefs, and the powers of chthonic 
and Olympian deities. 783 Rational medicine that excluded divine caprice was the 
exception. Home remedies ranging from eggs to sheep dung and snakes' heads, 
amulets and incantations, and various herbal remedies from saffron to poppy­
tears were all available and widely used without relying on professional 
doctors. 784 
A combination of explanations for ailments can be seen in the Homeric 
poems, long before Hippocratic medicine began developing-which suggests 
that ""rational" medicine did not spring from nothing, but rather, from common 
783. Lloyd 1987, chapter one. Also see Lloyd 1979, 29ff. and note 98, which includes 
additional references for this subject. 
784. Celsus lists many of the drugs and herbal remedies along with descriptions of their 
uses and descriptions of surgical tools, in De Medicina 2.xv-lxiii, and in more detail in De 
Medicina 5. 
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sense ideas that when you stub a toe on a rock, the broken bone could have 
been caused by divine action, but also by inattention. An implication of this is 
that when we see in stories differing attributions of causation, it suggests that 
people were involved in a process of sorting out what to do with their beliefs and 
knowledge. They sought by various means to learn when to apply this or that 
response to an ailment or wound. It was thought, for example, that evil, semi­
divine creatures wandered the earth causing disease. 785 Decisions about how to 
respond to their actions probably involved amulets, magic, mysterious herbal 
remedies, and a variety of other treatments. But not all ill health resulted from 
divinity. In the Iliad, ailments result from a combination of causes. Some wounds 
arise in battle; others from the darts of Apollo or Artemis. A plague of disease 
was sent by Apollo to punish Agamemnon's forces, 786 arriving in a "'burning 
wind" of "'pain and sorrow," first killing mules and dogs, then soldiers: 
. . . . . the bundled arrows 
clanged on the sky behind as he rocked in his anger, 
descending like night itself. Apart from the ships 
he halted and let fly, and the bowstring slammed 
as the silver bow sprang, rolling in thunder away. 
Pack animals were his target first, and dogs, 
but soldiers, too, soon felt transfixing pain 
from his hard shots, and pyres burned night and day. 
Nine days the arrows of the god came down 
broadside upon the army.787 
785. See the citations in the previous note, as well as Hesiod's WD 102ff. 
786. mad 1.43ff. Also see mad 6.428, 19.59, 24. 758f., Odyssey 3.279f., 5 .123f., 11.324, 
15.478f., 18.202ff., 20.61ff. 
787. mad 1.53-62. 
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When sacrifices and the return of Chryses' daughter appease Apollo, 788 the 
Greeks purify themselves, then cleanse their camp by throwing "defilements" 
into the sea. This was clearly the result of divine displeasure. Other ills result 
from causes closer at hand, and some from a combination of both. Cures, then, 
often had to comprise both categories. For example, when Odysseus was 
wounded on a hunting trip by a boar goring him in the leg, he was bandaged by 
the sons of his maternal grandfather, Autolycus, and then they stopped his 
bleeding by singing incantations over the wound. 789 In other cases, causation and 
cure was univocal. The Odyssey, for example, refers to a man who became sick 
with great pains after being attacked by a terrible demon. He was healed by the 
gods.790 In other instances, the cause was mundane and the cure divine: 
Diomedes, wounded by an arrow, prayed to Athene for help and she restored 
him to health so that he could return to the battle.791 Similarly, when Aeneas's hip 
was crushed by a stone thrown by Diomedes, he was rescued by Apollo, and 
cured by Artemis and Leto.792 
So physicians were needed partly to bandage wounds and apply poultices, 
but also to beseech and appease gods or drive out demons with prayers, 
supplications, sacrifices, spells, and incantations.793 The common thread is that 
cures were sought by what was thought to be the appropriate means, relying 
788. See above, section m.b. 
789. Odyssey 19.455-458. 
790. Odyssey 5.394. 
791. mad 5.99ft'. 
792. mad 305ff, 44 7f. 
793. Longrigg 1963, 147-175. 
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upon seen and unseen forces. The sorting out of what was and was not 
appropriate was done in a way not entirely unlike our trying to decide what 
information to use in which situations. 
The process became significantly more like the sorting out we do when 
the practice and understanding of medicine shifted in such a way that over time 
the craft became more of a science. This change generated a complex set of 
questions about how medicine should be done, who should do it, and who would 
use it. But it occurred in the context of a range of practices from which to choose, 
and many healers employed the entirety of possibilities. 
Temple medicine was one layer of healing available in antiquity, 
sometimes as the primary source but also as an alternative to pursue when 
surgery, diet, and drugs failed-or when patients could not afford to see a 
physician.794 Even as late as the first century, Diodorus Siculus asserts that "when 
the art of the physician fails, everybody resorts to incantations and prayers."795 
And at least a century later, by the end of the first century C.E., Plutarch reports 
that, "Those who are ill with chronic diseases and do not succeed by the usual 
remedies and the customary diet turn to purifications and amuiets and 
dreams."796 When the human physician could not do anything, it was expected 
that the patient would go to the temples of Asclepius for "incubation" treatment 
by the priests acting on behalf of the gods. 
794. See Cohn-Haft 1956; also Pellegrino 1979; and Temkin 1949. 
795. Diodorus, Frag. 30.43, Diels. 
796. Plutarch, Pericles, ch. 38, in Stadter 1989, 301.  
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Incubation worked in the following way: After purification rites directed 
by priests, patients slept in the abaton, the holiest part of the temple. During 
sleep, the patient was said to receive a dream in which Asclepius would appear 
to heal or advise about treatments. When the patient awoke, priests interpreted 
the dreams and prescribed treatments, which usually involved diet, exercise, and 
occasional herbal remedies including salves and drugs. One inscription mentions 
the god ordering a patient to eat partridge with frankincense. Another is told to 
swim in rivers; others are sent to compose odes. Sometimes the god is reported 
to cut the body open during a patient's dream, repair the ailment, and leave the 
skin unscarred on awakening. In some dreams sacred dogs or serpents cured the 
patients by licking them. Sometimes the god cured by touching his hand to the 
spot of the illness, or by �ssing. Those who were healed left votive offerings, 
such as terra cotta models of eyes, ears, limbs, and other organs that were 
healed, which have been found in considerable numbers at the sanctuaries. 
Several cases recorded on marble tablets in the temples are clearly fictional: a 
woman gave birth to a child she had carried for five years; another woman 
awoke with a new eye in her vacant eye-socket. 797 
Edelstein says the temples were especially important to the poor because 
the priests were happy with small offerings whereas professional medical care 
was expensive: 
Philanthropy was the ideal set before the physician. Yet, with the 
necessary allowance for individual kindness and willingness to help even 
without adequate renumeration physicians on the whole were 
businessmen, and no moral or professional code . . .  obliged them to give 
their service to the needy. 798 
797. Walton 1894, 57ff; Edelstein 1967, 150ff. 
798. Edelstein 1967, 175. 
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Walton says that no well-known citizens are found on lists of suppliants at the 
temples, suggesting that it was not the wealthy, ruling class that frequented 
them.799 
RationaVHippocratic medicine was once thought to have originated in 
these temples because a temple of Asclepius was found on Cos, the island on 
which Hippocrates was born and where there was a large medical school. But 
archaeological evidence showed that the temple was built long after the medical 
school and scholars have since come to believe that temple medicine existed 
alongside rational medicine rather than one growing out of the other.800 
Thus, while a series of natural rather than divine explanations was being 
developed for disease and other phenomena, the day-to-day life of antiquity 
retained strong beliefs in the supernatural, and this would continue to be a 
strong element of healing for many, many more centuries. One reason for this is 
that not only did temple medicine exist alongside rational practice, each seemed 
to draw from the other. Dream heatings, for example, were the province of 
temple priests who combined them with ritualistic singing and amulets. But 
medical writers in the Hippocratic and other collections also devised elaborate 
theories about dreams and their role in diagnosis. Among the earliest 
speculations is Empedocles' assertion in the mid-fifth century that thoughts and 
dreams vary with changes in the body. Later in the century, the Hippocratic text 
Epidemics states that "dreams, their nature and their time" are among the items 
799. Walton 1894, 58. 
800. Walton 1894, 59. 
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in the general list of factors to be considered in diagnosis. 801 The Hippocratic On 
Diet is a treatise about dreams and their interpretation, distinguishing two kinds 
of dreams. One is sent by gods presaging good or bad luck and is the business of 
diviners. The other is of physical origin and describes ailments.802 
Even later medical authorities such as Herophilus in the third century and 
Galen in the second century CE took dreams seriously. Epicurus and 
Xenophanes alone among ancient Greek philosophers left writings in which they 
reject divine dreams.803 Galen, in a second century commentary on book I of 
Epidemics, 804 states that therapies for arteriotomy and various diagnoses were 
suggested to him by dreams. Herophilus in the third century distinguishes 
dreams sent by God from those which are natural.805 Aristotle concludes that 
''dreams are not sent by God," but suggests that careful attention should be paid 
to them since they can provide information about changes occurring in the body. 
He says dreams correspond to movements in the body, notably in the sense 
organs, and these movements are transmitted to the soul. During the day these 
movements are not noticed since so many impressions are received by the soul. 
But at night, traces of the daytime impressions are registered in the soul if the 
soul is in a stable condition. 806 Something similar to Aristotle's fourth century 
description is evident in the late fifth-century Hippocratic text On Regimen, 
801. Epidemics 1.10; 2.670.8. 
802. Edelstein 1967, 6.642. 
803. Dodds 1951, 119. 
804. Temkin 1973. 
805. Von Staden 1989, 306-10, 386-87, 449. 
806. On Divination in Sleep 463.b.12ff.; 464.a.1ff. 
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which states that the soul is distracted by the various impressions while awake 
but at night, while asleep, "it becomes master in its own house." Then he explains 
his position in contrast to others': 
As for the god-given dreams which give to cities and to individuals 
foreknowledge of bad things and of good, there are interpreters with their 
own art in these matters. Such people also interpret the signs derived 
from the soul which indicate bodily affections in advance: excess, whether 
of repletion or depletion, of what is natural, or some unusual change. In 
such matters they are sometimes right and sometimes wrong, but in 
neither case do they know why it happens, neither when they are right 
nor when they are wrong. But they give advice to beware of taking harm: 
and yet they do not teach you how you ought to beware, but merely 
instruct you to pray to the gods. Prayer is a good thing, but one should 
take on part of the burden oneself and call on the gods only to help.807 
Although some physicians believed that dreams caused by physical factors 
were intelligible to them, doctors generally were not considered able to interpret 
divine dreams; that was left to priests. Edelstein argues that because most 
doctors seem to have accepted the divine origin of dreams, they probably did not 
object to temple healing as either an alternative or an adjunct to scientific 
treatment. If dreams come from gods, there would be no reason to object to 
healing by priests according to divine advice, which usually was in the form of 
diet, rest, exercise, and prayer.808 Neither the primary nor the secondary sources 
make clear whether dreams were widely used for prognosis, but several scholars 
imply that since physicians' reputations in the fifth century depended at least 
partly on their ability to both diagnose and prognose, many practitioners used 
dreams as well as other tools to deduce the outcome of disease.809 
807. On 'Regimen 4.87. 
808. Edelstein 1967, 241-243 
809. See especially Lloyd 1987, 34-41; and Edelstein 1967, 243. 
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Some Hippocratic treatises recommend prognosis in terms that are little if 
at all different from prophecy or divination. In Epidemics physicians are urged to 
"declare the past, determine the present, foretell the future."810 This parallels 
Hesiod's Theogony, which says the muses "Tell of what is, and what is to be, and 
what was before now."811 Some of the purpose to foretelling is to advance the 
doctor's reputation; patients will more readily entrust themselves to his care if he 
can tell them not just the outcome of the disease, but its past course and present 
condition. For this the doctor will 'justly be an object of wonder."812 Other 
Hippocratics, however, see the danger of medicine being confused with 
divination. The Prorrhetic warns that it is not possible to make "marvelous" and 
exact predictions in medicine. 813 
Knowing whether disease is divine was important in antiquity because, if 
divine, what was the physician's role? If everything was divinely necessary then 
there might have been reason to avoid physicians and let gods manage the 
illness, or seek the intercession of priests and magicians. Most philosophers and 
physicians would have responded as Herophilus did, saying that if disease is 
divine, nature is divine, thus plants are divine, hence plants as healing agents are 
"the hands of the gods" and the physician as pharmacologist is merely aiding the 
hands of gods.814 
810. Epidemics 1.5. 
811. Theogony 41-42. 
812. Prognosis I, 2.110.2ff. 
813. Prorrhetic 2.19, 4.474.12f. 
814. Von Staden 1989, 143ff. 
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In this sense, magic, music, and other tools were often rejected as 
irrational. Referring to users of incantations, the Hippocratic book O n  the Sacred 
Disease states, "What they profess is not true, the fact being that men, in need of 
a livelihood, contrive and devise many fictions of all sorts. "815 Sophocles similarly 
suggests rejecting incantation when, in Ajax, Ajax says, .uNo good physician 
. quavers incantations when the malady he's treating needs the knife."816 In later 
antiquity, the prohibition becomes more direct: Soranus argues that it would be 
stupid to believe illness can be expelled by songs and Galen notes that 
incantations and songs should be rejected.817 
Dodds asserts that while some of the more educated Greeks rejected 
incantations and such, magic became even more popular for everyone else. He 
attributes this to the generalized instability in Greece during the late fifth 
century. Belief in traditional religion was tottering and faith in civic institutions 
was in decline. But old ways still held sway.818 Thus, while many Greek physicians 
or philosophical schools denied that demons caused disease, the continuing 
belief that malicious beings and magical powers affect disease is attested to by 
the Neo-Platonist Plotinus, who, referring to magicians in late antiquity, says: 
They tell us they can free themselves of diseases . . .  they assert diseases to 
be Spirit-Beings and boast of being able to expel them by formulae: this 
pretension may enhance their importance with the crowd, gaping upon 
the powers of magicians; but they can never persuade the intelligent that 
disease arises otherwise than from such causes as overstrain, excess, 
deficiency, putrid decay . . .  The nature of illness is indicated by its very 
815. On the Sacred Disease 1.c,147. 
816. Ajax 582-583. 
817. Edelstein 1967, 238. 
818. Dodds 1951, ch. 6. 
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I cure. A motion, a medicine, the letting of blood, and the disease shifts down and away. 819 
This suggests that_ while many Greeks began accepting at least some of the new 
ideas about illness being caused by out-of-balance humors, climate, air, winds, 
and so forth, they also likely viewed these causes as the expression-actively or 
passively-of divine agencies. The entirely natural explanation of disease was 
probably more unusual than the superstitious belief in demons. Philosophers and 
physicians may have tended toward an understanding of nature without overt 
reference to divine power, but they were not much more immune to supernatural 
tendencies than anyone else. Gods and science could coexist, one not 
necessitating the abnegation of the other. The Hippocratic Airs, Waters, Places, 
for example, holds that while disease has natural cause, it is simultaneously 
divine in origin: 
these diseases are divine, and so are all others, no one being more divine 
or more human than any other; all are alike, and all divine. Each of them 
has a nature of its own, and none arises without its natural cause.820 
Similar beliefs continued through antiquity. Several centuries after the 
Hippocratics, the physician Galen describes his treatise On the Use of the Parts as 
a 11sacred" book composed as a hymn to the world-soul, or creator (demiurge), so 
that he can 11show to others how wise he is, how powerful, and how good."821 For 
Galen, if god did not exist, the world would be governed by chance, not by 
intelligible laws or causation. Thus, 11his wish to bring the whole cosmos into 
819. MacKenna 1921-1930, 235. 
820. Airs, Waters, Places 22.1.c, 127. 
821. On the Use of Parts 3.10.1:ff. 
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order . . .  and that he should have found out how best to order everything . . .  is 
a proof of his perfect wisdom . . .  and absolute goodness."822 
As theological understandings evolved during this period, so did medical 
practice and belief. A thread beginning with the fifth century developed a theory 
of prognostics and clear steps of treatment based on the study of the progress 
and causes of disease. Toward the end of the century, Leucippus, the originator 
of atomic theory, declared that "Nothing comes to be at random, but everything 
for a reason and by necessity."823 Similar beliefs reinforcing the shift were 
expressed later by the Hippocratic On the Sacred Disease, whose author vows to 
expose as frauds those who claimed to be able to cure the disease by 
purifications, incantations and other ritual means . . .  My own view is that 
those who first attributed a sacred character to this malady were like the 
magicians, purifiers, charlatans and quacks of our own day, men who 
claim great piety and superior knowledge. Being at a loss, and having no 
treatment which would help, they concealed and sheltered themselves 
behind superstition, and called this illness sacred, in order that their utter 
ignorance might not be manifest. 824 
What is important about this and other attacks in the treatise is that it is against 
all purifiers and against any idea that any disease is the result of divine 
intervention. The author concedes divinity only in that the whole of nature is 
divine. Lloyd finds in this many of the features of a paradigm shift in that the 
writer seems to be rejecting ""the notion of supernatural intervention in natural 
phenomena as a whole."825 The shift is clear in Lucretius: ""All nature, as it is in 
822. On the Use of Parts 3.10.16ff. 
823. Furley 1967, 6. 
824. On the Sacred Disease 1.41. 
825. Lloyd 1979, 26. 
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itself, consists of two things: there are bodies and there is void in which the 
bodies are and through which they move. "826 With Promethean fierceness, 
Lucretius goes on to describe the courage of his mentor Epicurus's battle against 
the 11foul" crush of superstitution: 
When human life lay foul for all to see 
Upon the earth, crushed by the burden of religion, 
Religion which from heaven's firmament 
Displayed its face, its ghastly countenance, 
Lowering above mankind, the first who dared 
Raise mortal eyes against it, first to take 
His stand against it, was a man of Greece. 
He was not cowed by fables of the gods 
Or thunderbolts or heaven's threatening roar, 
But they the more spurred on his ardent soul 
Yearning to be the first to break apart 
The bolts of nature's gates and throw them open. 827 
It was not that Lucretius did not believe divinity existed in some form; instead, he 
declared that gods do not proscribe humanity from exploring and understanding 
nature. The foolish superstititions created by people establish most boundaries. 
The gods had nothing to do with that. They merely allow nature to be laid open 
��in every part displayed," while they live in II quiet abodes which no winds every 
shake . . .  {and) nothing comes to vex the tranquil tenor of their minds."828 
Nothing comes to vex their minds, including the efforts of humanity. W. R. 
Johnson says that what Lucretius found maddening was not claims about gods' 
existence, but the accounts that anthropomorphized them in ways suggesting 
they were concerned about the small flailings of humanity's endeavors.829 
826. Lucretius 1 .60. 
827. Lucretius 1.62-79. 
828. Lucretius 3.28-24, Latham, tr. 
829. Johnson 2000, 12. 
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Lucretius says that as human beings shook off superstitions and applied 
their analytical talent to understanding the universe, they gradually learned more 
and more in a process demonstrating the triumph of reason: 
As step by step they made their forward way. So each thing in its turn by slow degrees Time doth bring forward to the lives of men, And reason lifts it to the light of day. For as one concept followed on another Men saw it form and brighten in their minds Till by their arts they scaled the highest peak. 830 
Ronald Melville says Lucretius's poem ""constantly recalls us from the mists and 
darkness of false belief to the plain light of scientific reasoning."831 What attracts 
us to this, Melville asserts, is the same quality that attracted us to the 
Enlightenment project of freeing humanity from delusion. It is the ""images of 
Nature unchained, of the hero Epicurus challenging heaven and bringing back 
victory over it. "832 
Lucretius offers a view of the universe as it would be after Prometheus's 
predictions have come true. Prometheus, by way of Epicurus and Lucretius, has 
unthroned Zeus. In the passage of a few centuries, humanity's exploration of 
nature proceeded from Hesiod's semi-divinities creeping around the planet 
spewing disease, to the scientist applying reason to see into places once 
forbidden. The study of nature continued to be circumscribed in various ways, 
but the acceptability of seeking natural understanding was established. For 
Lucretius and centuries later the scientists of the Enlightenment, this was not just 
830. Lucretius 5.1453-57. 
831. Melville 1997, xxviii. 
832. Melville 1997, xxviii. 
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accepting the search for natural understanding, it was a rebellious proclamation 
of defiance, toppling not just Zeus but all of the unseen and mysterious universe: 
If anyone decides to call the sea Neptune, And corn Ceres, and misuse the name of Bacchus Rather than give grape juice its proper title, Let us agree that he can call the earth Mother of the Gods, on this condition-that he refuses to pollute his mind With the foul poison of religion. 833 
Lucretius argued for a way of seeing and examining the universe that by 
the early twenty first century looks like a precursor to reductionistic views. It is a 
radical and defiant position reacting to a legacy that painted the universe in the 
metaphors of mythology-the view Hesiod described when he spoke about evil, 
marginally divine beings creeping unseen upon the earth spewing disease and 
misery. Lucretius represents the end point of the paradigm shift Lloyd speaks 
about. 
2. Dissection and autopsy 
Just as the ancient world underwent a transformative process in the shift 
from magical and mythological explanations toward scientific and rational 
explanations, the Hellenic and Medieval worlds experienced a transformation in 
coming to accept dissection of human bodies. 
During the transformation of medicine that occurred in the fifth, fourth 
and into the early third century, the emphasis was on prognosis and therapy, not 
on anatomical investigation. The unexplored inside of the body was thought to 
833. Lucretius 2.652-60. 
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operate on the basis of humoral physiopathology based on knowledge of what 
was breathed, eaten, and expelled. 834 Vegetti asserts that the essential alteration 
in medical thinking after that period was the shift during the Hellenistic period 
from a focus on disease to a focus on understanding the natural, normal state of 
human bodies, and hence, health. 835 Herophilus in the first half of the third 
century was instrumental in this when he distinguished among three kinds of 
medical knowledge: health, disease, and surgicaVpharmacological.836 He 
abandoned, mostly, the description of the body as a contained of fluids, which 
was the Hippocratic humoral physiology, and replaced it with descriptions of the 
body as an assembly of solid parts.8�7 Erasistratus, too, a contemporary of 
Herophilus, distinguished between anatomophysiology and therapy. 838 His 
anatomical studies demonstrated a distinction between sensory and motor 
nerves obtained by post-mortem dissections and possibly vivisections.839 
Some have suggested that dissections were performed by the Homeric 
physicians on grounds that their knowledge of the body could be possible only if 
they had experience with dissection. The assertions are inconclusive, mostly 
because they require much imaginative extrapolation. Edelstein argues that what 
anatomy was known was probably obtained by battlefield observation or by 
inspecting the corpses of sacrificed human beings. 
834. On the epistemology of Hippocratic medicine, see Vegetti 1998. 
835. Vegetti 1998, 73. 
836. Von Staden 1989, fragment 42. 
837. Vegetti 1998, 85. 
838. Vegetti 1998, 74. 
839. Vegetti 1998, 83. 
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If dissections were employed by the Hippocratic physicians, Edelstein 
argues, they they were not done systematically and garnered little information. 840 
But if he is correct and they were not generally used, why not? It would seem 
that the Hippocratics as well as others during this period were enormously 
curious. A dead body must have evinced more than small temptation in healers 
who speculated about humours and the various effects of heat and cold on 
internal workings. 
Edelstein asserts that dissection was generally unlikely because of 
"religious and magical concepts, veneration of the dead, and dread of the corpse 
. . .  " Thus, accounts of dissection and vivisection were declared to be "wicked 
inventions by which one school sought to discredit the other."841 As a result, 
Edelstein says physicians knew little detail about anatomy. What is known may 
be the result, like that of the Homeric physicians, of battlefield observation, 
accidental wounds, dissection of animals, and perhaps an occasional human 
dissection done despite the prohibition. The treatise On the Heart is regarded as 
the most accurate of the Hippocratic anatomic observations and apparently is the 
result of careful dissection of animal, not human, hearts. 
Only infrequently before the third century do any writers mention the use 
of dissection to gain information about anatomy and physiology.842 Von Staden is 
inconclusive about when it became a common method of inquiry. On Ancient 
Medicine notes the difficulty of getting information about the internal body, but 
840. Edelstein 1967, 248. 
841. Edelstein 1967, 249. 
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rather than discuss dissection, the author suggests studying objects on the 
outside of the body. 843 In neither of the two treatises that give good accounts of 
blood vessels and sense organs, On the Places in Man and On Fleshes, 844 does the 
author indicate he learned about these from dissection. 
Were dissections not done or just not reported because of the likely 
religious objection? Aristotle dissected animals, but said in reference to human 
cadavers that, "no one can look at the elements of the human frame-blood, 
flesh, bones, vessels, and the like-without much repugnance."845 Additionally, he 
explains that it is 11the total form" which one should study, just as the 
true object of architecture is not bricks, mortar, or timber, but the house; and so the principal object of natural philosophy is not the material elements, but their composition, and the totality of the substance, independently of which they have no existence.846 
Aristotle also says the inner parts of human beings are unknown, and may be 
better left that way: 
The inner parts of man are to a very great extent unknown, and the consequence is that we must have recourse to an examination of the inner parts of other animals whose nature in any resembles that of man.847 
One reason dissections may seldom have been performed is the difficulties faced 
by early researchers. Lloyd points to this when he says that: 
I For a dissection to be carried out successfully requires not only patience, attention to detail and practical skill, but also and more importantly a clear 
842. Lloyd 1979, 157. 
843. On Ancient Medicine 16. 
844. On the Places in Man 30ff; On Fleshes 88ff; also see Lloyd 1979, 158f. 
845. Parts of Animals 645a28-30. 
846. Parts of Animals 645a33ff. 
84 7. History of Animals 494b22ff. 
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conception of what to look for . . . after dissections had begun to be made 
on the heart, it was some time before the valves, for instance, came to be 
recognized as such. 848 
Herophilus and Erasistratus in the first half of the third century were the first 
physicians, about whom we have evidence, who regularly conducted dissections 
of human bodies. They also are said to have done vivisections on animals and on 
humans, especially criminals, the chief evidence for which is Celsus' s first 
century C.E. De Medicina: 
Herophilus and Erasistratus proceeded in by far the best way: they cut 
open living men, criminals they obtained out of prison from the kings, and 
they observed, while their subjects still breathed, parts that nature had 
previously hidden, their position, colour, shape, size, arrangement, 
hardness, softness, smoothness, points of contact, and finally the 
processes and recesses of each and whether any �art is inserted into 
another or receives the part of another into itself. 9 
The veracity of this report has been questioned, but without adequate reason to 
reject it.850 Von Staden says that live prisoners were made available to Herophilus 
and possibly to Erasistratus for vivisection but that if so, this was "in 
contravention of a pristine taboo" against opening the human body.851 But von 
Staden neither explains nor cites a source for the taboo. True or not, the report 
does show that the issue was debated. Most people, Celsus says, considered it a 
cruel practice, but he says others defended it by arguing that "They laid open 
men whilst alive . . . and whilst these were still breathing, observed parts which 
beforeheand nature had concealed, their position, colour, shape, size . . .  Nor is it, 
848. Lloyd 1979, 161. 
849. De Medicina I, Preface 23f. 
850. For the debate on this, see Edelstein 1967, 249f. 
851. Von Staden 1989, 26, 29. 
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as most people say, cruel that in the execution of criminals, and but a few of 
them, we should seek remedies for innocent people of all future ages." 852 
While Herophilus cited the necessity of dissection to learn how the body 
works, 853 other physicians rejected both dissection and vivisection as irrelevant 
and superfluous, since on death the body is changed. Celsus says these other 
physicians argued that: 
the inquiry about obscure causes and natural actions is superfluous 
because nature cannot be comprehended. Rejecting the use of reasoning 
partly on the grounds that in theorising it is always possible to argue 
either side of a question, they held that practical experience of treatments 
is the sole source of medical knowledge. There is no need to inquire how 
we breathe, but only what relieves laboured breathing, no need to find out 
what moves the blood-vessels, only what the various types of movement 
signify. Dissection is superfluous, and vivisection should be rejected on the 
further grounds that it is cruel.854 
The philosophical justification for Herophilus's position here is found in Plato's 
Phaedo and Laws, which taught that the soul is an independent and immortal 
entity that carries its physical body only as an envelope or instrument to be 
discarded at death. Aristotle said the soul, although not separable and immortal, 
was the purpose of the organism. The body is merely that which encases the 
soul. 855 From these claims, it would not be much of a jump to allowing dead 
bodies to be used for anatomical study, the important part-the soul-having 
already departed. 
852. De Medicina I, Preface, 23-26. 
853. Von Staden 1989, 139-154. 
854. De Medicina I, Preface, 26, 1 .21.29-32. 
855. On the Parts of Animals I, 641a17ff. 
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Herophilus' s role was also important in establishing in contemporary 
thinking that there was a distinction between philosophy and medicine. Among 
other things the distinction allowed medical researchers to argue that concerns 
about the soul, or about philosophical proscriptions on entering the body did not 
have to apply to scientific inquiry. Vegetti asserts that what Herophilus 
''fundamentally rejected was the necessity of incorporating into medicine, at its 
very foundation, the philosophical theory of elements or qualities over which 
medicine could not possibly exert any control. "856 Herophilus said medicine 
should be concerned with the phenomena learned about through dissection,857 
thereby following the Aristotelian division between natural philosophy and 
scientific medicine.858 In this way he seemed to establish an independent place for 
medicine and ensuring it did not have to become involved in the debate among 
various philosophical schools. 
It seems from the various evidence then that dissections and vivisections 
may have been occasionally performed during the sixth through early fourth 
centuries. Beginning later in the fourth century they probably became more 
common and by the first half of the third century, with Erasistratus and 
Herophilus, dissection of human bodies became a routine source of information. 
By the early first century C.E.,  Celsus demands that dissections be done, but 
clearly opposes vivisection. 859 
856. Vegetti 1998, 85. 
857. Von Staden 1989, 232. 
858. Sense and Sensibilia 436a.18-20. 
859. Edelstein 1967, 250. 
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Vegetti argues that this transformation accompanied a tension in the 
medical community between the theoreticians, concentrated at Alexandria 
especially in the work of Herophilus, and those who focused on dietetics, 
surgery, and pharmacology. There was crossover between the two, such that 
each side employed techniques of the other. But during the third and second 
centuries the practice of dissection eventually supplanted the Hippocratic 
physiology of humoral fluids in favor of anatomically based explanations.860 
This change does not suggest a diminished role of the medical institutions 
of Alexandria. Von Staden describes its place in Hellenistic medicine as 
""scientific and literary frontiersmanship."861 And Vegetti outlines the process by 
which Alexandria quickly adopted anatomical studies to incorporate into their 
theoretical understandings. This was enhanced by state support from the new 
dynasty of the Ptolemies. Thus, 
The new climate allowed physicians to venture to shatter an age-old 
taboo, tacit but daunting: anatomical intrusion into human cadavers. This 
step was necessary if they were to overcome the limits of observation 
inherent in the dissections of animals practiced by Aristotle . . . .  And state 
support had an even more sensational effect: according to the 
unquestionable assertion of Celsus, Herophilus and Erasistratus were 
allowed to practice human vivisection upon criminals who had been 
sentenced to death and who were delivered into their hands for this 
purpose by the royal authorities. 862 
Aristotle may have provided the philosophical justification for vivisection by his 
claim that the parts of the corpse do not remain the same as those of a living 
person. Nevertheless, dissection of human beings, either dead or alive, 
860. Vegetti 1998, 74. 
861. Von Staden 1989, 28ff. 
862. Vegetti 1998, 82--83. 
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apparently stopped in Alexandria and elsewhere by the middle of the third 
century. The ban on dissection followed the expulsion from Alexandria of the 
intellectuals, ordered by Ptolemy III Euergetes in the middle of the third century. 
With this social upheaval came a return of the influence of Egyptian and Greek 
religious elements that reestablished theological taboos against entering dead or 
live human bodies. Dissections were not sanctioned again for hundreds of years. 
In the second century C.E., Galen wrote that he still had to rely on animal 
dissection and vivisection, although he recommended to his students that they 
should perhaps break into graves to observe human cadavers.863 
Vegetti reports that outside of Hellenistic medicine, the Egyptian practice 
of mummification might have provided physicians with anatomical knowledge of 
the human body, but if it occurred we have no evidence. Two other factors tell 
against this as a source. One is that the people who prepared the corpses for 
mummification were ''shunned as being tainted and were social outcasts,"864 
suggesting that in Egypt, too, there existed strict social taboos on entering the 
human body. The second is Von Staden's assertion that Alexandrian medicine 
had no intellectual or social contact with Egyptian medicine. 865 
Through most of the first millennium C.E. little is said in the surviving 
literature about dissection of human bodies. Dissection and vivisection of animals 
was common, but not, apparently, of humans. In the Islamic world, similar 
prohibitions were observed. In a commentary on Avicenna, Ibn an-Nafis, a 
863. Vegetti 1998, 83. 
864. Vegetti 1998, 83. 
865. Von Staden 1989, 3ff, 149ff. 
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physician and theologian, in the thirteenth century C.E., said that religious law 
and his "innate love of his neighbor prevented him from performing dissections 
himself." But Gotthard Strohmaier suggests this was for public consumption, 
that an-Nafis's knowledge of anatomy went well beyond the existent texts.866 
In the mid-thirteenth century Roger Bacon wrote a treatise, On the Errors 
of Physicians, in which he condemns them for too much logical argumentation 
and not enough reliance on practical research. 867 During this period and through 
the fifteenth century, medical research was conducted from a variety of 
philosophical views, some pursuing rationalist methods, some empirical. Just 
before Bacon's treatise, an Italian, Mondino de' Liuzzi, published his Anathomia, 
the first study in the Western Middle Ages to describe dissection of a human 
body. 
Jacquart asserts that the church never explicitly forbade dissection of 
human bodies, although there was a papal decree in 1299 threatening 
excommunication for dismembering of a cadaver or boiling pieces of a cadaver 
to remove the flesh form the bone. The decree is thought to have been referring 
not to anatomists but rather to an odd thirteenth century custom of cutting up 
bodies and burying them in different cemeteries. Given de' Liuzzi's treatise, it is 
likely, Jacquart argues, that by this period more researchers were exploring 
human anatomy by dissecting bodies. 868 
866. Strohmaier 1998, 165. 
867. Jacquart 1998, 220. 
868. Jacquart 1998, 224-25. 
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Beginning in the early fourteenth century, dissections occurred with 
increasing frequency. In 1307, reports first appeared in Paris newspapers about 
surgeons announcing public exhibitions of corpses being examined. By the mid­
fourteenth century, dissections and autopsies had apparently become routine, 
with physicians and surgeons jointly conducting officially sanctioned autopsies in 
public and in university halls. 
No one event or social change led to the shift from reliance on animals for 
anatomical information to normalizing human dissection. Jacquart attributes the 
eventual acceptance partly to the growing precision of medical information. 869 It 
would have been a natural progression, he asserts, to proceed with dissections of 
human corpses in the effort to develop more specificity in both treatment and 
research. The normalization was probably speeded up, too, when Galen's 
complete works were finally rediscovered by Western scientists in 1317. Prior to 
this, fragments were in English translation, but the entirety of his reports had for 
centuries been available only in Arabic. The information he provided must have 
prompted investigators to see for themselves whether Galen's claimed 
anatomical descriptions were accurate. 
Another of the currents that probably fed normalization was the late 
fourteenth and early fifteenth century popularity of Avicenna's ''Canon of 
Medicine." Adopted as a standard by medical schools throughout Europe, Spain, 
and the Middle East, the Canon urged investigators not to rely entirely on data 
obtained from pharmacological experimentation on animals. Avicenna said the 
only reliable data was that derived directly from human beings. Jacquart says 
869. Jacquart 1998, 226. 
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one of the factors, too, may have been that university medical teachers 
probably tired of doing work that reminded them of the work done by butchers 
in their markets. They viewed their work as a noble undertaking and may have 
sought to do research that reflected something other than the work of a butcher 
shop. 
All of this probably contributed, but these factors were only part of the 
confluence of events that came together in the early fourteenth century. General 
intellectual and cultural developments encompassed a variety of changes that 
combined to shape emerging values and tradition. It is in the melding of these 
that we find the clearest comparisons to the struggle that is shaping decisions 
about whether and how to intervene with the human genome. 
Medicine, like all institutions, has always had its own culture and 
traditions. These in turn combine with other social, political, and religious values, 
and the amalgam affects everyone's lives. What we consider normal and 
abnormal has been strongly influenced by the practice and culture of medicine. 
Whether we think of a human quality as a cultural construct or an innate 
biological fact is shaped by the definitions of medicine because those definitions 
are determined by a combination of myth, fact, and social realities. For example, 
when we speak of alcoholism today, we are unsure whether to attribute 
causation to moral failure, genetic determinism, social situation, mimicking 
behavior, or some combination of all of these. Sexually transmitted diseases are 
similarly drawn and mental illness even more so given its association with 
everything from moral degeneracy, demon possession, skewed genetics, incest, 
and hormonal imbalance. 
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Understanding the complex of factors that accompanied the emerging 
acceptance of human dissection requires an understanding of the body not as a 
simple biological thing, but as a cultural construct. Some of this construction 
derives from the culture of medicine, some to meanings and values of other parts 
of the larger culture. In Greece and Rome, the classical body was thought of as 
inherently perfect, which was a reflection of its philosophical and artistic 
institutions. The body was described through the prism of those elements. The 
second century C.E. Roman Physician Galen said the body was a flawless 
example of God's universal design, a description he develops partly from his 
participation in the Greek and Roman medical cultures and partly from an 
emerging religious belief.870 The Jewish and Christian traditions generally 
asserted the body is sacred, that it was created by God and continues to fall 
under God's ownership. In Judaism, the covenant between God and the people 
Israel is physically etched in the male body by circumcision. 
Whereas the Hippocratic investigators tried to view the body as a natural 
phenomenon they could understand by the application of various observations 
and procedures, the construction of the body became increasingly complex as 
this mechanistic approach melded with other influences, including Galen's claims 
of divine provenance. Just before the early fourteenth century normalization of 
autopsy in Europe, the church may have abetted the process by its curiosity 
about the extent to which the body reflected divine action. In an Italian account 
870. Galen 1968. This essay, On the Usefulness of the Parts of the Body, was written as a 
criticism of the Epicurean medical sect that disputed claims for the body's perfection of 
design as proof of divine creation. Galen argues their claim was blasphemy and he tries 
to support Plato's belief in the demiurge. He calls his essay a "true hymn of praise to our 
Creator." His assertion provided support for the emerging Christian claim of divine 
creation and ownership. The discussion of this is in Rothman/Marcus/Kiceluk 1995, 17. 
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of the life of Sister Chiara of Montefalco, an Augustinian abbess, Piero 
Camporesi describes an autopsy in 1308 performed on her corpse by four nuns 
who claimed they were looking for anatomical signs of her saintliness: 
Having decided that . . .  it was not proper for that virgin flesh to be 
touched by any man whatsoever, and that her saintly body which had 
been a living temple to the Holy Ghost, should not be contaminated by the 
hands of a barber-surgeon, . . .  four of the number, tucking up their 
sleeves, went into the oratory and with the utmost respect undressed the 
saintly body. Sister Francesca, inexperienced though she was, opened it as 
best she could with a razor. They then began to remove the intestines. She 
noticed that the gall-bladder was white and when she touched it she felt 
inside it three hard objects like stones, which were round in shape and 
together formed a triangle . . . .  As they continued removing the intestines, 
they reached the heart and all saw that it was inordinately large . . . .  and 
placing all the other intestines in an earthenware jar, they buried them 
within the oratory itself where the saint had died, to one side of the altar 
where to this day they are thought to lie.871 
Some time later the sisters talked among themselves, recalling that the Mother 
Abbess had told them Christ had once appeared to her and said he would plant 
the cross in her heart. Their curiosity grew sufficiently excited that one night they 
went to the box, took out the heart, and with a razor made an incision from top 
to bottom. 
The excess of blood was such that they did not at first see what was 
contained therein . . .  then Sister Francesca felt with her finger that in the 
middle of one section there ran a nerve; and when she drew it out, they 
saw to their amazement that it was a cross, formed of flesh, which had 
been ensconced in a cavity of the same shape as the cross. Upon seeing 
this, Sister Margarita began shouting, 'A miracle, a miracle.' . . .  872 
871. Rothman 1995, 37-38. 
872. Rothman 1995, 38. 
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With their mystical fervor peaking, Sister Giovanna suggested that the heart 
might hold still more mysteries and told Sister Francesca to continue her 
inspection: 
And in so doing, she encountered another small nerve standing up in the 
heart, like the Cross; and studying it carefully, they realized that it 
represented the Whip, or Scourge, with which Christ was beaten at the 
Pillar.873 
When news of their discovery reached the Bishop, he gathered a collection of 
judges, doctors, and churchmen, had the heart inspected, and found not just a 
cross and whip, but still more miracles: 
. . .  there were other mysteries of the Passion, to wit the Pillar, the Crown 
of Thorns, the three Nails, the Spear and the Pole with the Sponge, all so 
truly represented that (the Bishop) on touching the point of the Spear and 
the three Nails was pricked by them as thought they had really been of 
iron. At this point everyone was awe-struck and filled with amazement.874 
The discoveries in Sister Chiara's innards continued, of course, until the Holy 
Trinity itself was located, along with blood that for many years afterward would 
boil, 0portentously» during periods of mourning, catastrophe, war, or epidemic. 
If theological justification was needed to assist the gathering momentum 
toward regular employment of human autopsy, the miraculous interior of Sister 
Chiara's mouldering remains may have provided it. That, combined with Galen's 
newly rediscovered descriptions led to a flurry of anatomical investigation. By 
The sixteenth century, the Brussels-born physician and anatomist Andreas 
Vesalius set out to learn with certainty whether Galen's texts accurately 
represented the human body. At first, discrepancies between what he found and 
what Galen said were attributed to changes that occurred in the human body 
873. Rothman 1995, 39. 
874. Rothman 1995, 39. 
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over the intervening centuries.875 In 1543, however, Vesalius published the 
results of his studies in De Humanis Corporis Fabrica, Libri Septem, containing 
hundreds of illustrations and full descriptions. It was the same year that 
Copernicus revealed his new understanding of the heavenly bodies. The 
discoveries set the stage for dramatic changes in scientific inquiry during the 
European Enlightenment. 
A combination of forces led to acceptance of human dissection: time, 
religious discussion, scientific inquiry, and a new conception of the possibilities 
for healing. Earlier repugnance at entering the human body was replaced by the 
practical possibilities it afforded. The body came to be thought of in more 
mechanical terms, a development that came partly because of Vesalius's studies. 
These changes were complemented in the larger culture by the increasing 
conviction that there were orderly laws and causes to all of the universe. 
Divinity's dominion was pushed farther and farther away from the human realm. 
The human heart's imagination had again led humanity to cross one more 
proscribed boundary. 
875. Rothman 1995, 54. 
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Chapter V: Conclusion 
I said in the previous chapter that dramatic shifts in how we think about 
healing and the body were met by arguments similar to those made today against 
genetic intervention. Over time, as the perceived benefits of those shifts became 
apparent, the necessary adjustments were made to the culture's moral image so 
that eventually the old understandings were replaced by others that offered 
seemingly beneficial advantages. This may be merely a process of finding ways to 
justify whatever we want to do. But I think it is more than that. What we found 
were ways to incorporate into our moral and religious sensibilities those changes 
that did not unreasonably alter our view of cherished values. We could have 
continued doing vivisection, perhaps on grounds that the most complete 
understandings could be had by way of that technique. But we did not-not 
because it offered no profit but because it so violated fundamental strictures that 
we set it aside as repugnant. 
Lucretius might say that our crossing these threshholds was a glorious 
example of human courage. Others-Oppenheimer, for example-might say that, 
perhaps, yes, it is courageous, but he would urge caution. For Oppenheimer, 
Lucretius's way of thinking wrongly suggests that the applications of science are 
separate from other considerations, maybe of the heavens, or of some universal 
law that, following Rescher, proscribes crossing certain boundaries. The mistake 
of thinking that scientific work exists apart from other realms, Oppenheimer 
said, led him and his colleagues to become "destroyers of worlds." Daryl Tress 
believes the dilemma of Oppenheimer and of scientific medicine generally has 
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been that both paid too much attention to the technique of their craft and_ too 
little attention to other important values: 
. . .  the persistence of a spiritual dimension in healing in the ancient world seems to have spoken to an important human need for meaning and coherence. This need is generally neglected within the framework of strictly scientific medicine and neglected, too, within the secularist assumptions of modern ethics."876 
Plato warned about this when he said, in reference to the Thracian healers of 
Zalmoxis, Nwho are also said to make men immortal" that "one should not 
attempt to cure the body apart from the soul."877 But this is exactly what was 
being done by Vesalius and other anatomists in their determination to separate 
the mechanical construction of the body from the social and religious 
construction. 
Nussbaum says Vesalius's project may have some of its origin in the 
thinking of Hellenistic physician-philosophers who were wary of Plato's 
apparent belief that the good of medical practice is in some way to be found "out 
there.,, She says the physician-philosophers opposed Platonic methodology 
partly because they were developing a medical conception of philosophy that 
cannot be conceived of as something that looks 'out there' to determine what 
health is; rather, a person's health is good for that person, and a doctor's "aim 
can never be completely separated from the patient's own sense of the better and 
worse. "878 She says they believed Platonism held that "ethical norms are what 
they are quite independently of human beings, human ways of life, human 
876. Tress 2000, 218. 
877. Charmenides 156b-157b. 
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desires. The good is out there . . .  and no wishing of ours . . .  can make it be 
otherwise. "879 
This question is reducible, Nussbaum says, to whether what is good for 
human beings is independent of human desires. As such, it is the same question 
that is repeatedly asked throughout the stories I have described: does humanity 
alone set limits? And if so, where are they; if not, by what are they set; and, 
where are they? 
Given that the questions recur and are implicit in modern concerns, how 
will we know where to get bearings as we develop the new technologies of 
genetic intervention, cloning, and in vitro fertilization? In the past, dilemmas 
related to medicine were resolved by a combination of moral codes, religious 
beliefs, the good of the patient, of the community, and so forth. Those will 
continue to be the source of resolving how we proceed because there is no 
generally agreed-upon and clearly articulated formal theory of the physician­
patient relationship, nor of the community-patient relationship. 
Edmund Pellegrino and David Thomasma say it is difficult to know where 
to turn, partly because it may be only partly helpful to look to the past for 
guidance: the Hippocratic corpus is contradictory and incomplete; our situation 
has changed; oth�r sources are inappropriate for modern application, either 
because they are paternalistic or do not contain a full sense of accountability that 
extends much beyond kindliness. The various professional codes of behavior 
878. Nussbaum 1994, 19. 
879. Nussbaum 1994, 17. 
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have been similarly lacking.880 Yet they argue that medicine is at heart a moral 
enterprise, as well as an ethical endeavor. It is moral because many of its 
functions converge upon one end: Nmaking a decision for a particular person 
who presents himself in need, as a patient, someone bearing distress or 
disease."881 Medicine is a moral activity because it focuses on a right .decision for 
a patient and there are values that should guide decisions. It is with the 
introduction of Nright" and Ngood" that morality becomes a part of the effort. 
Medicine must also be ethical in that the physician's actions ""must have some 
rational justification beyond simple conformity to one or another . . .  code. "882 For 
Pellegrino and Thomasma, ethics becomes involved when morality becomes 
problematic, ""when the validity of beliefs about what is right and good comes 
into question, or when a conflict between opposing moral systems or obligations 
must be resolved."883 But they admit that developing a generally held ethical 
theory will be difficult given the divergence of views held by the various strains 
of moral philosophy. 
The concerns about genetic interventions generally fall into three groups. 
One is that future persons have a right to a genetic inheritance unaltered by 
0intrusive" measures. A second is related to fears that state authority will develop 
coercive measures that either compel participation or otherwise violate privacy. 
The third is that genetic modification is ""playing God." This last is a kind of 
appeal to nature in that it argues there is an identifiable human nature, perhaps 
880. Pellegrino and Thomasma 1981, 201ff. 
881. Pellegrino and Thomasma 1981, 224. 
882. Pellegrino and Thomasma 1981, 224. 
883. Pellegrino and Thomasma 1981, 225. 
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along with a divine teleology, and that by intervening in the interior of genes we 
would violate either the integrity of that nature or some other-imposed 
proscription. It is to this third objection that I will address the remainder of my 
comments. 
The argument that intervention violates either nature's or god's will 
sometimes takes the form of claiming it will be the first in a series of steps 
leading to positive eugenics. To this, others point out that almost any alteration to 
nature, including the use of antibiotics, may be viewed as eugenics. The 
argument from eugenics tends to assume that there is some way to know what 
interventions should be classified as therapy and what as enhancement. 
The argument from nature also employs the concern that the possibility 
for disaster looms if we alter the germ line. Examples of unanticipated 
consequences in medicine are widely known. If the effects of thalidomide had not 
appeared for several generations, the drug might have been employed 
throughout the world-with much larger consequences than occurred. Another 
example sometimes cited is myotonic dystrophy, the most common form of 
dystrophy. It is caused by a gene that grows bigger each time it is inherited, and 
as it grows, the disease worsens, causing more severe effects in later 
generations. The fear is that since this occurs naturally, then our intervention 
might cause other mutations whose problems might not be known for 
generations. This argument encompasses the general concern that there is 
danger that genetic therapies may be employed too quickly if their benefits seem 
too good to pass up. 
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The third concern in the argument from nature is that it threatens the 
.. humanness' we value. This is what Leon Kass fears, that a series of genetic 
changes over generations could alter us in fundamental ways. 884 This rests at 
least partly on the Stoic belief that all of the universe, including human nature, 
operates within a rational framework that is knowable by the application of 
human reasoning. It also sometimes employs an Aristotelian view that human 
flourishing requires that we act toward the peculiar end that is best for human 
beings. And it can call on Aquinas's view that there is a divinely ordered human 
essence and end and that we should pursue one thing rather than another to the 
extent that it does not contravene the divine nature of creation. Kass says 
cloning, for example, stirs an intuition in us that it would violate .... things we 
rightfully hold dear." It represents to us, he asserts, something that would be .... a 
profound defilement of our given nature as pro-creative beings, and of the social 
relations built on this natural ground."885 He seeks to encompass both religious 
and secular views by arguing that the good of human sexual reproduction rests 
on its naturalness, its place in our traditional social systems, and its place in 
evolution. 886 Employing an assertion that these could be endangered by 
unnecessary interventions, he strongly opposes cloning and urges caution in 
other genetic interventions that suggest .... the Frankensteinian hubris to create 
human life and increasingly to control its destiny; man playing God."887 
884. Kass 1998, 20-21, 34ff. Also see Kass 2001. 
885. Kass 2001, 9. 
886. Kass 1998, 13. 
887. Kass 1998, 20. 
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Similarly, during discussion among members of the president's Council on 
Bioethics, William May drew upon Hawthorne's story -rhe Birthmark" to urge 
caution in how we proceed toward the future. In the story, the scientist Aylmer 
unintentionally kills his wife while trying to remove a blemish from her cheek. 
Alymer's intellectual forbearers heralded something new in the world. 
Whereas the ancient Greeks celebrated the human power for knowledge, 
the modern scientist celebrates the powers acquired through knowledge. 
The Greeks recognized that reason crashes against limits-the power of 
fate and death from without and flaws from within. Reason offers us, at 
best, wisdom in the midst of suffering, not relief from its toils. But modern 
science offers the dizzying prospect of the powers which knowledge itself 
can generate to alter human life for the good, the ultimate end of which 
would be to lift the burden of mortality itself. 888 
These various ways of using the argument from nature suggest that the 
problem inherent to it is how we are to define nature, and what tools we will 
employ in arriving at the definition. Given the pluralistic encompassment of 
modern cultures, there are many possibilities for conflict. If human nature is 
merely the chance occurrence of an evolutionary process over time, then it may 
have no normative quality. If it has developed as it has as a result of a teleological 
process or a divine plan, then normative requirements clearly accrue. But even if 
we could decide what human nature is, there is little likelihood, following Hume, 
that we could easily educe what we ought to do. Would we, for example, rely 
upon an intuitionist system to decide? A consequentialist? Communitarian? On 
Joseph Fletcher's account, if humans can exert more control, then more control 
is what we should employ. But Paul Ramsey's demand for constraints on human 
interference would send us in an entirely different direction. Some would assert 
that moral controversies such as this are irresolvable in a pluralistic culture 
888. See http://www.bioethics.gov/meetings/200201/intro.html. 
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because there is no agreed-upon ordering of values. On their account the 
various ideologies will enjoin each other in battle, leaving it to whoever has the 
most power, the greatest resources, the strongest authority to decide which 
ideology prevails. 
However, because there is no algorithm that will produce a rationally 
certain solution does not mean there is no resolution to be had. The pushes and 
pulls that would have us proceed in various possible directions will, over time, 
sort themselves out, and some more or less acceptable way of operating will take 
hold. The interest groups will talk with each other, each bringing its own view of 
moral authority. Certain fundamental beliefs will serve as points of agreement 
from which reasonably satisfactory solutions will ensue. The beliefs employed in 
the solutions will be encompassed by the myriad ways of framing the values I 
listed in the previous section. For example, we will agree that future generations 
need to be protected from the whims of fashion, that people have intrinsic value 
and should not be used solely to benefit others. We will concur about issues 
related to informed consent and that resources be allocated in some roughly 
equitable way. These most basic ethical conditions will allow people with 
different interests to create standards and agreements. Some will maintain 
fundamental differences with whatever solutions are created. There will be some 
techniques and therapies we will not pursue and others that we will. As we 
resolve these difficulties, other issues will arise to focus our concerns. But the 
issues that so now perplex us will finally fade into an admixture of new and old 
elements of our moral image. The new directions we take will further enrich our 
moral image and it in turn will be employed in discussions of the new difficulties. 
Kevin Wildes comes to a similar conclusion in his discussion of ways to resolve 
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moral dilemmas among competing interests. He argues that the solution is to 
employ a system of respect for others and negotiation among groups: 
There will be no general secular view of how genetic therapies ought to be 
used. Indeed, because there are competing views of human nature there 
will be competing views of what constituties health and disease that, in 
turn, yield different views of appropriate medical therapy . . . .  If all 
becomes relative, and neither a canonical ordering of values nor moral 
constraints on human actions can be established, then secular morality 
will be one supported by force, not reason. 889 
Wildes says a moral nexus between moral strangers can result if the competing 
interests are willing to weave a a fabric of mutual respect and the possibility for 
persons to create particular webs of mutual responsibilities through mutual 
agreement. "890 
What I have tried to suggest is that the stories I have discussed, as well as 
many, many others I could have discussed, show the living out of the complexity 
of this system of values that supports the individual living in community. This 
system is what Wildes refers to when he says moral strangers can create a nexus 
by weaving together their competing interests. By employing the narrative of 
ancient stories into this weaving, I am not suggesting that the values of the 
archaic period in Greece are the values of a modern liberal community, but they 
do include foundational elements of our moral image. 
An analysis of literature extending from the Greeks to Toni Morrison 
would provide a more dramatic depiction of the continuous lineage, of Steiner's 
"continuities of the human psyche." The Greeks, along with the foundation 
889. Wildes 1998, 45-46. 
890. Wildes 1998, 46. 
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provided by stories in the Hebraic tradition, were the beginning. We have 
inherited their ideas, changed as they came to us, but they are there, nonetheless, 
with the seeds embedded in them that would develop into our view of being 
human and how to be in relationship with others. Attending to those ideas, as I 
have said, could help us understand at what point in altering ourselves we begin 
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